Daily Report

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CSCE Envoys on Prospects of Conference

AU1403091390 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 9 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Klaus-Dieter Ernst and Guenther Buehring, GDR delegation heads to the Vienna negotiations, by Bo Adam; place and date not given: "We Will Continue in Vienna for Some Time"]

[Text] A few days ago in Vienna, the fifth round of the negotiations on troop reductions and conventional disarmament in Europe, as well as of the parallel negotiations on security and confidence-building measures on our continent, was concluded. BERLINER ZEITUNG had the opportunity to talk to the GDR's two chief negotiators, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst and Ambassador Guenther Buehring, on the state and the prospects of the negotiations in view of the leap-frogging political developments in Europe.

[Adam] How much progress has been achieved in Vienna in the meantime?

[Ernst] I will concentrate on the negotiations on conventional disarmament, in which the 23 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are participating. During the fifth round, standpoints have been brought closer to each other concerning quite a number of problems, for instance concerning the definitions of helicopters, tanks, and planes, without which an agreement would not be possible.

However, essential progress was not achieved in Vienna but in Ottawa. There, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the reduction of their armed forces that are stationed in Europe. Accordingly, the United States and the Soviet Union may have only 195,000 men each stationed in Europe. This would be a quite considerable reduction, in particular on the part of the USSR. For the USSR this means more than halving its forces. In addition, there is the stipulation that the Americans may keep only 30,000 men in the "rest" of Europe. This is a very important question, which was cleared up here in advance and which will be part of an agreement.

Nevertheless, many things remain open. But one may be cautiously optimistic.

Seminar on Doctrines Was a Complete Success

[Buehring] The main event of the conference on security and confidence-building measures, in which all 35 CSCE states participate, was undoubtedly the seminar on military doctrines, which took place recently. There had been some resistance against this seminar—in particular from the Western side.

However, the seminar was a complete success. In which sense? In the sense that the highest-ranking military officials from East and West agreed at least basically that it is not enough to reduce troops and armaments, but that this must be accompanied by a change in the military way of thinking, that is, in the concepts, the deployment plans, and the equipment programs. In the end, they agreed that this seminar should not be a one-time event.

[Adam] While you have been negotiating in Vienna, the political changes in Europe have achieved breathtaking speed. Let us take just the topic of troop reductions and troop withdrawal. Is this not a problem for the negotiations?

[Ernst] Certainly, it is a problem. Of course, at the beginning of the negotiations in March last year we had certain ideas, which no longer correspond with today's political situation. However, I also have to say: The measures that have now been taken unilaterally by the Warsaw Pact states in the field of disarmament, but also the predictable withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSSR—all this is certainly still within the framework that we had originally planned. In detail: Last May, for instance, we proposed that only 570,000 men should be stationed on both sides of Central Europe. The aforementioned reductions would be within this framework, and, under certain circumstances, we would reach the figure 570,000. Thus, we are able to keep pace. Basically, the problem only is that the Western side is not willing to carry out bigger reductions and wants to keep almost 1 million men.

Let us take another example—the upper thresholds for military equipment. On the side of the Warsaw Pact, also in reality, we have not reached the intended number of 20,000 tanks by a long way. And concerning combat planes, the reductions are not going as far as originally intended. Thus, there is still quite a lot to do. But one thing is of course a fact: The basic principle of the negotiations, which we had intended to establish, that is, to establish equal collective upper thresholds for the two alliances—this is now slowly starting to topple because the alliances are simply no longer what they were a year ago. This applies, in particular, to the Warsaw Pact; but, of course, changes are also taking place within NATO. One can certainly imagine a situation—not within the next three or four months, but in the longer term—in which we might establish equal collective upper thresholds between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but with the Warsaw Pact no longer being willing to reach them but remaining below them.

[Adam] Let us go back to the troop strengths. If we proceed from the current state of affairs, the armed forces of a united Germany would amount to about 600,000 men. Such a military power in Europe is hardly compatible with the goals of the Vienna negotiations.

[Ernst] In terms of figures, the number would even be a bit higher. But one thing is clear: However the process of drawing closer together and unification of the two German states takes place, it is neither in the interest of the Germans nor in the interest of the Germans' political surroundings that an army with 600,000 men is established or maintained. Basically, it should be a fundamental condition that in an overall Germany—whatever

it may look like—there must also be some developments in the military area, namely toward a drastic reduction. Twice Germany was armed to the teeth and this was to the detriment of the people in Europe. Upper thresholds must be set for Germany so that this Germany cannot be a danger to anyone. The ideal thing would certainly be a complete demilitarization down to some sort of police troop. However, the ideal thing usually cannot be implemented in politics. But we must be clear about the fact that the size of a future German Army—regardless of what it will look like and what its structure will be—should be between zero and 600,000 and should be closer to zero than to the 600,000, in my view.

Fears About Too Quick a Unification

[Adam] At present, there is a great controversy over the alliance membership of the two states in the process of drawing closer together and unification. The topic will certainly be a focal issue of the "two-plus-four" talks. However, the question also directly affects the Vienna negotiations.

[Buehring] This is, indeed, an extraordinarily complicated matter. I will try to simplify it as far as possible: In the technical negotiations themselves, the question of the drawing together and unification of the two German states is not an issue, either at the meeting of the 23 states or at that of the 35 states. There one expects to continue to see the GDR for some time to come. At the same time, in personal talks one can clearly feel and hear the fear that all this could take place much too quickly and without any control. When a chancellor comes back from Moscow like a drunken rabbit and states: Well, now we will quickly hold these GDR elections, and then in December we will hold all-German elections—this causes some shock to the experts' minds.

The basic idea, the framework that was mapped out in Ottawa for the incorporation of the German issue in the CSCE process is good. In simple terms, the basic idea is as follows: The four and the two meet first to discuss how the questions concerning the future status and membership in an alliance can be settled. Subsequently, a summit of the 35 CSCE states will be held to deal with these issues. As I already stated, the basic idea is good. However, nobody has precise ideas concerning the timetable and the practical implementation. I think it is illusionary to work out a specific timetable according to which there should first be two or three "two-plus-four" meetings. At these meetings, a decision will be adopted that Germany will either belong to NATO or become neutral. Four weeks later, the result will be presented to the CSCE summit, and the statesmen will listen attentively and state afterward: How nice. Thus, the German question has been settled for us. Well, things will certainly not work out this way.

Some people have now seriously thought about how this process can be shaped in a reasonable way. The GDR Foreign Ministry has presented a memorandum that might be helpful. There are also neutral states, such as Austria, for example, that are trying to find a way in which the 35 CSCE states in Vienna can make a useful contribution. They have suggested that, on the sidelines of the Vienna talks, experts should think about the agenda of a possible summit of the 35 CSCE states. The question of the agenda is probably open again because the summit's central issue has changed. So far, everything was clear—the agreement of the 23 states on conventional disarmament was to be adopted. Now the question is whether the German question should be the summit's central issue. This naturally depends on how much progress is achieved by the "two plus four."

[Ernst] I would like to add that all those who are participating in the 23 states' talks are also thinking about a timetable. Most of them believe that if a disarmament agreement is completed this year it should also be adopted the way it is, irrespective of the situation on the German issue. However, if everything becomes irrational, if all reasonable arguments are ultimately discarded, it may happen that the chances for the conclusion of a disarmament agreement this year will diminish. Such an agreement would be based on the existence of the alliances and that of the GDR. Whoever wants to change this will have to draft a completely new agreement.

Ramiz Alia Meets Tirana Workers

AU0803132390 Tirana ATA in English 0857 GMT 8 Mar 90

["The Country's Progress Is Determined by the Decisions Adopted and Realized Jointly by the Party and People"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, March 8 (ATA)—On March 7, in one of the halls of the Palace of Congresses, Comrade Ramiz Alia conducted a warm talk with a group of distinguished workers of various sectors of the economy of the capital. He listened to the workers' opinions on the importance of the orientations and of the decisions of the 9th Plenum of the party Central Committee and for the efforts the working class is making to go deeper and translate into life them resolutely. Through their mature opinions and the experience of the work, the workers laid the stress on the correctness of the party's line and gave valuable opinions to increase the applicative force of the directives in the struggle against bureaucracy and routine. They expressed the unflinching trust to translate into life the party's word because it is the word of the working class itself. It is the life of the people and the future of our country. The party's creativeness in its line and policy, united with the opinion and realising force of the working masses, the workers emphasized, is the firm basis of the monolithic unity of our socialist society.

Comrade Ramiz Alia expressed the special satisfaction he felt and thanked the workers on behalf of the party for the opinions they voiced, the optimism and readiness for the work with novatorism. This, Comrade Ramiz Alia said, is vital for the work of the party and progress of the country, because the workers' opinion is the line of the masses, is democracy in action. Precisely this is the essence of the orientations and of the tasks of the 9th Plenum of the party Central Committee.

Now, Comrade Ramiz Alia emphasized, important is the line of the masses and the democratisation of the country's life which find concrete and real application in all the activity of the social life, in production and administration, in the activity of the party and state power, in the social organisations and in the sphere of culture, in the city and countryside. Formalism and the superficial work fades away the party's directives power, that nourished the harmful psychology of campaigns, are in open opposition with the essence of the demands of the 9th Plenum of the party Central Committee and of the vital interests of the working class and labouring peasantry. [sentence as received]

The working class, Comrade Ramiz underlined, should play better its vanguard role of the struggle for the democratisation of the country's life, to do away with the bureaucratic barriers. It is the decisive force in the whole political and social life of the country, in the development of production and technical progress in struggle for the elevation of the well-being and consolidation of the defence of the homeland.

Further on Comrade Ramiz Alia pointed out that in Albania the problem of independence, national sovereignty and socialism are closely linked with one another. There is no independence and freedom of the homeland without socialism and there is no socialism, no progress to the interest of the broad labouring masses without freedom and independence.

If we say that the life of our people has thoroughly changed and everyday fresh victories are attained, this is precisely linked with the fact that Albania marches ahead resolutely on the road of socialism and that it has been and is a free and sovereign country, that has marched and marches relying on its own efforts. This development and progress is defined by the leading role of the party, the close links with the labouring masses, with the realising force of the decisions it adopts jointly with the people.

Present at this meeting was also the alternate member of the Political Bureau of the party CC [Central Committee] and first secretary of the Tirana District Party Committee, Comrade Pirro Kondi.

USSR Representative Denies Rumors on Rift

AU1303113690 Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian No. 11, 12 Mar 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Is USSR Backing Off From Us?"]

[Text] According to the rumors, the USSR will back off from us on 1 July, when the supply of newsprint will be stopped. Afterward, the supply of oil, natural gas, iron ore, and so forth, will also be stopped.

This rumor was a mystery to Vladimir Cherkas, USSR deputy trade representative in Bulgaria:

"The protocol on trade and payments between our countries was signed in Moscow on 19 January 1990. The volume of the aforementioned goods has been maintained at the 1989 level, while the export of natural gas to Bulgaria will even increase. According to the protocol, the USSR will export to Bulgaria 45,000 tonnes of paper (34,000 tonnes of which will be newsprint), and 11.6 million tonnes of oil. Bulgaria will receive 500 million cubic meters of natural gas more than in 1989. In 1990 we will export to Bulgaria the same amount of electric power, iron ore, and coal as in 1989. According to the precise information I have, up to 4 March 1990 the supplies had been delivered according to the mutually agreed timetable. I myself have not heard that either of the sides has asked for the protocol, which was signed two months ago, to be revised or abolished."

Editorial note: In one of our next issues we shall publish a more detailed interview with the USSR trade representative in Bulgaria, on the problems and state of mutual trade.

Economic Minister Ends Visit to GDR

AU1003173590 Sofia BTA in English 2115 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin, March 9 (BTA Correspondent)—Mr Ivan Tenev, minister of economy and planning of Bulgaria, today completed his two-day visit to the GDR. He was received by Mr Hans Modrow, prime minister of the GDR, and had meetings with Mr Peter-Claus Budich, minister of science and technology, and Mr Kurt Wunsche, minister of justice.

A high assessment was made of the two countries' economic and sci-technical cooperation up to now and the concrete lines were mapped out of the establishment of a new type of economic relations in the near future against the background of the rapidly changing situation in the GDR.

Our cooperation with the GDR now should be quickly adjusted to the realities of the market economy, by which the higher criteria of quality and competitiveness and the interests of the separate enterpises will come to the fore, Minister Ivan Tenev said to the BTA correspondent before leaving Berlin. We should adapt to the new economic conditions in the GDR that will be created after the economic and monetary union with the FRG by restructuring the two countries' interaction, he said. Now the GDR is our second biggest partner of the East European countries, and the FRG is our most important Western partner in trade. I hope that if we continue the traditions of our good relations in future, united Germany will become our second biggest economic partner after the Soviet Union, Mr Ivan Tenev pointed out.

FRG-CSU Economic Experts Advise on Reform

AU1303094790 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 10 Mar 90 p 6

[BTA correspondent Ilyana Bozhilova report: "Consultations For Economic Reform"]

[Text] Sofia, 9 March—Ruediger von Voss, federal executive secretary of the Christian Democratic Union's [CSU] Economic Council and Philipp Graf von Walderdorff, member of the council in charge of European affairs, are visiting our country at the government's invitation for consultations on concepts of the economic reform and the anti-crisis program.

Following talks with Stefan Stoilov, minister of foreign economic relations; Georgi Khadzhikov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations; Ivan Dragnevski, Bulgarian National Bank representative; and with representatives of the Union of Private Producers, the West German specialists also met Belcho Belchev, Council of Ministers deputy chairman and minister of finance.

Their views on the stages and methods of promoting reform and on implementing the program in question to a great extent coincided with the trends hitherto followed by the Bulgarian Government. The visitors paid particular attention to the speed at which the measures in question should be implemented in pointing out that this requirement and the systematic promotion of the complex of measures are likely to play a decisive role for the effectiveness of the measures.

The visitors expressed their categorical opinion that the success of reform depends on the coming free elctions in our country. It should be considered that the quick transition to economic reforms would under all circumstances require financial assistance from abroad and a restructuring of the country's debts and of the foreign capital influx. The CSU representatives think that Western capital would respond to such requirements considering the political stability in Bulgaria and the economic reform that should be proceeding under such conditions.

Questions of bilateral cooperation were also touched upon during the discussions. The idea of creating a joint Bulgarian-FRG chamber of commerce and industry was launched.

FRG ambassador to Bulgaria Karl Walter Lewalter also attended the talks.

Economic Assistance Expected From United Germany

AU0603105490 Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian No. 9, 26 Feb 90 p 1

[Yavor Tsakov commentary: "Fear"]

[Text] Our former ally, with whom we have experienced two national disasters, could now assist the ailing Bulgarian economy. Without being resentful, the patient in question feels concerned once more, at least because he remembers the malicious remark attributed to the French writer Francois Mauriac (who is reported to have said: "I love Germany so much that I hope there will always be two German states.") Despite the fact that the emerging ghost of united Germany is hovering over Europe, the sinister memory of the last German Reich is overshadowed by the hope for more financial credits and technologies.

Regardless of how powerful a united Germany appears to be in the last decade of the 20th century, the Europeans' misgivings are mitigated because the FRG must give up a great deal in order to gain the full confidence, not only of its East European brothers, but also the trust of its Western allies, who are expected to be future partners in the pan-European home.

The reason for our fear of this urgent fusion is certainly based on the misgiving that Germany's reunification might require tremendous financial resources, so that there will not be enough left to rescue us from a third national disaster.

Flaws in East European 'Democracy' Viewed

AU2302213790 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 21 Feb 90

[Captain Ivan Genov article: "The Distorted Face of 'Democracy'"]

[Text] "The witch hunt" of the MacCarthy era and the more recent "bans on certain professions" used to be highly exploited subjects of criticism in commentaries dealing with the situation of human rights in the West. Nowadays, however, this seems to be a topical issue in discussing the East European countries.

Every day approximately 2,000 GDR citizens are emigrating from the GDR to the FRG where they wish to establish their permanent residence. Despite numerous jobs that remain vacant as a result of this emigration, over 50,000 people are unemployed in the GDR today because they were leading cadres of the former ruling party, or employees of the Ministry of State Security that has been eliminated. Many of those who were brutally dismissed from their jobs on these grounds consider themselves fortunate if they can find occupations as janitors or night watchmen. Others are begging for any kind of work by concealing their former party affiliation, while some, having lost all hope, are committing suicide in despair.

In Poland, Lech Walesa, of all people, who experienced the bitter humiliation of political persecutions, denies the right of existence to the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland.

As to Czechoslovakia, many journalists in that country have become victims of the loyalty tests to the "velvet revolution." Certain intentions of reducing the numerous personnel of Czechoslovak Television by one-fifth were recently expressed. Financial difficulties, overstaffing, and other arguments were mentioned as reasons for this action. Nevertheless, it appears that Communist Party membership is the only real cause of the dismissals. Even the Czechoslovak Government expressed some concern about this situation.

In connection with similar cases, a Socialist Party deputy in the Hungarian parliament pointed out that this new "witch hunt" is in contradiction with European political and moral standards.

A wave of unmasking crimes has invaded East Europe. Abuse of power, misappropriation of state resources, and corruption—this is the incomplete list of accusations against the overthrown pro-Stalinist upper crusts in those countries. Unfortunately, however, thirst for revenge, partiality, and opportunism at the expense of legal rights are increasingly prevailing over the quest for justice in those countries. In the noisy and hysterical campaigns the blame for the guilt of former dictators and their cliques is evidently put on the rank-and-file Communists for the purpose of slandering and discrediting their parties and ideas. The fanning of subversive persecutions on ideological grounds inevitably exacerbates the atmosphere of tension and confrontation, it destabilizes the peaceful social atmosphere. Persecution of people for their ideological convictions is incompatible with the ideas of priority for human rights and the people's prosperity, in the name of which the changes in Eastern Europe were initiated. May the distorted face of this kind of "democracy" be just the birthmark of a recently rejected system. In the opposite case, the lofty ideals will remain only beautiful slogans.

Lilov, Zhelev Discount 'Macedonian Question'

AU2202131490 Sofia BTA in English 1209 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia, February 22 (BTA)—I neither understand the motives for raising the so-called "Macedonian question" again nor shall I accept any attempts to actualize it and, what is more, to turn it into a current problem of Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations, BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Supreme Council Chairman Aleksandur Lilov told RABOTNICHESKO DELO.

Mr. Lilov characterized the anti-Bulgarian campaign launched in Yugoslavia in connection with the "Macedonian problem" as a manifestation of an improvident policy and expressed the hope that all political forces in Bulgaria will unite in coming out with a common platform on this question.

Mr. Angel Dimitrov, secretary of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS), expressed the resentment of the BZNS members at the attempt to interfere in Bulgaria's internal affairs. He underlined that there is no "Macedonian minority" in Bulgaria, adding that if some circles in Yugoslavia want to form a Macedonian nationality it is their own business.

We are candidates for the common European home, but we are still going on with "the Balkan syndrome." There are no supporters of "Pan-Macedonian" and "Pan-Serbian" chauvinism among the United Agrarians, Mr. Dimitrov said.

"The Macedonian Problem" is non-existent for us and the attempts to create and fan it up in an artificial way remind of days far gone by, pointed out Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces. Raising the question by the Yugoslav Skupstina is a gross interference in Bulgaria's internal affairs, he said.

But what are the rights of the people with Bulgarian national self-consciousness in Yugoslavia and SR [Socialist Republic] Macedonia, asked the leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, Dr. Petur Dertliev.

Lilov, Lukanov Receive Greek Leader Farakos

AU1303082990 Sofia BTA in English
2305 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 12 (BTA)—Mr Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Supreme Council met today with Mr Grigoris Farakos, secretary general of the CC [Central Committee] of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).

They discussed a wide range of issues, related with the changes in the socialist countries, in Europe and in the world.

Mr Aleksandur Lilov acquainted the guest with the BCP activity for changes in society.

Mr Grigoris Farakos expressed conviction that the Bulgarian people, the BCP and all sociopolitical forces will find the true way towards building of a democratic and humane socialist society.

At a meeting held today between Mr Andrey Lukanov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mr Grigoris Farakos, the Grecian politician was acquainted with the government activity for the preparation of an economic reform and anti-crisis programme.

Mr Andrey Lukanov expressed conviction that the resolution of the grave problems of Bulgaria in the socioeconomic sphere, inherited from the totalitarian regime, require the establishment of a widely represented coalition government.

There was a common conviction that bilateral economic relations need greater flow of investments, more common projects, new border check up points, joint initiatives in transport and other spheres.

The prime minister dwelled on the steps adopted by Bulgaria for development of relations with the European community. Mr Grigoris Farakos expressed conviction that Bulgaro-Grecian economic cooperation will contribute to that.

Meeting With Mladenov

AU1203203690 Sofia BTA in English
1841 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March (BTA) [no date as received]—The leaders of the major Greek parties are considering the idea of a simultaneous withdrawal of the Balkan countries from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. This was revealed today at a meeting between Mr Petur Mladenov, president of the State Council, and Mr Grigorios Farakos, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).

Mr Farakos told his host that Athens is exploring new ideas for the promotion of Balkan cooperation and understanding, including this idea.

Mr Petur Mladenov took a positive view of the idea which he described as "great and interesting".

Mr Mladenov and Mr Farakos agreed that Bulgaro-Greek relations are an important stabilizing factor in the Balkans. They briefed each other on the development of political processes in Bulgaria and Greece. Mr Petur Mladenov said that all political forces here are convinced of the need to preserve what has been achieved in Bulgaro-Greek relations and declared themselves in favor of a further expansion of the mutually advantageous cooperation.

Business Forum Opens in Athens

AU1303205290 Sofia BTA in English
1848 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 13 (BTA Correspondent)—Organized at the initiative of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, another business Forum '90 was opened today in Athens. For three days the representatives of the business circles in Greece and Bulgaria will be discussing the practical possibilities for extending their cooperation in the field of joint companies, trade, banking, tourism, services, etc.

The forum was opened by Mr Theodoros Gamaletsos, minister of commerce of Greece, and Mr Georgi Khadzhikov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations of Bulgaria.

In their dialogue, which is the second one held this year, the business circles of the two countries will look for new

forms of expanding cooperation and lending more stability to their mutually advantageous economic relations. The new economic situation in Bulgaria which is characterized by a liberalization of the economic life, including foreign-trade activity, will help achieve these ends. Bulgaria will welcome Greek investments and supplies of modern equipment along with all other initiatives which would go beyong the conventional forms of trade.

The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and the Commercial Bank of Greece signed a protocol on cooperation. They will cooperate mainly in the sphere of joint investments, stimulating the establishment of joint bulgaro-greek enterprises and the activation of business contacts, contacts with third countries included.

National Hospital in Turkey Eliminated

AU0103105090 Sofia BTA in English 1016 GMT 1 Mar 90

["Turkish Authorities Destroy Bulgarian Cultural Monuments"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 1 (BTA)—Ten days ago the Turkish authorities went ahead with the final elimination of the Evlogi Georgiev Bulgarian Hospital in Istanbul, writes today's RABOTNICHESKO DELO. The feature says that on February 19 part of the equipment was seized and moved to another hospital. Preparations were underway to hold a public auction to rent out the building.

The ambassador of the Republic of Turkey in Sofia was handed a protest note urging for an end to the unjustified action against the hospital and for the return of the seized property.

The hospital was built between 1897 and 1899 with funds raised in a nationwide campaign. It was dedicated at a ceremony on April 23, 1902 which was attended by representatives of the Bulgarian Prince and by official representatives of the Sultan. Permission to build the hospital was granted by a Sultan's firman [decree] in 1896 at the request of the Bulgarian Exarchate [synod].

The hospital's affiliation to the Bulgarian state was manifested by the hoisting of the Bulgarian national flag which was removed on an order from the Turkish authorities in 1952.

In 1937 Turkey delivered a note verbale requesting to buy the site and the building of the hospital from Bulgaria. In 1988, merely a couple of months after the signing of the Belgrade Protocol, the Turkish authorities occupied the hospital, acting illegally and by force.

RABOTNICHESKO DELO recalls that most Bulgarian churches and schools on Turkish territory have been destroyed, and almost all that is left of the numerous Bulgarian real estates in Istanbul, Edirne and Kirklareli is records in the archives.

Filip Ishpekov Meets Al-Qadhdhafi in Tripoli

AU2702221290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2100 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] According to a report from JANA Agency, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the Libyan Revolution, received in Tripoli today Filip Ishpekov, special representative of the State Council chairman and deputy minister of foreign affairs.

During their conversation they discussed bilateral relations. Filip Ishpekov, who until recently served as Bulgarian ambassador in Libya, handed over a letter from Petur Mladenov to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. He also met with the secretary of the People's Bureau for International Relations.

Differences Between U.S. Friendship Societies

AU0203225990 Sofia BTA in English 1918 GMT 2 Mar 90

["Friends of U.S. in Bulgaria Distance Themselves From Bulgaria-USA 104"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 2 (BTA)—The Friends of the U.S. in Bulgaria Association has released an announcement stressing the substantial difference between it and the Bulgaria-USA 104 Independent Club.

The purpose of the Friends of the U.S. in Bulgaria, which is chaired by Mr. Krustan Dyankov, a translator, is to "present the truth about the United States, about the American way of life and about the American civilisation, about their public mechanisms and ethical principles. The association will help an active communication and an exchange of information and views on the future of the world."

The Bulgaria-USA 104 Club is chaired by Mr. Georgi Pirinski, who is deputy chairman of the BCP Supreme Council. The Friends of the U.S. in Bulgaria express readiness to cooperate with any organisation working for the friendship between the two countries' peoples but stress the substantial difference between themselves and the club, which limits its membership to people who have been actively involved in Bulgaro-American relations.

Lukanov, Dzhurov Discuss Cabinet, Army

AU1802155790 Sofia ANTENI in Bulgarian No. 7, 14 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Council of Ministers Chairman Andrey Lukanov and Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense, by Nadezhda Stefanova, ANTENI reporter; place and date not given: "Competent, Able People"]

[Excerpt] We all adapt to democracy and to freedom of thinking, and accept without thinking things that until yesterday would have puzzled us. We put aside our

personal plans and are moved by the roundtable dialogue. We followed with interest the recent parliamentary session, which for the first time took place in three stages. Something changes every day, and among other things, we finally have a new government, completely composed of members of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP]. It will function until the elections. Elected under unusual circumstances and having an extremely brief period in which it must act, its declaration inspired optimism. We hope to see real results of its activity. In those first working days of the new government, two of its members were kind enough to make statements especially for ANTENI readers.

Council of Ministers Chairman Andrey Lukanov.

[Stefanova] Comrade Lukanov, what was your preliminary attitude? Did you use any specific experience in the task of forming the new government—a rather unfamiliar task in our country until now.

[Lukanov] Until the last moment, I had the optimistic feeling that the talks were proceeding well, and I succeeded in creating a form of government with five ministers, members of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, the same number of nonparty members, and the rest—BCP members. Unfortunately, things developed in a different manner and I was unable to present the already complete cabinet at the National Assembly. I had to begin new consultations on forming a new government, composed solely of BCP members. I am happy that the National Assembly approved this government. I think that it is composed of competent and able people who can accomplish what we expect from them in the next few months. I personally think that our tasks, although important, are not too many. They include the elections and the preparation for them; the anti-crisis program and developing a radical economic reform; and third, maintaining Bulgaria's international contacts. The last task means to not allow the interruption of the so-important relations with our foreign partners.

[Stefanova] Nevertheless, how did you cope with the great personal burden of forming the government?

[Lukanov] Frankly, the burden was rather heavy. I could think of something better to do, but at the time I had no choice.

General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense.

[Stefanova] Comrade Dzhurov, we speak of a crisis in the society, is there a crisis in the Army?

[Dzhurov] There is no crisis in the Army. However, the Army is not an isolated system. We are a national subsystem and all social processes, phenomena, and tendencies undoubtedly have a certain influence over the Army. However, I must point out that the military employees understand their responsibility very well.

[Stefanova] In this context, how are the processes of democratization progressing in the Army? After all, there is a military discipline, the one-man-command principle and other specific military factors.

[Dzhurov] Democracy and the processes of democratization have their place in the Army. If you open our newspaper, NARODNA ARMIYA, you will immediately notice this. However, democratization has different directions in the Army. We do not intend to mechanically transfer it from our society.

[Stefanova] Comrade Dzhurov, please allow me a personal question. Recently we saw on television the results of a poll, according to which you are one of the most popular figures. How do you view this?

[Dzhurov] Frankly, I did not see the program, but I saw the results of the poll. This moves me as a man.

[Stefanova] Do you feel the respect and love of the soldiers?

[Dzhurov] I think that those feelings are mutual. [passage omitted]

Resistance to Army Depolitization Viewed

AU1802152390 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Engineer Stefan Zlatev, Colonel (Res) of the Bulgarian People's Army: "Depolitization of Armed Forces"]

[Text] Decree No. 126 of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on creating educational work organs in the Armed Forces was published on 27 January 1990. This decree evoked certain thoughts, and I would like to share some of them.

However, since the aforementioned decree was not the beginning but a consequence of events that took place earlier, it would be appropriate to begin with the events themselves. Immediately after 10 November 1989, the democratic public groups, organizations, and parties, which expressed the spontaneous will of the Bulgarian people to fully eliminate the dictatorship of the single-party totalitarian government, posed the depolitization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces as their basic demands. Under "Armed Forces" they meant all units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Construction Troops, the Railroad Units, the troops of the Committee on Communications and Information, and other departments. It must be pointed out that the demand for depolitization was in fact a demand for deideologization. However, at thousands of spontaneous meetings, the Bulgarian citizens did not distinguish between those two concepts, and for a good reason. Therefore, I shall also use the concept depolitization, despite the fact that if we want to be precise in our definitions, we would have to use the concept "deideologization." The essence of this demand was to eliminate the supremacy of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces, disband the organizations of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the Dimitrov Komsomol, and eliminate the institution of

the political organs, which in essence are BCP organs. All this was aimed at giving a new content to the adjective "People's."

Immediately after its establishment, the Union of Democratic Forces included in its program the demand to resolve and implement within the briefest period of time the elimination of the totalitarian system in the Armed Forces by disbanding, in a categorical and irreversible manner, the party and Komsomol organizations in the Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the other Armed Forces structures, and simultaneously to eliminate the institution of political officers. The Union of Democratic Forces drew attention to the real danger of attempting to impose solutions by military force if the processes of democratization in the country in general, and in the Armed Forces in particular, were delayed.

The party political department of Colonel General Mitkov, head of the Main Political Administration of the Bulgarian People's Army, opposed this demand. On 12 December 1989, NARODNA ARMIYA published the article of Lieutenant General Bratanov, "The Party Organizations in the Army—With Active Social Position." Gen. Bratanov is the deputy of Gen. Mitkov. Apparently, his article was not the expression of a personal position, but the program declaration of a department to which he belongs. Since the readers would hardly be able to find and read the article, I shall quote two of its most interesting passages:

".... Under such circumstances the party organizations and the Communists, including those in the Army, must conduct an aggressive struggle...for unmasking the real face of some of the self-proclaimed "democrats" and "champions" of the "people's well-being." Their tentacles directed toward the Army, must be cut off...."

"....The attempts of certain circles outside the Army and certain military employees to underestimate the role and influence of the party organizations and their proposals to disband those organizations are political extremism and shortsight...."

And yet, on 27 January 1990, demonstrating "political extremism and shortsightedness," the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria with Decree 126 announced the disbandment of the party organizations in the Armed Forces of the country (Article 4 of the decree).

We are glad that the first step toward democratizing the Armed Forces has been made. This is a serious step, especially if one takes into consideration the conditions under which it was made. It appears that the Ministry of Internal Affairs adapted itself more easily toward this step, while the political conservatism of Gen. Mitkov prevailed in the Army. I shall not dwell on the differences in the positions of the two ministries because serious research is needed in this area, and at present I cannot do this. However, I must express the opinion that we could hardly blame Dobri Dzhurov for the conservative position of the Main Political Administration of the Bulgarian People's Army. One or two general conclusions cannot cover the rather complicated relations between the minister on the one hand, and Gens. Mitkov and Velko Palin on the other. The important fact is that in the final analysis realism prevailed, albeit this was expressed literally in a rather delicate manner.

While the decree is rather clear in dealing with banning the creation and existence of organizations of the political parties in the Armed Forces, certain questions and a lack of sufficient clarity exist with regard to the part dealing with the creation and essence of the organs to conduct educational work among the military personnel.

Naturally, the thought emerges whether this is not an attempt to dress old structures in new clothes, or a political machination carried out against the social activity of the Bulgarian people under conditions of the unexpected by the authorities. Is this not an attempt to save the command-bureaucratic institution of the Armed Forces' political organs, which are so dear to certain circles?

Since we cannot imagine that in future, instead of the deputy commanders on political matters we shall see in the Army educators, like those in the kindergartens, the question emerges who will "educate" who and how in the Army, the Interior Ministry services, State Security, and so forth. Will the conservative forces relinquish their positions as powerful masters of the will and convictions of the people in uniforms? Or will we return to the situation that existed 40 years ago, when I was secretly admitted to party ranks because officially it was forbidden to have party organizations in the Army? Where are the guarantees that Decree No. 126 will be or already is implemented?

The questions are rather numerous, and only the near future alone can provide the answers. The past and future declarations of the governmental leaders and their spokesmen merely represent wishes in this cases. This is so because for the time being nobody has the right or the wisdom to serve as the highest instance of the truth.

However, we believe that prudent and educated people with high professional training will prevail in the Army, and that the Army and the other armed units will relieve themselves of the burden of empty words, pretense, dogmatism, and pseudopatriotism, implanted by an institution needed by nobody, and that cost the people dozens of millions of leva and thousands of deformed youth characters.

The implementation of Decree 126 has been entrusted to the relevant ministers and department heads who lead the armed units. Our people believe both Gen. Dobri Dzhurov and Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev. Consequently, grounds exist to believe that the instructions of the State Council related to democratically renewing the moral-psychological state of the soldiers, sergeants, officers, and generals will be implemented consistently and without any blind areas. I used the concept the "moral-psychological state," because this was most severely

damaged by the totalitarian regime after 9 September 1944. Let us hope that we will really have a People's Army, People's Militia, and State Security that will defend the simple working people!

Defense Ministry Spokesman on Counterintelligence

AU1303122490 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, Ministry of National Defense spokesman, by Major Vladi Vladkov and Major Georgi Vuchev, NARODNA ARMIYA reporters; place and date not given: "Let Us Fulfill Our Duty"]

[Excerpts] It is well known that the Army is an organic part of society and that it cannot be isolated from the changes that take place in society. Recently, in the press, radio, and television, in declarations of various sociopolitical organizations, at rallies and processions, and even in the city transport system; competent and not-so-competent people, correctly and not so correctly discuss issues that directly relate to the life and activity of the Bulgarian People's Army. On the basis of our readers' letters, telephone calls, and the direct contacts of our journalists in the units, we see that the soldiers, naturally, are not indifferent toward the Army's problems either. This interest in the Army during the time of glasnost and pluralism is totally understandable.

In order to avoid the arbitrary, and occasionally biased, interpretation of various issues and further clarify changes that have been or are to be effected in the Bulgarian People's Army, representatives of the NARODNA ARMIYA Editorial Board put questions to Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, Ministry of National Defense spokesman. [passage omitted]

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What are the tasks of the organs of Military Counterintelligence under the new conditions?

[Minchev] Military Counterintelligence is a specialized organ of the Ministry of National Defense that deals with the security of the Bulgarian People's Army. All armies throughout the world have similar services.

The comprehensive activity of the Military Intelligence organs is based on the country's Constitution and laws, and the orders and decrees of the minister of national defense and the commander of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army. Their tasks are as follows: to reveal, prevent, and intercept intelligence-subversive activity of foreign organizations, centers, and persons aimed against the security of the Army. Together with the National Intelligence Service [Natsionalnata Sluzhba za Razuznavane] and the National Service for the Defense of the Constitution, they conduct activities aimed at foiling hostile intentions and plans. They struggle against spying, treason, terror, subversion, sabotage, and other acute forms of subversive activity. They work to reveal crimes aimed against the country's defensive capability, and against peace and mankind. They intercept attempts to undermine the soldiers' principles and to influence them to conduct anticonstitutional and other hostile criminal activities. The Military Intelligence organs assist the commanders in protecting state, military, and official secrets and facilitate the increase of the personnel's vigilance. Preventive action is the most important aspect of Military Intelligence work.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Will the regiment commanders receive more rights and financial possibilities?

[Minchev] The regiment commander is the basic figure in our military life. He is personally responsible to more senior commanders, the government, and the people for maintaining the permanent combat and mobilization readiness of his unit (vessel), the state of combat training, education, military discipline, the moral-psychological condition and health of the personnel, maintaining the equipment, arms, and material resources in a state of permanent readiness for use, and the comprehensive supply of the regiment. Those responsible tasks naturally require that the regiment commander have appropriate rights and the necessary financial possibilities. They have been given to him by the statutes, regulations, and charters.

Simultaneously, certain important changes have taken place in our country's economy. They require greater independence in resolving specific financial issues. This presupposes the introduction of changes in the legal documents on the financial activity of the Bulgarian People's Army, through which the prerogatives of the regiment commanders will be expanded; something that will naturally increase their responsibilities.

In the context of the greater financial possibilities of the regiment commanders, we must also note the tendency to decrease the defense budget. This will effect a decrease in the means allocated to our Army. The striving of the General Staff will be to preserve at least the present level of the Bulgarian People's Army units' financial security. Thus, it would be unrealistic to think about expanding the financial possibilities of the commanders at the present stage. [passage omitted]

[NARODNA ARMIYA] An opinion was voiced that Hungary might join NATO. Against this background, what can you say about the future of the Warsaw Pact?

[Minchev] Officially, until now no Warsaw Pact member country has raised the issue of leaving the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, at the recent meetings all allied countries stressed and have continued to stress that they need the Warsaw Pact, and that no allied country intends to leave the pact because the Warsaw Pact guarantees the European borders and is a stabilizing factor in East-West relations. As repeatedly pointed out in the past, the Warsaw Pact will simultaneously cease to exist when NATO ceases to exist.

As for the 4 March statement of Hungarian Minister of Defense Gyula Horn, he himself refuted this opinion by literally saying: "Hungary does not plan any actions that would create tension within the Warsaw Pact...."

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Against the background of the fact that Bulgaria is Warsaw Pact's southern flank, what are the guarantees of Bulgaria's security within the framework of this organization?

[Minchev] The issue has two aspects. On the one hand, Bulgaria guarantees the security of the Warsaw Pact's southern border. On the other hand, our membership in this organization is a guarantee for the Bulgarian people that they have reliable friends and loyal allies, who at a time of a supreme test, will lend a helping hand in every way.

I think that at the present moment Turkey would not resort to a military adventure. Turkey's military leaders are experienced and realistic people. I presume that they are capable of soberly assessing the military-political situation and the consequences of possible rash actions. Unlike certain major political leaders in Turkey, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces is not influenced by the euphoria. However, if despite all this Turkey were to try such an adventure, it is necessary to recall that the Warsaw Pact documents are categorical, and that the Warsaw Pact, as well as the bilateral treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, have not lost their validity and power.

We must rightly understand that under conditions of reasonable defense sufficiency, both the level of arms and the Armed Forces, and the troops' comprehensive training must be such that the Bulgarian People's Army could fulfill its obligations in a worthy manner.

Democrats, Defense Differ on Depolitization

AU0303140990 Sofia BTA in English 2231 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 2 (BTA)—In connection with today's statement by a spokesman for the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) that there were a number of letters and complaints that many military school cadets and enlisted men were being forced to join the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defence released an announcement.

The management of the ministry declares that after the State Council issued its Decree on the Army Depoliticization on February 15, 1990, the operation of the political units and of the BCP branches in the Army was discontinued. "That is why the admission of people as BCP members in the system of the Bulgarian People's Army is absolutely impossible. It does not have units and organisations to effect this admission." The announcement says, the allegation that enlisted men are being admitted in the BCP en masse is still more improbable because they cannot even be signed as members at the BCP branches in the population places where their army units are deployed."

The Ministry of National Defence said it was ready to check the complaints and to inform the public about the results.

At a news conference today Dr. Petur Dertliev, the leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, questioned the real depoliticization of the Army. He stressed that in the forthcoming elections servicemen should vote outside the army units. SDS representatives told the news conference they had unconfirmed information about "compulsory admission of enlisted men as BCP members."

Mladenov's National Day Address

AU0603092290 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 4 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Report on National Day speech by State Council Chairman Petur Mladenov read on 3 March at Sofia's Ivan Vazov Theater marking the 112th anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation from the Ottoman empire]

[Text] State Council Chairman Petur Mladenov read a speech in which he outlined the historical merits and vital impact of our national day on our present and future.

The date 3 March is a landmark in our historical fate, which marks the beginning of the uneven historical road of the Bulgarian people's efforts to unite. This road was full of passions and tests. For decades the foreign forces divided the Bulgarian people on regional, political, ethnic, religious, class, and other bases. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians died on the fronts in the name of Bulgaria and for its national unity. The date 3 March reminds us of the integral and indivisible character of the Bulgarian nations. It appeals for overcoming passions and infighting, whose remnants still exist in our consciousness, the speaker said.

This anniversary of rebirth from the ashes is also a triumph of the universal values that our people succeeded in protecting throughout the cosmic night of slavery, namely, the faith in justice, love for the kin and motherland, thirst for freedom, readiness for self-sacrifice and gratitude for the help and the outstretched hand.

The date 3 March 1990 bridges over the decades. It is a reason for deep thoughts about the road traveled by the Bulgarian state from its liberation until today, and the shocks it has experienced. Faithful issues again emerge today, the most important being the one about the road that Bulgaria will select on the verge of a new era, the era of wisdom and mankind's unification. Will Bulgaria, after 100 years of state experience, marred by sways, extremes, and catastrophes, once and forever embark upon the road of democracy, humanity, and progress, or

will it be drawn again into the muddy whirlpool of egoistic disputes and fatal political quarrels?

This is a question, that cannot be answered by a single declaration, leader, or government. The answer will be determined by our practical deeds. It will depend on whether we are able to build a firm foundation for our motherland's renewal and a real and permanent government of the people. It was to this ideal that legendary fighters for our liberation and great Bulgarians of our most modern and contemporary history devoted their life. Among them there were figures such as Dimitur Blagoev, Georgi Kirkov, Yanko Sakuzov, Nikola Gabrovski, Tsanko Tserkovski, Aleksandur Stamboliyski, Vladimir Zaimov, Nikola Petkov, Asen Zlatarov, Georgi Dimitrov, Traycho Kostov, and many others. The people's and democratic republic was the faith of thousands of the best sons of our nations who fell in the battle for bread and human justice, and against tyranny and fascism.

Today our society is actively fermenting. The liberation of the thought and spirit resulting from the defeat of the authoritarian system released an unprecedented social energy. Today there is no social group or generation that is indifferent to the changes. This is a result not only of the pressing necessity to overcome our country's crisis through a radical political, economic, and legal reform, but also of the Bulgarian people's aspirations toward such a society and system, which will be based on the principles of equality, justice, and defense of human rights. Those principles have been behest to us because of 3 March. They spring from the profound democratic and progressive principle incorporated in the construction of free Bulgaria.

At the same time, the lessons related to our independent existence, full of unexpected turns, clearly warn us: Restructuring of society on a democratic basis is impossible without a profound internal moral restructuring by everyone. The all-national interests must be placed above party, group, and personal interests and considerations.

Otherwise, the danger exists that we will fall into the traps that exist along the road toward the desired democracy—intolerance, violence, and conflicts. This has already happened, and could happen again. It is very easy to repeat the past if we allow ourselves to be led by hatred, if we again divide ourselves into "we" and "they," and if we allow strife and ambitions to prevail over good sense. The dialogue, regardless of how difficult it is, is the only possible outcome, the only road that leads toward the civic society. Any other alternative is unthinkable, the speaker said.

The peaceful transition toward the law-governed and civilized state—this first of all means law and order. This means the conscious participation of everyone with his creative labor in stabilizing the economy and the social situation. The tendency to reject things must give its place to human attention for the views and opinions of the partners, opponents, and various groups and strata of our population. Under the Bulgarian tricolor with the golden lion, there is place for fruitful competition and unity of action on the part of all parties and organizations, ideological and political trends, and all citizens and patriots.

What can be and should be the guarantee of this transition? Nothing else but we ourselves, our people, and our state. We see the guarantee in a National Assembly that is free of petty quarrels, that has been freely elected, and that is intellectually enlightened. We see the guarantee in a competent government that relies on all social and political forces, and in a state power that has been democratically elected, has the necessary prerogatives, is led only by the people's aspirations, and a striving to unite the country.

Mastering the lessons of democracy means mastering new habits of political culture and the art of civilized dialogue. In the process of our democratic development, we should probably understand that in addition to political sympathy and antipathy there is also another attitude that is characteristic of ours—the attitude of reasonably striving toward understanding, compassion, and tolerance of political opponents. We must understand that the wreath of democracy does not consist only of two colors—black and white—but is significantly more picturesque, and thus more attractive.

This must be clearly and categorically understood also by those who have the power, by those who only slowly and with great difficulties rid themselves of the mistakes and deformations that have accumulated throughout the decades, and by those, who in their striving for power, are prepared to deny everything that has been created throughout the decades.

In order to reach our goals, we need determination, consistency, and national consensus, such as the consensus demonstrated by the Bulgarian people in expressing their will to turn 3 March into their national holiday. This is a national consensus in the name of the people's prosperity, the future of our children and grandchildren, and democracy.

In conclusion Petur Mladenov said:

Today, 3 March, we can sincerely say that the ancient Bulgarian people and their wonderful country deserve a worthy fate and future.

To rally and unite in the name of this future—this is the order of our time. The ascent and prosperity of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is impossible without national consensus.

Let Bulgaria, our motherland, and its interests always be the highest ideal that is above everything else!

Parliamentary Commission Session on Past 'Abuses'

AU1303214690 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] The Parliamentary Commission in charge of reviewing and resolving certain urgent problems related to past abuses and breaches of legal norms in our state, economic, and social life held a session on 12 March 1990.

The session was chaired by commission Chairman Rumen Serbezov. A report was read on the progress of the preliminary investigation against Todor Zhivkov. An open letter from parents and close relatives of victims who perished in the air crash at Sofia Airport on 2 August 1988 was also reviewd. The commission proposed to the Chief Prosecutor's Office to examine whether conditions exist for resuming the investigation on the accident considering the special conditions under which it occurred.

A statement submitted to the National Assembly by a group of Bulgarian specialists working in Algeria was also examined by the commission. On this subject, the commission proposed to the Council of Ministers that the legal documents that are now in force concerning the living and working conditions of Bulgarian specialists abroad be reviewed and that new legal regulations likely to provide better guarantees for the rights of such Bulgarian citizens working abroad be adopted.

[passage indistinct on economic and financial problems discussed at the session]

The parliamentary commission examined other questions and submitted the results of its investigations to the competent organs.

Cardiologist Assesses Zhivkov's Health as Good

AU0603105090 Sofia BTA in English 0852 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 6 (BTA)—Todor Zhivkov is in a very good state of health for his age, says Prof. Bernard Maurin of the Northern Cardiological Centre in Paris in an interview for RABOTNICHESKO DELO. Prof. Maurin took part in a consultation of the cardio-vascular condition of the former party leader and head of state, who is remanded in custody. The doctor says that the examination was very thoroughgoing, that clinical tests had been carried out individually by all consultants and, after comparing their findings, they agreed on all points.

A medical consultation which examined Zhivkov's neuropsychological condition on February 27 also found him in sound health.

Daily Reveals New Facts of Zhivkov's 'Betrayal'

AU0503134690 Sofia BTA in English 1312 GMT 5 Mar 90

["New Facts About Zhivkov's Betrayal"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 5 (BTA)—Today's RABOTNICHESKO DELO reveals facts about Zhivkov's suspicious underground activity before September 9, 1944. The author of the publication is Aleksandur Aleksandrov, chairman of the civil committee for the investigation of corruption and power abuse.

The feature gives further evidence eyewitnesses' accounts and documents which show that Zhivkov was an agent-provocateur of the police. After clandestine gatherings of Communists and before guerrilla campaigns, the police used to conduct pogroms against the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. According to many people's accounts the agent of the police was Todor Zhivkov. He betrayed many Communists. He was expelled from the BCP in 1934. But although he had a bad reputation he managed to sneak into the BCP in 1942.

According to Georgi Tsankov, former minister of the interior and member of the Politburo of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP, while in power Zhivkov was afraid that these facts might be revealed and tried to cover them up he destroyed dossiers, rummaged archives, surrounded himself with informers. He kept a sharp eye on the people who knew something about his "underground" activity. Informers told him that Tsankov and General Ivan Buchvarov want to oust him. Soon the aircraft on which the general flew exploded. "Maybe at Zhivkov's order", Tsankov says.

Dr. Vasil Anchev, resistance-fighter and personal friend of Gorunya and Tsolo Krustev who tried to oust Zhivkov, says that the dictator made intrigues among the groups that wanted to unseat him and managed to outwit them, with Khrushchev's help at that. Anchev also says that according to Ivan Andreev, prosecutor at the Chief Prosecutor's Office of Bulgaria, who died several years ago, Zhivkov's pseudonym at the police was the Ram. All who knew it were later killed in different circumstances.

The feature quotes other reminiscences and other people's accounts. The investigation of Zhivkov's betrayals is going on.

Interim Report on Zhivkov Investigation

AU0503191290 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 3 Mar 90 p 6

[BTA report: "At the Commission on Deformations"]

[Text] At its 1 March 1990 session, the Parliamentary Commission was informed by chief prosecutor Evtim Stoimenov on the progress of the investigation of Todor Zhivkov.

A draft, prepared by the Parliamentary Commission and addressed to the Council of Ministers was discussed. It deals with the more efficient and rational utilization of some residences and hunting reservations.

Tips related to the radiation in the country after the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the responsibility of many officials and institutions for misinforming our society were discussed.

According to the decision of the commission, the Chief Prosecutor's Office will be provided with the results of the investigation conducted by the finance and auditing organs that revealed serious violations of financial discipline, the illegal use monies, and cases of corruption and personal benefits on the part of officials at the Radomir Heavy Machine Building Enterprise.

The Parliamentary Commission also discussed a proposal addressed to the National Assembly on the political and civil rehabilitation of the illegally sentenced and repressed political figures of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, as well as nonparty members, victims of the authoritarian regime's arbitrariness, and lawlessness.

A proposal was made to the Supreme Court and the Chief Prosecutor's Office to assess whether conditions exist for reviewing the cases of those sentenced in the so-called "Teksim" trial.

Reference Release on Political Parties Issued

AU2302214990 Sofia BTA in English
1946 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia, February 23 (BTA)—The COURIER Press Service and the BTA " PARALELI" Weekly Magazine have prepared for publication an express release entitled "New Political and Public Forces", which will go on sale on Tuesday, February 27, 1990. The directory is the first attempt to cover the varied Bulgarian political scene today. It lists data on 54 parties, unions, associations, clubs and other organizations which have resumed their activity or have emerged since November 10, 1990.

The brief entries summarize the platforms and the programs of the new sociopolitical forces on the basis of unedited extracts from material delivered to the COURIER Press Service which has laready appeared in the latter's bulleting. The information is free of all comment and reflects soley the views of the organizations which have made it available.

The release has a press run of 50,000 and costs one lev.

Teachers Sign Agreement With Education Ministry

AU2302210590 Sofia BTA in English
1854 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia, February 23 (BTA)—A social agreement was signed here beween the Central Committee of the Bulgaran Teachers Union and the Ministry of National Education to settle schoolteachers' most pressing problems in 1990.

With a view to guaranteeing teachers' employment, pay rates, salaries and social security in the working out of an education development strategy covering the 1991-1995 period, the Ministry of National Education will suggest that the Ministry of Science and Higher Education modify its personnel training plan to meet the actual requirements of the school system. By the end of May the syllabi for the 1990-1991 academic year will be ratified after a wide-ranging grassroots discussion. They will guarantee a stabilization of the educational process. Pre-school child-care establishments, schools and other edutional institutions will switch over to a five-day workweek. The organization and the content of the educational process will not be revised before the end of an academic year. It is suggested to keep the teachers' employment rate unchanged.

The Ministy of National Education will insist that as early as this year the government make arrangements to adjust educationalists' incomes to the cost-of-living index and to lay down a mechanism to update their salaries and pensions. The government will be urged to pay a supplement to the salaries of teachers with overcrowded classes, starting from 1991.

By the end of March 1990 the ministry undertakes to introduce in the government a request that it restore to teachers their pre-1967 right to retirement at age 50 for women with a 20-year length of education service and a age 55 or men with a 25-year length of education service.

Election Law Passed by Federal Assembly

AU0903070190 Prague RUDE PRAVO Special Supplement in Czech 7 Mar 90 pp 1-8

["Law on Elections to the Federal Assembly," passed by the Federal Assembly on 27 February]

[Text] The CSSR Federal Assembly passed this law:

Part One

Fundamental Provisions

Article 1

Elections to the Federal Assembly are held on the basis of a general, equal, and direct right to vote by secret ballot according to the principles of proportional representation in the constituencies.

Article 2

1. All Czechoslovak citizens who by the election day have reached the age of 18 and are present in one of the constituencies on the election day have the right to vote.
2. The right to vote is denied, however, to those citizens who have been legally disqualified as being incompetent of legal deeds or those whose competence is limited (Articles 10 and 499 of the Civil Law No. 40/1964).
3. A legally imposed restriction of personal freedom for the purpose of the protection of a person's health constitutes an impediment to the exercise of the right to vote (Article 5, section 2, (b), Article 9, section 2, (a), and Article 24, Law No. 20/1966 on the people's health care).

Article 3

Every Czechoslovak citizen who has the right to vote and has reached the age of 21 by the day of the election may be elected a deputy of the Federal Assembly.

Part Two

Constituencies

Article 4

Electoral Territory

Elections take place on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Article 5

Electoral Regions

Electoral regions correspond to the political regions (in accordance with Articles 4 to 10, Law No. 36/1960 on the territorial division of the state, and Articles 3 to 5 of the Law of the Slovak National Council No. 130/1970 on the territorial division of the Slovak Socialist Republic) on the date the election is called.

Article 6

State Mandate Number

1. The number of deputies of the People's Chamber elected in the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic and the number of deputies of the People's Chamber elected in the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic will be determined by the Federal Assembly Presidium on basis of the state mandate number. The state mandate number for the election to the People's Chamber will be established by dividing the total number of the population (Article 1), as ascertained on 1 January of the election year, by the constitutionally stipulated number of the deputies of the People's Chamber.
2. In each of the two republics there will be elected as many deputies as the number of times the state mandate number is contained in the above-mentioned total number of the population (Article 1) of each of the two republics. If not all the mandates are assigned in this manner, the remaining mandate will be assigned to the republic showing the greater remainder of the division.
3. The number of deputies of the Chamber of Nations elected in the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic and the number of deputies elected in the territory of Slovak Socialist Republic is stipulated by the constitutional law.

Article 7

Polling Districts

1. Polling districts are formed in communities for the casting of ballots and counting of votes.
2. Polling districts and polling stations for each district will be established by the Council of the Local or, where appropriate, City or Municipal District National Committee (further only "Local National Committee") at least 30 days prior to the election day.
3. A polling district will be formed so as to consist of approximately 1,000 voters. For remote parts of a community an independent polling district may be established if it consists of at least 50 voters.
4. Special polling districts may be established in hospitals, maternity hospitals, sanatoriums, social care institutions, and similar facilities and institutions or parts of such facilities of institutions, but only for at least 100 voters.
5. In detention cells (Articles 75 and 76, Law No. 141/1961 on criminal proceedings), or in remand cells (Article 23, Law No. 40/1974 on the National Security Corps), and in places of imprisonment, custodial sentence, or disciplinary jail sentence, the opportunity to exercise the right to vote will be provided on the basis of a voter's card by the polling district electoral commission of the district in which the facility exists in cooperation with the chief of the appropriate facility.

The size of a polling district according to section 3 does not have to be adhered to in this case. These persons vote on basis of the voter's card they requested in case they do not have their domicile in this district.

In case of arrest (Article 20, Law No. 40/1974 on the National Security Corps) the appropriate member of the National Security Corps acts in such a manner as to enable the person arrested to exercise his or her right to vote.
6. If the elections to the Federal Assembly take place at the same time as elections to other representative bodies, these elections may have common polling districts.

Part Three

Electoral Register and Voter's Cards

Article 8

Entry in the Electoral Register

1. All Czechoslovak citizens with the right to vote will be entered in the electoral register according to their place of permanent residence (Law No. 135/1982 on the record of citizens' residence). Members of the armed forces and armed security corps sharing collective accommodation will be entered in the electoral register of the community in the territory in which the unit to which they are assigned is located. The unit commander, in cooperation with the local national committee of the community of assignment, will immediately notify the local national committee of the place of residence of these members.
2. Citizens who acquire or lose the right to vote upon the completion of the electoral register will be entered in or crossed off the register subsequently.
3. The fact that a citizen is impeded from exercizing his right to vote (Article 2, section 3) must be marked on the electoral register.
4. A Czechoslovak citizen who does not have a place of residence in the territory of the CSSR and appears in the polling station on election day will be entered in the electoral register by the polling district commission. The commission will mark the entry in the electoral register in the citizen's Czechoslovak travel document.
5. A voter may be entered in only one electoral register.

Article 9

Compilation of the Electoral Register

1. Electoral registers are compiled by local national committees according to the polling districts.
2. In the case of members of the armed forces and armed security corps sharing collective accommodation, the local national committee compiles the electoral register on the basis of data provided by the unit commanders. The local national committee will ensure that no polling districts are formed whose electoral registers contain only these members or only persons named in Article 7, section 5.
3. Should the elections to the Federal Assembly take place concurrently with elections to other representative bodies, they may have common electoral registers.

Article 10

Display of Electoral Registers

1. Local national committees will display the electoral registers for public perusal on official premises 30 days prior to the election day at the latest. The committee will inform citizens about the displayed registers according to the local custom.
2. Local national committees in communities with more than 5,000 voters in the electoral register will arrange for the display in each building of the list of voters living in it. The local national committee can take these steps even in communities with fewer than 5,000 voters on the electoral register. This must always be done in the areas of shared accommodation for members of the armed forces and members of the armed security corps.

Article 11

Complaint Proceedings

1. Any citizen may inform the local national committee of errors and irregularities in the electoral register orally or in writing and he may propose a correction. The local national committee is obligated within three days either to make the appropriate correction in the electoral register or inform the citizen in writing why the correction cannot be made.
2. Should the proposal be rejected, the citizen may appeal the decision to the district (municipal district) court responsible for the polling district; the court must decide within three days. The proceedings are governed by the civil laws governing investigation of decisions by other bodies. According to the court ruling, the local national committee and, on the election day, the polling district commission will make the correction in the electoral register. No fee is payable for the court proceedings. No appeal is accepted against the court decision.

Article 12

Voter's Card

1. To voters who will not be able to vote in the polling district in which they are entered in the electoral register, the local national committee will issue, upon request, a voter's card and cross them off the electoral register.
2. The voter's card authorizes the holder to be entered in the electoral register of another polling district for the elections to the People's Chamber. The voter's name may be entered in the electoral register for the elections to the Chamber of Nations on the basis of the voter's card only if his place of residence, or the place of assignment in the case of members of the armed forces or armed security corps sharing common accommodation (Article 8, section 1), authorizes him to vote for that part of the Chamber of Nations deputies, the election of which takes place in that particular polling district.

Part Four

Electoral Bodies

1. Elections to the Federal Assembly are administered by the Central Electoral Commission. In the electoral regions the administration is conducted by Regional Electoral Commissions, which establish district commissions in the district centers.
2. Polling district commissions are established in the polling districts.
3. Any Czechoslovak citizen who has the right to vote and has no restrictions to his right to vote may be a member of an electoral commission. A candidate for election to the Federal Assembly cannot be a member of an electoral commission.
4. Electoral commissions have an equal number of delegated representatives of political parties (Law No. 15/1990 on political parties), political movements (Article 8 of Law No. 15/1990 on political parties), and their coalitions (Article 18, section 8) (further only "political parties"), which submit separate lists of candidates. The names, surnames, and exact addresses of the representatives and substitutes are presented by the political parties to the caller of the first meeting of the electoral commission. The declaration of a list of candidates to be invalid or its withdrawal results in elimination of the representatives of this party from membership in the appropriate electoral commission. In case of illness, other commitments, or expiration of function of a member of an electoral commission, its chairman will call a substitute according to the order determined by the political party.
5. Members of the electoral commissions assume their duty by taking the following oath: "I promise on my honor that I will fulfil my duties conscientiously and impartially and will obey the laws and other legal regulations." The promise is made to the caller of the first meeting of the electoral commission.
6. The electoral commission may make decisions by an absolute majority of votes when more than one-half of its members are present. In case of equality of votes, a motion is turned down.
7. An electoral commission will select its chairman and his deputy from among its members in its first session by drawing lots. Each person holding a function in the electoral commission must be a member of a different political party. The draw for functions in the electoral commission is conducted by its senior member.
8. The recorder of the Central Electoral Commission is named by the CSSR Government. The recorder of the Regional Electoral Commission must be an employee of the Regional National Committee who is named by the secretary of the Regional National Committee in the locality of the commission. The recorder of the District Electoral Committee must be an employee of the District National Committee who is named by the secretary of the appropriate District (Municipal District) National Committee. The recorder of the polling district commission is an employee or an official named by the Council of the Local National Committee. A recorder must be named long enough in advance to enable him to fulfill his duties according to Article 18, section 3; during the electoral commission's sessions, the recorder is a nonvoting member. A recorder also takes the oath cited in section 5.
9. The Central Electoral Commission, Regional Electoral Commissions and their district subcommissions form expert (summarizing) [sumarizacni] departments for the computational processing of the electoral results consisting of employees provided for this purpose by the pertinent state statistical organization. These employees take the oath cited in section 5.

Article 14

Central Electoral Commission

1. Each political party which presents a list of candidates in at least one electoral region will delegate two members and two substitutes to the Central Electoral Commission at least 60 days prior to the election day.
2. The Czechoslovak Premier will call the first session of the Central Electoral Commission within three days after the time limit set in section 1 expires.
3. The task of the Central Electoral Commission is:

a) to enforce electoral legal regulations,
b) to decide on complaints regarding the proceeding by Regional Electoral Commissions and appeals against their decisions,
c) to secure and publish the returns,
d) to pass the record of the returns to the Federal Assembly Presidium,
e) to issue to the elected candidates a certificate of election,
f) to complete other assignments according to this law and other regulations.

Article 15

Regional Electoral Commission

1. Each political party which presents a list of candidates in an electoral region will delegate two members and two substitutes to the Regional Electoral Commission 60 days prior to the election day at the latest.
2. The chairman of the appropriate Regional National Committee will call the first session of the Regional Electoral Commission within three days after the time limit set in section 1 expires.
3. The task of the Regional Electoral Commission is:

a) to enforce electoral legal regulations,
b) to decide on complaints regarding the proceeding by polling district commissions and appeals against their decisions,
c) to discuss and register lists of candidates in the electoral region,
d) to secure the returns in the electoral region,
e) to pass the electoral files for safekeeping to the Regional National Committee,

f) to complete other assignments according to this law and other regulations and, if applicable, fulfil tasks assigned to it by the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 16

District Commision

1. Each political party with a list of candidates registered in this electoral region will delegate one member and one substitute to the District Electoral Commission 30 days prior to the election day at the latest. The chairman of the appropriate District (Municipal District) National Committee will call the first session of the District Electoral Commission.
2. District Commission will:

a) supervise the processing of voting results at the polling districts,
b) should doubts arise, it has the authority to request explanations and additional information from the polling district commission. It will correct obvious errors upon agreement with the polling district commission, or it will request that the polling district commission meet again in order to remove the shortcomings,
c) pass the processed returns for the polling districts within the district to the Regional Electoral Commission.

Article 17

Polling District Commissions

1. Each political party whose list of candidates has been registered in the electoral region of which the polling district is a part has the right to delegate one member and one substitute to the polling district commission as its representative 30 days prior to the election day at the latest. In consideration of the local conditions, the Council of the Local National Committee can appeal to the political parties to delegate to the polling district commissions a larger number of representatives.
2. Polling district commissions must consist of at least three members. Should a political party not delegate their representatives, or as the case may be, more representitives, the Council of the Local National Committee will name members of the polling district commission in their stead.
3. The chairman of the appropriate Local National Committee will call the first session of the polling district commission within three days after the time limit set in section one expires.
4. If the elections to the Federal Assembly are held concurrently with elections to other representative bodies, only one polling district commission will be established in each polling district.
5. A polling district commission will:

a) arrange the actual process of voting, and in particular will supervise the proper casting of ballots. It is also responsible for order in the polling station,
b) count votes and keep a record of the returns, which it will pass immediately onto the appropriate district commission,
c) send other electoral files to the Local National Committee for safekeeping.

Part Five

Processing of Lists of Candidates

Article 18

Lists of Candidates

1. Lists of candidates for the elections to the People's Chamber and to the Chamber of Nations are to be submitted by the political parties. These lists must be submitted to the recorder of the Regional Electoral Commission in two typewritten copies at least 60 days prior to the election day. The political party must enclose with the list:

a) a statement that it has at least 10,000 individual members or
b) in case it does not satisfy the condition under 1 a), a petition demanding that this party should stand for election signed by at least as many authorized voters as the party lacks in individual membership. Each signature can be made only when presenting a personal identification card and must be accompanied by name, surname, address, and birth registration number. The signature is irrevocable. The Regional Electoral Commission may verify the number of members or the data introduced in the petition.

2. If a political party submits a list of candidates in more than one electoral region, it will submit the petition to only one Regional Electoral Commission, but it will refer to it in the other submissions.
3. The recorder will verify that the lists of candidates satisfy the requirements. Should this not be the case, he will indicate the fact to an authorized representative of the political party. The recorder will certify the submission of the list of candidates to the authorized representative of the political party.
4. A list of candidates contains:

a) name of the political party,
b) name, surname, age, occupation, and address of candidates and their sequence on the list expressed in the form of an Arabic numeral,
c) designation of an authorized representative of the political party and two of his substitutes with exact addresses. The candidate can be neither the authorized representative of the political party nor his substitute.

5. In addition to the data in section 4 (b), the political party may mark on the list of candidates their membership in a particular political party, or the lack thereof, or that this is an independent candidate.
6. The largest number of candidates a political party may enter in the list of candidates for elections to the People's

Chamber or to the Chamber of Nations in one electoral region is set in the appendix to this law.
7. The list of candidates must be accompanied by a signed statement by the candidate that he agrees with his nomination, that he did not approve of his name being entered in any other list of candidates, and that he is not aware of any hindrances to his electability.
8. Political parties may agree on the submission of a joint list of candidates. The provisions of this law regarding political parties will be appropriately applied to a coalition thus established. In case of a joint submission of a list of candidates by more than one party, the conditions introduced in section 1, (a) and (b), and section 2 are verified for all the participating parties as if the list were submitted by a single political party.

Article 19

Processing of Lists of Candidates by a Regional Electoral Commission.

1. The regional Electoral Commission verifies the submitted lists of candidates by the deadline of 55 days prior to the election day.
2. The Regional Electoral Commission removes:

a) the name of a candidate whose statement according to Article 18, section 7 is missing.
b) the name of a candidate which appears on the lists of candidates of more than one political party from the list of the party without the statement according to Article 18, section 7. If the candidate signs more than one statement, he will be removed from all the lists of candidates.
c) the names of those candidates which were nominated above the limit set in Article 18, section 6.

3. After the discussion of the nomination, the chairman of the Regional Electoral Commission will send immediately one copy of the list of candidates, together with the declaration of the candidates that they agree with their nomination and with the record on the result of discussion on the list of candidates, to the Central Electoral Commission. The chairman will also issue a report on the results of the discussion to all political parties which have submitted a list of candidates in the electoral region.
4. Having obtained the records on the results of the discussion of the lists of candidates from the electoral region produced by the Central Electoral Commission, the Regional Electoral Commission will register, at least 45 days prior to election day, the lists of candidates as being valid and will announce this fact to the political parties. The registration is a condition for the reproduction of the lists of candidates.

Article 20

Discussion of Lists of Candidates By the Central Electoral Commission

1. The Central Electoral Commission will discuss the lists of candidates at least 50 days prior to election day. The resolutions of the Regional Electoral Commissions will be checked and errors found in the lists of candidates will be removed.
2. If some of the candidates appear on several lists of candidates, the Central Electoral Commission will strike him out from all lists of candidates.
3. If lists of candidates submitted apparently by the same political party are marked differently in different electoral regions, the chairman will invite the party's representative to announce a uniform designation for all the electoral regions no later than the end of session of the Central Electoral Commission. If the representative fails to do so, the designation will be decided by the Central Electoral Commission.
4. Further, the Central Electoral Commission will draw a number which will be used to uniformly designate the lists of candidates to the Federal Assembly of each political party which submitted a list of candidates. The laws related to the elections to National Councils may specify that this number be also valid for designating these parties' lists of candidates to the National Councils, provided these elections are being held simultaneously. In such case the draw will take place with the participation of representatives of the relevant republican Central Electoral Commissions.
5. The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission will immediately send a record of the results of the discussion to the Regional Electoral Commissions and to the political parties which run in the elections. The result of the draw will be announced in such a way that it becomes general knowledge.

Article 21

Relinquishing and Recalling Nomination

1. The candidate can relinquish his nomination in writing 48 hours prior to elections. An authorized representative of a political party can recall the candidate's nomination in the same manner within the same deadline. The declaration of a candidate's resignation or recalling cannot be reversed and must be delivered in two copies to the chairman of the Regional Electoral Commission, who will send one copy immediately to the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, who will also ensure its publication in an appropriate manner.
2. If such a declaration is made after the registration, the data on the candidate will remain on the list of candidates but this candidate will be disregarded when allocating the mandates.

Article 22

Reproduction of Lists of Candidates

1. The chairman of the Regional Electoral Commission will ensure, through the relevant Regional National Committee or District National Committee respectively, the reproduction of the registered lists of candidates in print, while indicating the number drawn, the party name, and the name of all the candidates and their order.

2. Each list of candidates is to be reproduced in the form of a ballot in such a way that all the lists for the elections to the same chamber of the Federal Assembly are printed in identical font of identical size, on paper of identical color, quality, and size. The ballots bear the stamp of the Regional Electoral Commission and are to be issued in such quantity that even voters with voter's cards will be able to cast the ballot without obstacles.
3. The chairman of the Regional Electoral Commission will send the lists of candidates (ballots) reproduced in this way to the chairmen of Local National Committees who will ensure their delivery to all voters at least three days prior to election date and, on the election day, to the Polling District Commissions.

Division 2 [as published; no division one specified in document]

Preparation of the Elections

Article 23

Election Day

1. The elections to the Federal Assembly are to be held on the entire CSSR territory on the same day. The Presidium of the Federal Assembly may determine that the elections be held over a period of two days.
2. The Presidium of the Federal Assembly calls the elections to the Federal Assembly and determines the election date no later than 90 days prior to election date. The resolution of the Presidium of the Federal Assembly is to be published in the Legal Gazette.
3. The elections are to be held on the given date from 0700 to 1800 hours. If local conditions require so, the Council of the Local National Committee may set the beginning of the election for an earlier hour.
4. If the elections are held over a period of two days, the beginning is set for 1400 and the end for 2000 hours of the first day. The next day the elections begin at 0700 and end at 1400 hours. If local conditions require so, the Council of the Local National Committee may set the beginning of the election for an earlier hour.

Article 24

Availability of Information to Voters

1. Not later than 15 days prior to the elections, the Local National Committee will announce, in a manner customary for the locality, the date and place where the elections are to be held. If several polling districts have been established on the territory of the community, the National Committee will designate which parts of the community, or units (Article 8, section 1) or facilities (Article 7, section 5) belong to individual polling districts. In a public notice, the Local National Committee will stress the obligation of voters to carry identity cards and will provide additional information needed for an undisturbed course of the elections.
2. In communities with more than 5,000 people registered on the list of voters, the Local National Committee will ensure a polling card for each voter, in which necessary data on the elections will be entered. At the same time, it will ensure that the polling card is delivered to the voter's apartment. The Local National Committee may determine that the same procedure be applied in communities where fewer than 5,000 voters are registered.

Article 25

Preparations Inside Polling Station

1. Before the elections are opened, the chairman of the Polling District Commission, in the presence of the commission, will inspect the ballot box, or the portable ballot box, and will seal it. He will also check how the polling station is equipped and whether the list of voters and a sufficient number of ballots are prepared.
2. If the elections are held over a period of two days, the chairman of the Polling District Commission will ensure that the ballot box, or portable ballot box, is sealed in such a way [following the elections] that the insertion of ballots is rendered impossible and will store it safely together with other electoral documents.

Article 26

Premises Designed for Marking Ballots

Within the polling stations, special areas are to be designated for marking the ballots, separated in a way guaranteeing the secrecy of voting. The number of these areas will be determined by the Local National Committee Council while taking into account the number of voters in the polling district. With the exception of instances cited in Article 29, section 5, no one, not even a member of the Polling District Commission, may be present in those areas together with the voter.

Division 3

Election Campaign

Article 27

1. For the purpose of this Law, the period of the election campaign is understood to be the period starting 40 days and ending 48 hours prior to the beginning of the elections.
2. During the election campaign each political party running individually in the elections has equal access to the state public information media. During the election campaign, every party running in the elections will be given a total of four hours in radio and TV broadcasts. The broadcast times and their allocation must correspond to the principle of equality of political parties running in the elections.
3. If the Local National Committee makes space available for putting up election posters, then the utilization of this space must correspond to the principle of equality of political parties running in the elections.
4. Within 48 hours prior to the opening of the elections and during the election day it is forbidden for political parties to campaign verbally, in writing, and using sound

or pictures. This ban applies to state-run public information media, buildings where Polling District Commissions are located, and their vicinity. The publishing of results of pre-election opinion polls is not allowed within seven days prior to election day.
5. Members of electoral commissions and workers in their expert bodies must not provide any information on the progress and partial results of the elections before signing the record on the election results.
6. During the elections and up to their conclusion, it is prohibited to publish the results of election polls.

Part Six

Voting

Article 28

Beginning of Voting

After carrying out an inspection in accordance with Article 25, section 1, the chairman of the Polling District Commission will declare, with the approval of the commission, the elections opened. The chairman and members of the commission are to be the first to cast their votes.

Article 29

Voting

1. The voter will cast his vote in person. No one must stand proxy for him. Members of the Polling District Commission must not amend the voters' ballots. Voters will step before the Polling District Commission and cast their votes in the sequence in which they arrived in the polling station.
2. After his arrival in the polling station, the voter will surrender his polling card and, after being recorded in both duplicates of the voters' register, will receive from the commission an empty envelope provided with an official stamp. These envelopes must not be transparent and must be of equal size, quality, and color. If the voter does not have a polling card and is not known to any member of the polling commission, the commission will request proof of his identity. If he is unable to do so by the end of the period of voting, by means of an identity card or the testimony of two persons who are known to the commission, he will not be permitted to cast a vote. At the voter's request, the Polling District Commission will replace ballots that are missing, scratched, or otherwise marked.
3. The name of a voter who arrives in the polling station with his polling card is to be entered in the voters' register by the Polling District Commission. The entry is to be confirmed by the signature of the chairman and two members of the commission; the polling card is to be attached to the first duplicate of the voters' register. The commission will then present to the voter ballots for the elections to the People's Chamber. A voter whose place of residence entitles him to participate in the election of that part of Chamber of Nations deputies and whose election takes place in the electoral district in which his name was added to the voters' register, will receive from the Polling District Commission also the ballots for elections to this chamber.
4. After receiving the ballots and the official envelope, the voter will enter the area designated for this purpose (Article 26) where he will insert into the official envelope one ballot for the election of each chamber. With every ballot inserted into the envelope, he may indicate, by circling the serial number of a maximum of four candidates, to which candidate he gives his preferential vote. No other alterations to the ballot may be made. The voter will deposit all the other ballots in a box designated for this purpose which is located in a separate area.
5. A voter who is unable to mark the ballot on his own, for reasons of physical handicap or because he cannot read or write, has the right to be accompanied into the area designated for marking the ballots by another voter so that this voter may mark the ballot for him, according to his instructions, and insert it into the envelope.
6. The voter casts his vote so that, after leaving the area designated for marking the ballots, he casts the official envelope into the ballot box in front of the polling commission. The commission will not permit a voter to cast his vote if he does not depart for the designated area [before marking the ballot]. This applies also to voting in special polling districts (Article 7, section 4), with due regard for the conditions in which voting takes place.

Article 30

Order in the Polling Station and its Immediate Surroundings

The chairman of the Polling District Commission is responsible for order in the polling station and its immediate surroundings. His instructions concerning the maintenance of order in the polling station and a dignified course of voting are binding for everyone present.

Article 31

Interruption of Voting

If circumstances make it impossible to start voting, to continue it, or if they compel its termination, the Polling District Commission may, on the basis of an agreement with the Regional Electoral Commission, delay the start of voting or extend the period of voting. However, the total period of voting (Article 23) must not be shortened by this measure. The Polling District Commission will make known such a measure by such a method as is customary in the given locality. If the voting is interrupted, the Polling District Commission will seal the electoral documents and the ballot box. After the resumption of voting, the chairman verifies, in the presence of the commission, that the seal is intact and records this fact in the report on the course of voting.

Article 32

Conclusion of Voting

Once the hour set for ending the elections is complete, the polling station is deemed closed. However, prior to this, all those who are in the polling station or in front of it will cast their vote. The chairman of the Polling District Commission will then declare the voting concluded.

Part Seven

Ascertaining and Declaring the Election Results

Article 33

Who May Be Present When Votes Are Counted

Members of the higher level electoral commissions, members of its expert units, and persons who have received authorization from the Central Electoral Commission may be present in the room in which the Polling District Commission counts the votes.

Article 34

Counting of Votes by the Polling District Commission

1. Once the voting is concluded, the chairman of the Polling District Commission will have the special box for depositing ballots (Article 29, section 4) and have the remaining unused ballots and envelopes sealed and, subsequently will have the ballot box opened. If the Polling District Commission has made use of a portable ballot box as well—at the explicit request of individual voters or in harmony with Article 7, section 5—the commission will mix the contents of the two boxes as soon as they are opened.
2. The Polling District Commission will remove the envelopes with ballots from the ballot box, count the official envelopes, and will compare the number of envelopes with the record in the voter's register. The commission will disqualify all unofficial envelopes.
3. The Polling District Commission will sort and count the ballots cast for individual parties, separately for the election to the People's Chamber, and separately for the election to the Chamber of Nations, as soon as they are removed from the official envelopes. In doing so it will eliminate all invalid ballots. Further, it will determine how many voters of the political party utilized the right of preferential vote, and will count all the preferential votes for individual candidates.
4. Each member of the Polling District Commission may look at the ballots. The chairman of the Polling District Commission will supervise regularity in the vote counting.

Article 35

Ballots Review

1. Even ballots with names of candidates removed, added, or altered, count for the list of candidates of the political party. Such alterations are ignored. If the voter gives on his ballot preferential votes to more than four candidates, the ballot is counted in favor of the political party; however, the preferential votes are disregarded.
2. Ballots which are not on the proper form are invalid. If the envelope contains several lists of candidates of various political parties for the election to the same chamber, all these votes are deemed invalid with respect to the election to this chamber. The vote is valid if the voter has cast his envelope with a ballot only for the election to one of the chambers. If the envelope contains more ballots of the same political party for elections to the same chamber, they count as one vote; if one ballot has a preferential vote indicated, this ballot or a ballot with more preferential votes is considered.
3. The Polling District Commission will make the final decision regarding the validity of the envelope, ballot, and preferential votes.

Article 36

Polling District Record of the Voting

1. The Polling District Commission will prepare two typed copies of the electoral proceedings and will return records separately for each Chamber of the Federal Assembly. The record is to be signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, and other members of the commission. Reasons to refuse a signature are to be recorded.
2. The electoral proceedings and returns record prepared by the Polling District Commission must contain:

a) the time of the opening and closing of the polls, and, if applicable, any interruptions,
b) the total number of persons in the polling district entered in the voters' register,
c) the number of voters who were given official envelopes,
d) the number of official envelopes submitted,
e) the number of valid votes cast for each list of candidates,
f) the number of voters of a political party who utilized the right of preferential vote,
g) the number of valid preferential votes cast for individual candidates according to the lists of candidates,
h) a brief summary of statements and complaints which have been made to the Polling District Commission, decisions made by the commission, and, concisely, the grounds for them.

3. In order to record the data according to section 2, (g), the commission will use the necessary number of ballots not used in the elections which, after the elections, the chairman explicitly assigned to this purpose in the presence of the commission.

Article 37

End of Proceedings in the Polling District Commission

1. After the vote count and signing of records of the electoral proceeding and returns, the chairman of the Polling District Commission will announce the results,

and he will send immediately one of the copies of the record to the district commission and will await its instruction to cease activities.
2. The Polling District Commission will seal the ballots cast, the official envelopes, and voters' registers, and will pass them, together with other electoral materials, to the Local National Committee for safekeeping.

Article 38

Presence During the Proceedings of the District Commission

Only members of higher level commissions and workers of the expert units may be present in the room where the district commissions process the returns of the Polling District Commissions.

Article 39

Vote Counting in Regional Electoral Commission

1. Regional Electoral Commission will count the votes and obtain the returns from the entire region on basis of the records of proceedings and returns provided by the Polling District Commissions.
2. Only members of the Central Electoral Commission and workers of the expert units may be present in the room where the Regional Electoral Commission counts the votes and processes the returns.

Article 40

Regional Electoral Commission Record

1. The Regional Electoral Commission will prepare two typed copies of the record of returns in the electoral region, separately for each Chamber of the Federal Assembly. The record is to be signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, and other members of the commission. Reasons to refuse a signature are to be recorded.
2. The following items have to be listed in the regional electoral commission's record of voting results:

a) the number of electoral polling districts in the electoral region and the number of polling district commissions which sent voting results;
b) the number of people registered on the voter's list in the electoral region ;
c) the number of voters to whom official envelopes were issued;
d) the number of official envelopes that were returned;
e) the number of valid votes cast for each list of candidates;
f) the number of voters for a political party who exercised their right to a preferential vote;
g) the number of valid preferential votes cast for individual candidates in conformity with the list of candidates;
h) a summary of statements and complaints handed to the regional electoral commission; a summary of the decisions made by the commission and a brief explanation of them.

3. After signing both duplicates of the records of the voting results, the chairman will send one duplicate without delay to the central electoral commission. The other election documents will be sent to the appropriate national committee for safekeeping.

Article 41

Determining the Number of Deputies Elected in Electoral Regions

1. The central electoral commission will review the regional electoral commissions' records and, according to them, will ascertain the total number of valid votes cast for all candidate lists in each electoral region in the Czech Socialist Republic and in the Slovak Socialist Republic. This will be carried out separately for the elections to each chamber. This data will be divided by the number of mandates, which,—on the basis of the state mandate number (Article 6) or of a constitutional regulation as in the case of the Chamber of People—were assigned to the republic. The number calculated in this way and rounded off into units is the republican mandate number.
2. The total number of valid votes cast in each electoral region is divided by the republican mandate number. The overall number calculated this way is the number of mandates which is granted to individual electoral regions.
3. If all the mandates granted to the Czech Socialist Republic or to the Slovak Socialist Republic are not divided in such a way, the central electoral commission will gradually allocate these mandates in the republic to the electoral regions that boast the largest number of remaining votes. A ballot will decide the number of the remaining votes.

Article 42

The Political Parties' Progress Toward the First Count

1. The central electoral commission will ascertain how many valid votes were cast overall for each political party within the framework of the Czech Socialist Republic and within the framework of the Slovak Socialist Republic. This will be carried out separately for the elections to each chamber. It will ascertain which political parties have gained less than five percent of the overall number of valid votes cast within the framework of the Czech Socialist Republic or within the framework of the Slovak Socialist Republic.

When ascertaining the election results and allocating the mandates, it will disregard these political parties and the votes cast for them. If a political party has submitted candidate lists in the Czech Socialist Republic and in the Slovak Socialist Republic, it is enough if the party gains five percent in one of the republics.
2. The other political parties will proceed to the first count in which mandates will be divided within the framework of the electoral regions.

Article 43

The First Count

1. The number of valid votes cast in an electoral region for the political parties which advanced to the first count will be divided by the number of mandates allocated to this electoral region (Article 41) increased by one; the overall number worked out by this method and rounded off into units is the regional electoral number.
2. The overall number of valid votes obtained by a political party within the framework of an electoral region will be divided by the regional electoral number and the political party will be allotted as many mandates as the number of times the regional ... number is contained [tolik mandatu, kolikrat je krajske ... cislo obsazeno] in the overall number of valid votes gained by this political party.
3. Within the framework of individual political parties, candidates will obtain mandates allotted to the party according to the order in which they come on the ballot. However, if at least one tenth of the total number of voters—who in an electoral region returned a valid vote for a political party—has exercised its right to a preferential vote, the candidate who has gained more than a 50 percent majority of the voters' votes for this political party—the voters who exercised their right to a preferential vote—will obtain the mandate first of all. If a political party is allotted more mandates and more candidates have fulfilled this condition described in the preceding sentence, candidates will obtain mandates in order according to the largest number of preferential votes gained. If the number of preferential votes is equal, the order on the ballot will be decisive.
4. If a political party did not put forward as many candidates as it is entitled to, according to the results of the first count, this party will only obtain as many mandates as it has candidates.

Article 44

Second Count

1. All the mandates which were not assigned in the first count in the Czech Socialist Republic or Slovak Socialist Republic, will be assigned by the Central Electoral Commission in the second count. The remainder of the votes cast for individual political parties will be transferred into the second count in the Czech Socialist Republic or in the Slovak Socialist Republic. If a party failed to obtain a single mandate in the first count, then all votes in its favor will be used in the second count.
2. Before beginning the second count, at the latest, members of the Central Electoral Commission will hand over the lists of candidates of their political parties to its chairman, separately for the Czech Socialist Republic and for the Slovak Socialist Republic. The number of candidates on these lists of candidates is not limited; the political party, however, can put on these lists only the names of those candidates who were fielded in some electoral region of the pertinent republic and who were not elected in the first count. After submitting the lists of candidates, neither the candidates' names nor the order in which they are entered in the list of candidates may be changed.
3. In the second count, the Central Electoral Commission will add up the remaining votes for individual political parties in the Czech Socialist Republic and in the Slovak Socialist Republic and for each of the Chambers. This total will be divided by the number of mandates that remain to be filled in the pertinent republic increased by one. The number resulting from the division and rounded to an integer is the election number [volebni cislo] of the republic. On this basis, each political party will be assigned as many mandates in the pertinent republic as the number of times the election number of the republic is contained in the sum total of the remaining votes cast for this political party.
4. If all mandates are not filled in this manner, or if a political party announced fewer candidates than it is entitled to, the Central Electoral Commission will assign these mandates sequentially to those political parties which submitted valid lists of candidates in the pertinent republic and which show the largest remainder after division. If the remainders are equal, the mandate will be assigned to the party which has a larger sum of remainders in the second count. If these sums of remainders are equal, the mandate will be assigned to the party which obtained more votes in the Czech Socialist Republic and in the Slovak Socialist Republic; if the number of votes is equal then the draw will decide.
5. If the number of assigned mandates exceeds by one the number of mandates that were to be assigned, then the surplus mandate will be taken from the party which showed the smallest remainder after division in the second count; if these remainders are equal, then the smaller number of votes in the electoral regions within the republic will decide; if these numbers are also equal, then the draw will decide.
6. Within the framework of individual parties, the candidates will obtain the mandates assigned to a party in the order in which they are entered on the list of candidates for the second count.
7. Candidates who obtained a mandate neither in the first nor in the second count will become substitutes.

Article 45

Records of Central Electoral Commission and Publication of Election Results

1. After the first and second counts, the Central Electoral Commission will make an official record concerning the election results, separately for each Chamber of the Federal Assembly. The records will be signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, and remaining members of the commission.
2. The election records will contain the following information:

a) total number of persons entered in the voters' register;
b) total number of voters who were issued official envelopes;

c) number of valid votes cast for every list of candidates, separately in the Czech Socialist Republic and in the Slovak Socialist Republic and separately for individual electoral regions.
d) names of candidates who were elected from individual lists of candidates in the first count, including data on the results of preferential voting; candidates elected in the second count; as well as candidates who have become substitutes.

3. The Central Electoral Commission will publish the results of the elections to the People's Chamber and the Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly immediately after signing the records on election results in individual regions. It can also publish partial results, in which data given in section 2 (a) to (c) will be introduced.

Article 46

Certificate of Election

The Central Electoral Commission will issue to the candidates elected for deputies a Certificate of Election.

Article 47

Electoral Complaint

1. Complaint about the issue of election certificate according to Article 46 can be filed by any citizen whose name is in the voters' register in the polling district in which the deputy was elected, as well as by any political party which submitted a list of candidates in this electoral region. All complaints must be substantiated. A complaint must be submitted in writing to the CSSR Supreme Court within 10 days after the publication of electoral returns.
2. The CSSR Supreme Court will hear the complaint within 10 days in a tribunal consisting of a chairman and two judges. Czechoslovak civil court regulations regarding investigation of a decision of other bodies are appropriately applied.
3. No appeal is possible against the decree of the CSSR Supreme Court regarding a complaint.
4. The CSSR Supreme Court will send a decision containing its expert opinion to the Federal Assembly Presidium which will pass it onto the appropriate chamber.

Article 48

Arrangements for Execution of Supplementary Elections

If, for whatever reason, proper elections in one electoral region, according to this law, did not take place entirely or in part, the Federal Assembly will take the necessary steps, within a week of publication of returns at the latest, that the elections are complemented or held anew— in this case, the set deadlines may be shortened as appropriate.

Article 49

Succession of Substitutes

1. If a mandate in one of the chambers is vacated, a substitute from the same political party will succeed the position, according to the sequence on the list of candidates for elections in the electoral region in which the deputy whose mandate is vacant was nominated. If such a substitute is not available, a substitute of the same political party will succeed to the mandate, according to the sequence on the list of candidates for election to the People's Chamber, or to the appropriate part of the Chamber of Nations, for the second count.
2. Should there be no substitute from the same party, the mandate will remain vacant until the end of the term.
3. Succession of a substitute will be announced by the Federal Assembly within 15 days after a mandate is vacated. It will issue the substitute a certificate stating that he became a deputy and when the nomination takes effect and, at the same time, it will inform the presidium of the appropriate chamber.

Part Eight

Arrangements for Holding Elections

Article 50

Securing Auxiliary Facilities

1. Appropriate Local National Committees will secure for the polling district commissions all auxiliary facilities, especially polling stations and their equipment, official envelopes, and auxiliary help.
2. District National Committees will secure all auxiliary facilities for the District Commissions and Regional National Committees located at the appropriate electoral commission will secure them for the Regional Electoral Commissions.

Article 51

Cooperation of Other Citizens and Organizations

1. All state bodies and all organizations are obliged to take part in the implementation of this law.
2. Organizations or persons involved in the printing enterprise are obliged, upon request by the bodies ensuring the assignments according to this law, to assure that the lists of candidates, polling cards, voter's cards, and all the other necessary official forms are properly duplicated on time.

Article 52

Claims of Electoral Commission Members

The office of an Electoral Commission member is an honorary duty. The commission member must not be deprived of any rights and claims stemming from his employment or occupation. In particular, he has the right to paid leave of absence (Bulletin of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs No. 236/1988 on

other tasks in public interest; Government Decree No. 12/1968 on adjustments of awards and reimbursements, and some other matters of national committee deputies and national committee commission and caucus members in the wording of more recent regulations.)

Article 53

Claims of Candidates

1. The candidate has the right to a leave of absence provided by his employer (or equivalent) from the day following the day of registration of the list of candidates on which he is entered to the day prior to the election day.
2. The employer will reimburse the candidate for lost wages if the candidate so requests.
3. The employer has the right to be reimbursed by the political party on whose list of candidates his employee is entered for the foregone wages reimbursed to the said candidate.
4. A candidate who is not employed, or in similar circumstances, will be reimbursed by the political party on whose list of candidates he is entered.
5. Foregone wages of candidates are calculated in the same manner as those of electoral commission members.
6. The fact that someone is a candidate must not be detrimental to his labor-related legal or similar affairs. The period of leave of absence according to section 1 is considered to be a period spent working.

Article 54

Election Cost Compensation

1. The costs of elections to the Federal Assembly are to be paid from the state budget of the federation. If the elections to the Federal Assembly are held simultaneously with the elections to other representative bodies, the method of payment will be determined by an agreement between the relevant bodies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Czech Socialist Republic, and Slovak Socialist Republic.
2. Each political party is to cover the costs of its election campaign using its own funds, or bank, or savings bank credit, as the case may be. When asking for a credit the political party will submit information on its property and its income from membership fees or from other sources. The bank (savings bank) may require a guarantee of a number of guarantors.
3. After the verification of the validity of elections of deputies by the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Presidium of the Federal Assembly will send data to the Federal Ministry of Finance on the number of valid votes cast in favor of individual political parties. The political party which has won more than two percent of the valid votes in elections to the Chamber of People or Chamber of Nations in the Czech Socialist Republic or in the Slovak Socialist Republic will obtain from the state federal budget 10 korunas for each vote it has won.

Part Nine

Transitional and Final Provisions

Article 55

1. For the purpose of this law, the National Committees of Brno, Ostrava, Plzen, Usti nad Labem, and Kosice are considered to be District National Committees.
2. For the purpose of this law, the National Committee of Prague, CSSR capital, and the National Committee of Bratislava, capital of Slovak Socialist Republic, are considered to be Regional National Committees.

Article 56

Penalty Clause

Article 177 of the penal code No. 140/1961, in the wording of subsequent amendments, reads:
"Obstructing the preparation and course of elections:
"He who by using physical force or threat of physical force, or by applying a ruse, obstructs the right to vote, or who forces, in this manner, another person to vote, or
"who falsifies data in a document furnishing evidence of the number of members of a political party, in a petition compiled for election purposes, or in some other electoral document, or who knowingly uses such a document in lieu of a genuine one, or
"who knowingly makes a wrong count of the votes or violates the secrecy of voting, or
"who obstructs the preparation or the course of the elections to a representative body in some other grievous manner, will be punished by a prison term ranging between six month and three years."

Article 57

Authorization Clause

1. The Federal Ministry of Interior, based on an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Socialist Republic and with the Ministry of the Interior and Environment of the Slovak Socialist Republic

a) will define detailed obligations of the National Committees when

(i) setting up polling districts,
(ii) compiling voters' registers,
(iii) issuing voter's cards,
(iv) making available and equipping polling stations,
(v) safekeeping the ballots and other election documents;

b) will define samples of ballots, voters' registers, voter's cards, and certificates of election, and may also define samples of other electoral documents;
c) may define details of cooperation of the state administrative bodies (Article 51, section 1) when verifying the authenticity of data according to Article 18, section 1.

2. The Federal Office for Statistics, based on an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Socialist Republic and Ministry of the Interior and

Environment of the Slovak Socialist Republic, and in cooperation with the Czech Office for Statistics and Slovak Office for Statistics, will issue methodological instructions for processing the election results.
3. Provisions that have been introduced by relevant bodies of state administration in order to implement this law prior to its implementation will be deemed to have been introduced during the period of its validity, unless they contradict the law.

Article 58

Abolishing Clause

Law No. 44 from 1971 on elections to the Federal Assembly is to be abolished, with the exception of the provisions of Article 49, whose validity expires on election day.

Article 59

This Law comes into force on the day of its promulgation.

Appendix to the Federal Assembly Election Law

	;1;3	Number of candidates on lists of candidates
Region	Maximum number of candidates for elections to the People's Chamber	Maximum number of candidates for elections to the Chamber of Nations
1. Capital Prague	—20—	—15—
2. Central Bohemia	—19—	—14—
3. Southern Bohemia	—12—	—9—
4. Western Bohemia	—15—	—10—
5. Northern Bohemia	—19—	—15—
6. Eastern Bohemia	—20—	—15—
7. Southern Moravia	—34—	—25—
8. Northern Moravia	—32—	—24—
9. Slovak Capital Bratislava	—7—	—10—
10. Western Slovakia	—27—	—42—
11. Central Slovakia	—25—	—39—
12. Eastern Slovakia	—24—	—35—

Communist Party 'Understands' Cic's Decision

AU1403100190 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 12 Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Understanding for the Premier's Step"]

[Text] The Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia adopted a statement on the decision of the Slovak Premier, Academician Milan Cic, to surrender his membership in the Communist Party of Slovakia: "Considering the events in connection with the election of the chairman of the Slovak National Council last week, and in view of the vital tasks before the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee truly understands the decision of the Slovak premier. It will continue to support his work for a free, democratic, and prosperous Slovakia. At the same time, the Executive Committee hopes that when the political situation normalizes, it will be able once again to welcome Milan Cic in the ranks of Slovak Communists."

Slovak First Deputy Premier Leaving CPCZ

LD1303145490 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] The Slovak Government met today in Bratislava. The main item on the agenda was the draft Slovak budget for this year, which is based on the conditions of the transition to a market economy. Also on the agenda was the new wording of the proposal for the departure of Soviet troops from our territory, which contains measures for returning and recultivating damaged land, for the use of various structures, and for discontinuing preparations for further structures.

At a news conference about the session, journalists were told, among other things, that Vladimir Lexa, first deputy premier and chairman of the Slovak Commission for Planning and Scientific and Technical Development, had informed Premier Milan Cic of his decision to leave the CPCZ.

Klaus Comments on 1990 Budget, Privatization

AU1403093790 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Mar 90 p 1, 2

[Vladimir Cechlovsky report: "Draft Budget Approved"]

[Text] Prague (From our correspondent)— The CSSR Government discussed a single, but extremely important issue at its session on 8 March—the draft state budget for this year. The draft was described by Finance Minister Klaus at a press conference as "probably the most important document concerning the operation of the economy".

The minister said that the draft has been approved and will therefore be presented to deputies. Its anti-inflationary character, according to the minister, lies in its restriction on money being allowed into the economy so that demand will not exceed supply. In contrast to the previously approved budget, this one is a surplus budget. Despite this, it does not represent a radical change of conditions for the ministry departments, but a certain compromise. After the elimination of intermediate tiers of management, the weaker enterprises in particular, which previously relied on means redistributed within the economic production unit and ministry department, find themselves in a worse situation. Next week the government is to discuss the draft monetary plan, which builds on the draft budget.

V. Klaus also presented some budget figures. Compared to the original draft budget for this year, the growth rate of state budget revenues is to be lowered from 3.4 percent to 2.9 percent, and the growth rate of expenditures from 4.6 to 1.6 percent. The scaling down of nonproductive expenditures represents 14 percent. Subsidies to enterprises are being cut by 10.7 percent. Subsidies for the agricultural and food complex, which gets most of them, will be cut by 13 percent and subsidies for ore mining will be one third less. Investment subsidies are 16.4 percent less but, compared to last year's budget, they represent a growth of 1.1 percent. Expenditures on health care and education remain unchanged and "generous support" will be given for individual housing construction.

When asked how the newsprint production will be ensured, V. Klaus responded, saying that the government does not intend to solve this problem by means of a subsidy, yet "the issue will have to be solved. We may end up having fewer newspapers, there may even be too many newspapers today, I do not know," he said.

The negative turnover tax, i.e. the subsidizing of prices, represents in the draft some 50 billion korunas, which, according to V. Klaus, is a heavy burden on the budget. The majority of ministers are said to consider price changes to be necessary. The problems became most evident in the goods buy out by tourists. "This is connected not with an incorrect exchange rate but with incorrect prices," he said verbatim. The improvement must be made very fast, in his opinion, without regard for the elections. The efforts will be aimed at a compensation which would be as fair as possible, even though no solution, as he pointed out, can be entirely just.

How will privatization proceed this year? V. Klaus responded that by the end of March the ministry will have prepared a proposal on the basic outline of this process, on which the whole of society will be able to deliver its opinion. An important role will be played by the newly formed office for the administration of national property and its privatization. First, this office is to attempt to transform the economy into a privatized economy—that is, to transform state enterprises into joint stock companies. Their boards of directors will then, in some cases, transform these joint stock companies into a form of domestic or foreign private ownership. A significant part of our economy will remain in state ownership, such as railways, the water economy, and others. The fastest privatization should happen in the domain of community services.

In connection with the possibility of changing the koruna-forint exchange rate, V. Klaus said that in the past this was prevented, according to the Hungarian side, by the prevailing interest of our citizens in taking holidays and shopping in Hungary, rather than vice versa. Now, the situation is allegedly different.

Further, V. Klaus spoke about missions of the International Monetary Fund; one such mission is currently in Czechoslovakia. The purpose is to prepare all the materials so that Czechoslovakia might be admitted to the IMF and the World Bank in a record period of time—this September.

Official Expects September Entry to World Bank

AU1403102190 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Mar 90 p 1

["(US)"-signed report: "A Record Is Really Feasible"]

[Text] Prague—A World Bank delegation headed by Eugenio Lari, director of its European Department, stopped off in Prague yesterday en route from Warsaw to Belgrade and held talks here with Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus. The very first official visit made to Czechoslovakia by representatives of this organization has thus taken place.

As is already known in connection with our request to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the first mission of these organizations—which has been supported at an unusually senior level by Mr. Lari's visit—is at work in our country. The aim of his visit is to contribute toward determining priorities apropos cooperation with Czechoslovakia, especially as far as our economy's conversion to market conditions is concerned. Specifically, this involves cooperation in the form of technical assistance, economic analyses, discussions on economic policy, or—should our government request it—financial assistance. At the same time, Mr. Lari expressed to journalists his conviction that the annual International Monetary Fund and World Bank session, to be held at the end of September, will provide a suitable opportunity to celebrate our entry into these organizations. In effect, he once again confirmed that we have a feasible chance of setting a record for the speed of our acceptance into these organizations.

In reply to our question on how he evaluates—from the point of view of necessary changes in the economy—the state budget approved by the government on 8 March, he said that to date he had not had a chance to study it in detail. However, he had spoken about our government's budget policy with Minister Klaus, a policy which he fully supports. Nevertheless, he pointed out that this does not necessarily mean there will be a complete concurrence of views in the future. At the same time, he emphasized that the conversion to a market economy can only be implemented successfully against the background of an austere and disciplined budget policy. Only then will the situation remain in control and will we avoid serious inflationary upheavals.

Trade Minister Promoting Western Retailers

AU1303143690

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 9 March on page 12, under the headline "A Woman At the Helm of Trade," carries a 2,000-word

interview with Vlasta Stepova, minister of trade and tourism of the Czech Republic, by H. Vaclavikova. The date and place of the interview are not given. In the interview, the minister discusses her dissatisfaction with the state of supplies and with the standard of shopping in the Czech Republic and the need for foreign and private competition to improve the present situation.

Asked about the prospects of Western retailing organizations opening branches in the Czech Republic, Stepova says that a number of contacts have been established recently. In this context she mentions the Bata company, which "should open at least two shops in Prague as early as May"; Meinl and Billa, two Austrian retailers; Marks and Spencer; and unspecified "French and Dutch food retailers." Stepova states that Czechoslovakia is interested in these firms selling their goods for Czechoslovak korunas and that they can either exchange their wares for Czechoslovak commodities or turn their koruna profits into further investments in Czechoslovakia. She stresses that "we do not want and cannot pay in hard currency, which we need for completely different things than the purchase of ready-made goods."

Asked whether these firms will be able to buy property in Czechoslovakia, Stepova says that land is undervalued in Czechoslovakia, which is why "we will sell neither soil nor real estate, such as hotels or houses in the Little Quarter or anywhere else. We will not allow more than a lease."

Coal Export Contract With Hungary Concluded

AU1303200790 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "By Teletype, Mail, Telephone..." column: "Contract To Export 300,000 Tonnes of Coal"]

[Text] A contract to export 300,000 tonnes of coal annually was concluded by representatives of the Dolina mine in Velky Krtis and of the Nograd coal mine in the Hungarian Republic. The contract will help Krtis miners to solve marketing problems without a marked limitation in mining. A similar contract was signed on 7 March by the Handlova Mines concern.

Czech Premier Comments on Hungarian Visit

LD1403001590 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 2130 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Petr Pithart, premier of the Czech Republic, today began a two-day visit to Hungary. [passage omitted]

Tonight [13 March] Petr Pithart gave an interview to Czechoslovak journalists accredited in Budapest. He described the main points of his talks today as follows:

[Begin Pithart recording in Czech] We spoke of what awaits us in the economic sphere. We have a markedly passive trade balance with Hungary and this causes great problems for the Hungarians. We also talked about complicated nationality questions, although this does not fall within the competence of the Czech government. However, we heard what our Hungarian friends wished to say to us, and through us to the federal government, and we will pass on their grievances. I do not claim that it will be easy; solutions may not always be found, but we will do our best. Perhaps as a neutral party in these complicated questions, we can play a certain positive role. [end recording]

Asked whether such mutual familiarization can help speed solutions to the problems which have accumulated in Czechoslovak- Hungarian relations, Petr Pithart said:

[Begin Pithart recording] Undoubtedly, I think that we will soon realize where to find the specific use of these foreign-political activities of the Czech government. It is the first of many and we are learning how to do it. We are looking for contacts which will be specifically Czech because we do not wish to, nor can we represent the federal government, or interfere in its duties. But we will find our role and will be useful not only to ourselves, the Czech Republic, but also to Czechoslovakia. I am firmly convinced of this. [end recording]

Premier Calfa Updates Temelin Construction

AU1303132490 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Pavel Paral, Vladimir Vacha report: "Federal Premier in Temelin; Atom Has Good Prospects"]

[Text] Temelin (from our correspondents)—On Wednesday Federal Premier Marian Calfa visited the Temelin nuclear power station construction site. At the outset of his visit, Frantisek Poukar, director of the nuclear power station, acquainted him with the present state of work, which begins to reflect a dangerous delay.

He said, among other things, that there was a four-month delay compared to the original plan at the end of 1989, which will apparently increase to nine months this year. The work flowchart prepared on request by the construction management presents unhappy prospects: The construction of the first unit will be delayed by 18 months. Speaking on the causes, he said that, for instance, nonstandard steel structures are missing as well as hard currency for purchases of some imported components, and that the construction is not covered financially even for this year. Only 20 percent of the necessary funds are available from retained earnings. A loan of more than 3.5 billion korunas will have to be taken from the bank, which will provide it only if the government will guarantee that the power station will be completed. Therefore, the director asked Marian Calfa for federal government aid.

Moreover, the future nuclear power station meets public mistrust with respect to its safety. Therefore, the Federal

Ministry of Fuels and Power requested the International Atomic Energy Authority in Vienna to check the Temelin power source.

The premier then toured the construction site and debated with the workers. They spoke mostly about the insecurity implied by the obfuscated future of this power-generating project. Marian Calfa replied that without any doubt the first two units will be completed. The fates of the third and fourth units will be decided by the end of April.

The problems of work stoppage at the third and fourth units were also discussed at the afternoon caucus with representatives of the construction participants. The suppliers who have already prepared sufficient stores would incur, if the construction were abandoned, losses of hundreds of millions [currency not specified] through no fault of their own. Another problem under discussion was suppliers' discipline. In addition, the delay in Temelin construction means that international obligations to lower sulphur dioxide emissions cannot be fulfilled because some of the North Bohemian power stations cannot be closed.

In closing, M. Calfa said that the path of nuclear energy combined with economy in power consumption is necessary for solving our power problems, particularly with respect to ecology. Two Temelin units will enable us to put out of operation 2,000 megawatts worth of capacity in North Bohemian power stations. Hence the output of our power grid would in fact not increase until the end of the millennium. Members of the commission of independent experts for energy utilization of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center in Ceske Budejovice also delivered a critical opinion on a number of construction problems. According to their opinion, only two units should be completed in Temelin.

Calfa Visits Oil Refinery, Komensky University

AU1403102990 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Lubo Rabay report: "By Importing, By Regulating Sales, or By Increasing Prices?"]

[Text] Bratislava (From our editor)—The Federal Government ought to place more emphasis on the situation in the gasoline market. However, this question will become particularly significant if the hydrocracker unit at the Slovnaft [oil refinery] Bratislava plant is not brought into operation this April as had been envisaged a year ago. Therefore, it is no accident that Marian Calfa, CSSR premier, during the second day of his visit to the Slovak capital, gave a briefing at the enterprise about whether the government can rely on the project's suppliers.

We came across the premier—accompanied by Jan Carnogursky, CSSR first deputy premier, Milan Cic, Slovak Republic premier, Slavomir Stracar, CSSR minister of metallurgy, engineering, and the electrotechnical industry, and others—in conversation beneath the hydrocracker unit's intricate canopy of pipes with spirited shift foremen. They had sought him out during his tour of the plant in order to acquaint him with problems that have been in need of resolving for a number of years. They think the enterprise does not pay the bonuses they deserve for afternoon and evening shifts. However, they are not demanding an overall increase in their wage fund nor are they demanding—as Marian Calfa termed it—inflationary money, but they merely want the enterprise's management to thoroughly account for the bureaucracy which, in their opinion, is far too large. During this conversation, the CSSR premier asked Teodor Sajmir, the plant's director, to look into the problem together with the independent trade unions. Later, at a meeting with the project's suppliers, he commented that poor relations between an enterprise's employees and management always have deplorable consequences for us; it is necessary to get to the stage where all employees consider the enterprise to be their own.

In the management's conference room the premier explained the complexity of the situation surrounding gasoline supplies to representatives of the hydrocracker unit's suppliers. Until the year before last, the situation in this market had been relatively stable, but last year we had to import gasoline to the tune of 100 million korunas in foreign currency. The situation is complicated not only because of increasing domestic consumption and limited oil supplies, but recently it has been made more complicated by "purchase" tourism from neighboring countries. If the hydrocracker unit—which makes considerably better use of oil in the production of gasoline—does not come into operation, the government will have to take unpopular measures. According to Marian Calfa, increasing the price of fuels would have a very short term effect. Experiences after the last series of price increases demonstrated this. However, he also considers resolving the situation by importing more to be very ineffective. Only the introduction of a specific rationing system remains.

Teodor Sajmir, on behalf of the project's investor, assured the guests that, as long as nothing unforeseen happens, the deadline for bringing the hydrocracker unit into operation in April is feasible. However, we have already heard a similar claim made under similar circumstances about the December deadline. Yet, the number of mistakes made during the complex series of tests on the unit took the suppliers by surprise. These mistakes involved individual equipment made to order, equipment marked by spasmodic work methods during production in overburdened engineering enterprises. However, engineering specialists from Chepos and KPS in Brno and from CKD in Prague have now confirmed the feasibility of the new deadline. No mistakes that would threaten the operation's security should crop up.

Despite the annual delays in construction, the guests appreciated the productivity shown by the builders of this necessary, but technically very complicated and

unique, project. In this connection, possibilities for generalizing their experiences in order to make investments in the chemical industry more effective were also discussed. An analysis of the reasons for the delays ended in criticism of the previous command management system which forced enterprises into fulfilling disproportionately large orders and, at the same time, undermined the authority of contractual and market relations, matters for which everyone present expressed his support.

During the morning, M. Calfa had met with the academic staff and management at Komensky University. Among other things, young law students informed their guest that the main problem is the lack of pre-1948 literature and of contemporary social science titles published throughout the world. The lecturers pointed out that a solution could lie in integration into the European computer network which would not be too financially demanding in view of the close proximity of Vienna and of its usefulness throughout the CSSR.

Later, the CSSR premier participated in a working lunch with members of the Slovak Government. During the lunch, construction of the Gabcikovo water project formed the main part of the discussion. "We are convinced," stressed M. Calfa, "that if we succeed in bringing Gabcikovo into operation—while adhering to all the ecological contexts and while eradicating technical problems—we could mothball the power station in Novaky or reduce its output to such an extent that it could not influence the environment around it. By bringing Gabcikovo into operation we would considerably help the population of the upper Nitra region."

Issues surrounding the state budget, particularly from the point of view of some austere measures affecting economic development in Slovakia, were also discussed at the working lunch.

M. Calfa ended his two-day visit to Slovakia by visiting Bratislava town hall.

Vacek: 'Satisfied' With Draft Defense Law

LD1303165790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] The committees of both chambers today ended discussion of amendments and additions to the defense law which will be put to the Federal Assembly on 14 March. Vaclav Klement asked some questions of Miroslav Vacek, minister of national defense:

[Begin recording] [Klement] The Constitutional and Legal Committee spent almost four hours as the last committee to discuss changes in the defense law. Mr. Minister, are you satisfied with the course of the session? Did you succeed in defending the interests and needs of the Army?

[Vacek] It can be said that I am basically satisfied. After some time the deputies and even the students present succeeded in understanding the vital need for basic military service of 18 months at the present time, while recognizing that the future outlook is truly favorable enough for basic military service to continue to be shortened. There are many questions which were clarified during the course of these discussions over the last 10 days.

[Klement] What will the reduction in military service mean for the Army?

[Vacek] To begin, we need to have more sources from which to take conscripts. We also look with hope to the Vienna talks which, in our view and according to forecasts on the basis of the fact that we know how the talks are going there, should be completed in the autumn with some kind of agreement which would represent a considerable reduction in our Czechoslovak Army.

[Klement] The deputies asked you, Mr. Minister, whether a reduction in military service will bring with it a reduction in expenditure on the Army?

[Vacek] The fact that basic military servie will be reduced is not a basis for a reduction in expenditure. But, simply the fact that we released those in basic military service two months earlier and graduates of military academies one month earlier represents savings of many tens of millions. I would like to point out that we have decided that in 1990 we will call up 90,000 less reservists to exercises. This fact also represents another 2.5 billion korunas and we could find other sources. [end recording]

Campaign Fund Allotment Draws Wide Protest

AU1303133990 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Martin Krno article: "How the Ministry of Finance Wants To Distribute Grants"]

[Text] Janosik [Slovak Robin Hood] distributed the spoils of his activities among the Slovak poor rather inconsistently. Yet his way of measuring cloth from a beech tree to a beech tree must have been fairer than the ideas of the Slovak Ministry of Finance, Prices, and Wages on the administration of government grants to political parties, movements, and social organizations, the greater part of which are, in Slovakia, incorporated in the National Front.

According to a decree by the Slovak Government Presidium, a working task force was established to devise a set of regulations and a process for the distribution of these financial resources. A representation in this task force was granted to the Central Committee of the Slovak National Front, the Chancellery of the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, the Slovak Government Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Public Against Violence movement, and to the Christian Democratic Movement (it is a mystery why other political parties have no representation). The Ministry of Finance, in direct contradiction with previous agreements, recently

presented the government with a proposal on the principles of financing political parties and movements, social organizations, societies, and associations, and on the amount of government contribution from the 1990 Slovak budget. In its proposal the Ministry of Finance requests "an exceptional one-time total contribution in the amount of 80 million korunas for the new civic and political movements and political parties in order to enable them to have approximately equal material, technical, and organizational conditions, and to ensure free and democratic elections."

It is "requested" that 40 to 45 million of this amount be released to the Public Against Violence movement and 20 to 25 million to the Christian Democratic Movement. This means that all remaining parties and movements in Slovakia would share 10 to 20 million korunas. The document justifies this by the need to respect the "particular roles played by the Public Against Violence movement and the Christian Democratic Movement in guaranteeing democratic elections." Why could such a role not be played by the Green Party, by the Liberals, or the Social Democrats? Besides, the ministry has already provided the Public Against Violence movement with 10 million from the state budget.

And what about the social organizations? Those which in some functions substitute for government bodies (the Red Cross, firemen, the Disabled Citizens' Union) will receive the originally planned contributions from the National Front in the full amount but, for instance, the Slovak Union of Antifascist Fighters will receive 70 percent and philatelists only 50 percent of the originally proposed grants. The Union of the Young (together with other youth organizations) will receive less than one fifth of the planned budget. The Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, the Czechoslovak Scientific and Technical Society, the Union of Cooperative Farmers, the Women's Union, and the Syndicate of Journalists will have to make do without a single koruna.

Naturally, everybody understands that in the present economic situation government grants must be reduced, but it has to be done fairly. And what were the reactions of 13 political parties and 15 social organizations to yesterday's "roundtable?"

Party of National Prosperity: "Our members were among those who stood in the city squares from the very beginning of the revolution. How can anybody talk of equal opportunities for all parties before the elections?! It is an unauthorized manipulation of government funds!" The Union of the Young: "Who forgot so fast that the velvet revolution was initiated by the youth? And now its interests are not taken into consideration at all." The Slovak Union of Antifascist Fighters: "We absolutely cannot agree with the materials as presented." National Liberals: "That is the ultimate insult!" The Democratic Party: "We express strong disagreement in principle!" The Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society: "It is a lampoon. How can anybody have the audacity to present something like this! We are in the process of extension to become Friends of the European Home, and we plan self-financing but it cannot be done overnight." The Czechoslovak Agricultural Party: "It is nondemocratic and unfair. Who is in charge here?"

Similar opinions were expressed by the representatives of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the Social Democracy, the Republican Party, the Czechoslovak Scientific and Technical Society, etc. At the conclusion of the 8 March meeting, a joint communique was accepted in which fundamental disagreement was expressed with the document presented by the Slovak Ministry of Finances, Prices, and Wages, and the demand was raised that the government does not even debate on this document.

It should be mentioned that the Communist Party of Slovakia is not incorporated in the economic system of the National Front, which is why it has not received, and does not receive, any contributions through this organization. Representatives of the Federal Government, of the Federal and of the Czech Ministry of Finance, representatives of the Czech and of the Federal Central Committees of the National Front, as well as representatives of the Council of the Civic Forum Coordinating Center took part in the nationwide debate on the system of financing of political parties and social organizations in Prague on 29 January. Only Slovak representatives were somehow forgotten on the invitation list. Why?

Brno Civic Forum Apologizes to Havel

LD1303182890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Petr Cibulka and the Civic Forum Information and Press Center collective on Mecova Street in Brno publically apologized to President Vaclav Havel for the mistake they made in publishing excerpts of a private conversation between Vaclav Havel and Petr Cibulka in pamphlets. They also apologize for the inaccuracy which arose as a result of the accidental alteration of one verb.

The text given to journalists today in Brno also comments on the situation in the city. They say that there are no scuffles taking place there, and that the public has not become fanatical. Despite all their efforts, however, there are instances where arguments are being heightened. They say that a section, so far unfortunately the minority, of the Civic Forum parliament in Brno is trying hard to renew the parliament, because its composition no longer tallies with the current situation or the needs of the immediate future. Calm will not be restored in Brno until the conservative group in the Civic Forum parliament defends democratically promoted essential changes, says the Civic Forum center's collective on Mecova Street in Brno.

Kanturek Appointed TV Director General

LD1203222890 Prague CTK in English 1825 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 12 (CTK)—The federal government today appointed Jiri Kanturek director general of Czechoslovak television.

Prior to the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia, Jiri Kanturek was one of the country's leading television commentators. He was subsequently dismissed from television. In November 1989 he became television spokesman of the Civic Forum, the leading political force in the country.

CPCZ Opposes Newsprint Redistribution Accord

AU1203225190

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 8 March on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word article by Zdenek Porybny, RUDE PRAVO chief editor, entitled "A Word to Readers." On the same day, on page 1, RUDE PRAVO carries a 200-word "Statement by Representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and RUDE PRAVO." Both items provide the motives of RUDE PRAVO and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] representatives' decision not to sign the agreement on the redistribution of newsprint which was concluded in Prague on 7 March. On 9 March, Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE and Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech publish articles providing details on the 7 March agreement and criticizing the CPCZ's stand on the issue.

In his RUDE PRAVO article, Porybny says that the "tedious and complicated negotiations of representatives of the main political forces and newspaper publishers in the Czech Republic on newsprint redistribution were wound up 7 March, at the end of their fourth round, by the signing of an agreement by most participants." Representatives of the CPCZ and of RUDE PRAVO (Frantisek Adamek, secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Petr Rosecky, head of the CPCZ Central Committee Economic Department, and himself), Porybny goes on to say, "did not sign the agreement."

Porybny provides the following rationale for this decision. He says that RUDE PRAVO's current print run is 900,000 during the week and 1,400,000 on Saturdays, of which 553,000 copies go to private and 122,000 to institutional subscribers. If RUDE PRAVO accepted the proposal of the Federal Press and Information Office that every daily newspaper be allocated an equal amount of newsprint—5,000 tonnes for the rest of the year—it would have to reduce its print run to around 450,000 copies and would thus be forced to halt deliveries to all institutional and to around 100,000 private subscribers. Moreover, there would be no RUDE PRAVO copies left for general distribution through newsstands.

Porybny points out that, aware of the need for a more equitable distribution of scarce newsprint, RUDE PRAVO has already reduced its demand for newsprint by an annualized 10,000 tonnes, compared with its original allocation. However, because the proposed agreement provides for "such a drastic and unbalanced reduction for the CPCZ daily," RUDE PRAVO was "unable to give its consent to it." Porybny reveals that, in addition to RUDE PRAVO, also SVOBODNE SLOVO, the daily of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, refused to sign the agreement, which is to go into force on 1 April.

The "Statement by Representatives of the CPCZ and RUDE PRAVO" reiterates the arguments put forward in Porybny's article, asserting that the proposed agreement on the redistribution of newsprint "does not respect the interests of RUDE PRAVO subscribers and readers" and that it affects RUDE PRAVO far more severely than it affects the other dailies. The statement also contends that the proposed agreement "does not correspond to the conclusions of the roundtable talks of main political forces reached on 1 March 1990."

Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 9 March on pages 1 and 3 carries a 650-word article by Alena Slezakova entitled "Is RUDE PRAVO Discriminated Against?" Slezakova says that a total of 36,900 tonnes of newsprint are available for all "central dailies" in the Czech Republic for the last three quarters of this year. Under the agreement concluded on 7 March, CESKOSLOVENSKY SPORT is to be allocated 1,900 tonnes and all other central Czech dailies (LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE, SVOBODNE SLOVO, MLADA FRONTA, ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY, PRACE, and LIDOVE NOVINY, which will be published as a daily from 1 April) 5,000 tonnes each.

Slezakova goes on to dismiss RUDE PRAVO's claim that the CPCZ daily is being "discriminated against." She argues that the print runs of the other dailies have been kept artificially low for years and that subscriptions to RUDE PRAVO have been mandatory for many institutions. This is why, in her opinion, RUDE PRAVO's current high print run is not a reflection of readers' preferences but a consequence of its former privileged position. Slezakova also objects to RUDE PRAVO's assertion that, with the exception of RUDE PRAVO and SVOBODNE SLOVO, no other central daily will be affected by the agreement. She notes that, under the agreement, the annual allocation of ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY will be reduced by 300 tonnes and that of MLADA FRONTA by 500 tonnes.

Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech on 9 March on page 1 carries a 300-word editorial article entitled "Communists Are Stirring Up Mud Again." The article expresses MLADA FRONTA's approval of the agreement concluded on 7 March, even though "it is not advantageous for us, contrary to RUDE PRAVO's claim," and accuses RUDE PRAVO of striving to perpetuate its former privileges.

New Peace Society Established in Prague

AU1303152290 Prague PRACE in Czech 8 Mar 90 p 2

["zs"-signed report: "With an Olive Branch to Milovice"]

[Text] Spokesmen for the recently established Czechoslovak Peace Society [Ceskoslovenska mirova spolecnost] briefed journalists on the further destiny of our peace movement in Prague on 7 March. The establishment of this movement was preceded by the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Peace Committee last November. On 27 January The Czechoslovak Peace Union was established. In this organization, however, the voices of paid functionaries of the Czech and Slovak Peace Councils prevailed, basically asserting the old organizational structures.

Many members disagreed with this and on 21 February they established the Czechoslovak Peace Society [CMS]. In contrast to the Union, the CMS does not claim a monopoly in the area of the peace movement and definitely does not push for a territorial structure. As a democratic and open association, it wants to be an equal partner for various independent peace initiatives, to which it will make available all the facilities, finances, as well as the network of international contacts of the former Peace Committee, where these have been established. The program declaration states that the CMS "associates all those who want to help enforce human rights and to live in peace and freedom." The Easter peace marches, which have a world tradition, are also held in this spirit. In our country, pacifists will be heading for the Soviet military bases where they will demand the acceleration of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Akhromeyev Calls FRG Promise 'Insufficient'

LD1303142990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1214 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The USSR, according to Gorbachev adviser Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, believes the mere promise by the FRG Government not to deploy Bundeswehr troops on the GDR's territory once the two German states are united, to be insufficient. In an interview with the Soviet press agency NOVOSTI, the former general chief of staff said that the promise by the Federal Republic or even of the United States and other states to forego an advance of Bundeswehr troops to the GDR's territory "cannot satisfy us."

"First, they are mere promises. Second, even if the NATO bloc were to make such a statement, we would not receive the necessary guarantees," the military adviser said. He recalled that Hitler's Germany had not observed the Versaille peace treaty of 1919 and had in 1936 sent in German troops to occupy the demilitarized Rhineland. "We all know what happened after that," Akhromeyev said. He did not believe such a promise could serve as a reliable basis for guaranteeing the Soviet Union's security.

Gorbachev's military adviser expressed the view that a united Germany should not be a member either of NATO nor of the Warsaw Treaty. Apart from neutralizing Germany, there was another solution in which a united Germany would be integrated into an organization that was not an opponent of the Soviet Union or of the United States, Great Britain, France, and other European states, he said. One ought to look for such a solution. The representatives of the four Allies and the two German states would also be dealing with this at their "two-plus-four" negotiations.

In addition, a solution had to be found for the U.S. nuclear short-range missiles on FRG territory in case of unification. These weapons would, in case of unification, not disappear of their own accord. Even if demilitarization of the GDR were to be considered as a starting principle, the FRG's territory would continue to be fully stockpiled with these weapons. "This prospect is unacceptable to us," he said.

Akhromeyev also spoke out against the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact as a unilateral advance concession. "Such unilateral action is not going to benefit us." The Warsaw Pact had been proposing to NATO for a long time to discuss the possibility of transforming the two alliances. However, NATO was not even willing to change its military doctrine, let alone make more radical decisions, Akhromeyev criticized.

Red Army Faction Believed Active in GDR

AU1403105390 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 12 Mar 90 p 3

[ND report: "Red Army Faction Active in the GDR?"]

[Text] Berlin (West)—Criminality has taken on a new development in the GDR after the opening of the borders, Ingo Herrmann, Federation of German Criminal Officers (BDK) chairman, stated at a news conference on 11 March in Berlin (West). The journalists were briefed on the results of the first working meeting between the BDK and the GDR Association of Criminal Officers, which was held during the weekend. There is well-founded suspicion that the Red Army Faction is active in the GDR as well, the journalists were told.

Trade, Cooperation Agreement With EC Initialed

LD1303132690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1139 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Brussels (ADN-Corr)—A trade and cooperation agreement between the GDR and the EC was initialed in Brussels today at EC Commission headquarters. Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Christian Meyer initialed for the GDR and the director of relations with North and Central Europe, Pablo Benavides, for the EC.

The agreement establishes a legal basis for cooperation in the transition period until the GDR's full entry into the EC. A final signing could be agreed with the EC by the new GDR Government formed after the People's Chamber election on 18 March. The EC Commission is thereby opening up the option for the new government in Berlin to negotiate the arrangements for the GDR to grow into the EC, parallel to the negotiations on the unification of the two German states.

The initialed text, therefore, also contains a clause according to which the agreement will be "appropriately adopted following the agreement of a GDR-FRG economic union."

ADN Correction to Modrow Letter to Shamir

LD1303214490

East Berlin ADN International Service supplies the following correction to the item headlined "Modrow Letter to Shamir" published in the 13 March East Europe DAILY REPORT on page 23:

Paragraph three, sentences one to two make read: ...Bronfman, in February. Particular attention was drawn to the condemnation of Nazism as a special variety of fascism, which the Israeli side considered important, Rainer Neumann said. (rewording sentence)

Kohl at Alliance for Germany Rally in Cottbus

LD1303195190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1831 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Cottbus (ADN)—The necessary economic reforms will be implemented immediately after the elections, FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said at an election rally staged by the Alliance for Germany this evening. He noted that people are ready in the FRG, the United States, Japan, and other countries to invest in the

GDR. About 3,000 small and large FRG firms are waiting for the green light. No one in the world should have any fears when 62 million FRG citizens and 16 million GDR citizens unite. "We want Poland to be able to live within secure borders. But our European neighbors must also take seriously our wish to come together in a single German fatherland," Kohl said to the applause of about 50,000 people. He said that in a few years the GDR, with its intelligent and talented people, will be a flourishing country. A social market economy, the best social system in the world, is needed for this. At the same time the federal chancellor called on people to remain in the GDR in order to help build a common Germany.

Referring to the international disarmament process, Kohl expressed the hope that tangible results will be attained in the reduction of conventional weapons at the Vienna negotiations this year. The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on ICBM's must lead to a 50 percent reduction. Chemical weapons must be eliminated worldwide. [passage omitted]

FRG Finance Minister Speaks at DSU Rally

LD1303184590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1735 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Neubrandenburg (ADN)—In Christian Social Union [CSU] Chairman Theo Waigel's view, the ground for an economic miracle, such as has not existed in Germany since 1949, exists in the GDR. The FRG finance minister emphasized this on 13 March at an election rally of the German Social Union (DSU) in Neubrandenburg. A precondition is that the democratically elected government of the GDR must make decisions in the direction of a social market economy as quickly as possible after 18 March.

Waigel announced that savers in the GDR should not have fears about a monetary union. He argued in favor of a "qualifying date arrangement so that speculators come away empty-handed." Waigel described the warnings from the Party for Democratic Socialism [PDS] of a sellout of the GDR, as "foolish stupid chatter" and said it was "insolence" to call on Gorbachev "to protect socialist ownership conditions."

The CSU chairman critized the statement by GDR-Social Democratic Party Chairman Ibrahim Boehme who ruled out a coalition with the PDS or the DSU after the elections. Waigel denied Boehme the right to compare the DSU with the PDS. The CSU chairman said that bringing about a "nonsocialist majority in the People's Chamber" is the electoral aim in the GDR.

Modrow Says PDS Favors 'Radical Restructuring'

LD1303203890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1920 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Neubrandenburg (ADN)—The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) favors a radical restructuring of the GDR in all areas of life. It stands for a market economy oriented toward social and ecological concerns, the PDS top candidate, Prime Minister Hans Modrow, stated on Tuesday evening in Neubrandenburg at a rally of 50,000 participants. He named strong cooperative ownership and strong public ownership as conditions for these aims. The PDS is in favor of a rapid increase in efficiency and productivity, which could hardly be achieved without Western capital and know-how, the premier said. The monetary union should not be implemented without social security. The parliament needs a strong left opposition for this, which prevents a remote-controlled majority [i.e. controlled from the FRG] from emerging.

The PDS does not want power, Modrow said: It has renounced demands for power and leadership once and for all. It is a young party with a mature program, standing in the leftist tradition of the German workers' movement. It stands for German unity in a Europe of free, equal nations and peoples and against an annexation of the GDR by the FRG in accordance with Article 23.

Predicts 'Orderly' Transfer of Power

LD1303155390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1249 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The present GDR Government will conclude its work in an orderly way and cleanly hand over its business. This was described by GDR Premier Hans Modrow today, when speaking to the paper BERLINER ZEITUNG AM ABEND, as the most important task during the last days in office of his government. This applied particularly for foreign debts.

Modrow said obligations calculated on a dollar basis had fallen during his time (since 14 November). "I would not like to say more on this now." This did not mean, however, that the GDR's economic position was rosy. [passage omitted]

Modrow Jeered at Election Rally in Demmin

LD1303190690 Hamburg DPA in German 1637 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Demmin (DPA)—GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow was received with boos and whistles at an election rally in Demmin, Mecklenburg, today. It was mainly Social Democratic Party [SPD] and German Social Union [DSU] supporters who shouted down the Party for Democratic Socialism [PDS] politician. With placards with the slogans "Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party for Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] a dead certainty" and "PDS flourishes, but our villages are dying," a group of demonstrators protested against Modrow's appearance in the town of 20,000 inhabitants. In the district town of Waren, Modrow had been greeted this morning by a cheering crowd waving GDR flags.

Modrow criticized the protest with the words: "The placards are anything but a true road to democracy."

The whistling was also directed against those who have assumed rsponsibility in the government and in the roundtable in the past months. Modrow spoke expressly against a unification of the two German states in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law, i.e. against a simple declaration of accession by the Laender. "Anyone who wants to cobble together the two states via Article 23 will reap not trust but fear."

His remark that the GDR needs a party that stands to the left of the Social Demcorats, namely the PDS, was again drowned out by whistling. Modrow intends to end his only day of election campaigning for the PDS with a speech this evening at an election rally in the speedway stadium in Neubrandenburg.

SPD Leader Addresses Berlin Rally

LD1303221690 Easty Berlin ADN International Service in German 2132 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—Helmut Kohl did not start and carry through this peaceful revolution in the GDR, Social Democratic Party [SPD] Chairman Ibrahim Boehme stressed at a large party rally on Tuesday evening in Berlin. He added, whoever goes to Kohl will be punished by life. Boehme regretted the "mudfight" that is presently occurring in the electoral campaign, however the SPD will not participate in it.

As the SPD chairman underlined, a social system should arise in this part of Germany in which matters proceed in a democratic and social manner. The SPD clearly supports the unity of Germany, but social union comes first. Free and democratic trade unions cannot be effective on the basis of a trade union law but only on the basis of a law on regulations governing industrial relations. [passage omitted]

CDU Chairman on Elections, Unity

AU1303140690 Hamburg BILD in German 13 Mar 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Christian Democratic Union Chairman Lothar de Maiziere by Peter Bartels and Hans-Hermann Tiedje; place and date not given: "Chairman of the GDR's CDU: Monetary Union—Immediately After the Elections"]

[Text] [BILD] Was your partner in the "Alliance for Germany," Democratic Awakening Chairman Wolfgang Schnur, an informant of the Stasi state security service?

[De Maiziere] Only God knows the truth. This is a nasty story. The timing is insidious.

[BILD] Opinion polls show that the Alliance has a lead over the Social Democratic Party now. Will you claim the position of prime minister on 18 March?

[De Maiziere] If need be, I will do anything.

[BILD] With whom do you want to form a government?

[De Maiziere] This naturally depends on Sunday's results.

[BILD] When will unity be achieved?

[De Maiziere] First we must quickly create an economic, monetary, and social union. People must be given hope.

[BILD] Can you mention a date?

[De Maiziere] This will take place within a few weeks of the elections. We are losing 10,000 people every week. We need them in the GDR.

[BILD] What will happen then?

[De Maiziere] We should reinstate the 1949 GDR Constitution. In this way the laender structure would also be restored. This would mean five new laender.

[BILD] Will Article 23 be applied, which provides for accession of the GDR?

[De Maiziere] We can and must proceed on the basis of Article 23 because we must quickly do something for the people that is tangible in their lives. Unity cannot be postponed. However, there are also certain conditions for the path toward unity on the basis of Article 23.

[BILD] Which city will become the capital?

[De Maiziere] Berlin. There is no doubt about that.

[BILD] Did Modrow not betray Germany with his secret letter to Mikhail Gorbachev?

[De Maiziere] I do not consider this as scandalous as you describe it. It was certainly nothing he can be proud of. However, the practical consequences are zero.

[BILD] How do you assess attempts by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]/Party of Democratic Socialism to maintain public ownership?

[De Maiziere] Some other form of ownership must be developed. I would suggest regulations as practiced by Volkswagen or the United Electricity and Mining Corporation, in the form of employee stock.

[BILD] Are you planning a general amnesty?

[De Maiziere] Yes, for those who were wrongfully convicted by the previous unjust system. We are currently drafting a rehabilitation law.

[BILD] What will become of former SED comrades Honecker, Stoph, and Mielke?

[De Maiziere] Honecker must be subject to a trial on the basis of the rule of law, however only on condition that his criminal responsibility is ensured. Otherwise punishment is of no use.

Cologne Institute Poll on Elections

LD1303200590 Hamburg DPA in German 1750 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Around 91 percent of the people entitled to vote in the election to the GDR People's Chamber this coming Sunday intend to do so. This is the result published today of an opinion poll conducted by the Cologne Institute for Empirical Psychology (IFEF) of 1,985 people on 4 March with its own interviewers. According to the poll, the number of undecided voters is around 10 percent.

According to the IFEF poll, the GDR Social Democratic Party was, two weeks before the election, with 42.8 percent, far ahead of the conservative "Alliance for Germany" consisting of the Christian Democratic Union, Democratic Awakening, and German Social Union (DSU), which together obtained 27.2 percent. Following them were the Party for Democratic Socialism with 10.7 percent; the electoral alliance Green Party/United Left Initiative/Independent Women's Union with 5.6 percent; "Alliance 90", consisting of New Forum, Democracy Now, and Initiative for Human Rights with 5.4 percent; the League of Free Democrats with 3.8 percent; and the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany with 2.6 percent.

Regulations for Voters in 18 Mar Elections

AU1403100490 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10-11 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by H.-J. Scharfenberg of the Law and Administration College: "The Procedure of the 18 March People's Chamber Elections"]

[Text] Time—Every citizen entitled to vote has the opportunity to cast his vote on election day between 0700 and 1800 at the polling station of his electoral district. If justified reasons are given, polling stations may open earlier, but not before 0500. (Paragraph 21 of the Electoral Regulations)

Ballot paper—Upon producing an identity card or a similar personal document, whose data must be compared with the electoral list by the electoral committee, the voters receive an official ballot paper in the polling station. To ensure that this process takes as little time as possible it is recommended that the written election notification together with the identity card be produced.

Voting with a voter's card—Those voters who are not at their place of residence on election day and who have a voter's card may receive a ballot paper in any electoral district in the GDR (Section 24 of the Electoral Law) as soon as they produce an identity card and hand in their voter's card (Section 29 of the Electoral Law).

Polling booth—Another difference with earlier elections is the fact that, under Section 30, Subsection 1 of the Electoral Law, each voter must use the polling booth. The design of the polling booths must prevent any observation so that the voters can mark the ballot paper in total secrecy. This also means that only one citizen must be inside a polling booth at any given time. This regulation is suspended in the case of voters who are unable to prepare the ballot papers themselves: These citizens are entitled to be supported by a person of their choice (Section 30, Subsection 3 of the Electoral Law). This mandatory procedure is proof of the great emphasis that has been put on the principle of the secret ballot.

Casting one's vote—As stipulated in Section 31, Subsection 1 of the Electoral Law, the voters must clearly mark the ballot papers by marking the party or political group (list) of their choice with an "x". For example, a ballot paper with the word "yes" after a party name is also considered to be clearly marked. Only those ballot papers that are clearly marked are valid. This regulation is intended to force the voters to make an active decision, contrary to the earlier practice of "folding the paper."

At the end of the voting procedure, the voter casts his ballot paper into the sealed ballot box. Only then is the casting of the vote registered in the electoral list. (Section 22 of the Electoral Law)

Alliance Publishes Newspaper on Elections

AU1303120890 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 9 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'Alliance for Germany' Publishes 'Newspaper on the Elections' "]

[Text] Berlin—A "Newspaper on the Elections" by which the "Alliance for Germany" provides information about its political intentions will soon be published with a circulation of about 5 million copies. This publication of the Democratic Awakening, the German Social Union, and the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] will be distributed to readers throughout the GDR. The electorate is informed on 16 pages about how "peace and freedom, prosperity, and social justice" will be achieved "in a unified Germany." Under the slogan "social market economy instead of socialism," goals are described and apprehensions and reservations stoked by other parties are refuted.

In a contribution by CDU Chairman Lothar de Maiziere, the policy of a renewed party is expounded.

Investigation of 'Slander' Against Schnur Starts

LD1303230790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2055 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—As a result of the accusations against lawyer Wolfgang Schnur last week there was an investigation, and consequently investigative proceedings have been instituted against persons unknown for slander against Mr. Schnur.

ADN was told this in response to an inquiry to the press office of the GDR State Prosecutor-General's Office.

Within the framework of the investigative proceedings, the State Prosecutor's Office has examined the documents held at the former Office of National Security. They were subjected to examination within the context of the proceedings against persons unknown.

The fact that Mr. Eppelmann was able to inspect the documents of the former Ministry of State Security, the press office stressed, has nothing whatsoever to do with the proceedings, which have already been instituted.

More Excerpts From Honecker Letter on Charges

LD1303224490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1813 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Copenhagen (ADN Correspondent)—In the words of Erich Honecker, the politics of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany leadership cannot be criminalized in retrospect. His lawyers are assuming that the charge brought against him will fail.

In a letter to Danish Communist Party member Ingmar Wagner, from which the Danish people LAND OG FOLK published more excerpts in its Wednesday edition following initial excerpts last weekend, Honecker points out that the charge has not yet been laid before him to date. It says further in the letter: "The path toward the capitalist FRG was laid open despite the reservations present. That is manifest now in all its clarity. I do not need to tell you and your friends what that means for the neighboring states. ... Dear Ingmar, you are right, the violation of my dignity as a Communist and former state head of the GDR is already taking place. It is at the same time an insult to the international workers' movement, an inappropriate attempt to extinguish the ideals of socialism in the hearts of the people. I am firmly convinced that it will not succeed. Our efforts were not in vain. They sowed seeds for the future that can be seen today in the fact that the majority of the GDR's citizens do not at all like to do without social achievements if it comes to an arrangement with the FRG, that means should it come to a swallowing up [of the GDR]. There is a hope for the future. ....Please assume that I am not guilty before the law. Despite all accusations, one cannot criminalize in retrospect our former politics that served the people's well-being."

LDP Favors Further Army Reforms

AU1103210490 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 7 Mar 90 p 2

[Gerd Robbe commentary: "Liberal Democratic Party For Further Reforms in Army"]

[Text] On 8 February 1990, the Liberal Democratic Party [LPD] was the first party in the GDR to support the abolition of compulsory military service. This would, at the same time, make civilian alternative service obsolete, which at least 15 percent—according to conservative estimates—of the draftees will decide in favor of. Three weeks later, at the election party congress on 25 February, the Party of Democratic Socialism followed suit. It, too, has been advocating a small professional army since then. In October 1989, a discussion about such a far-reaching aspect of security would not have been possible.

Since January 1990, the most important parties and political movements, as well as scientists and experts at the roundtable on questions of military reform, which was initiated by Defense Minister Admiral Hoffmann, have been busy making security policy ready for implementation; they are doing this in a democratic way and with heated debates and protracted voting. The Alliance of Free Democrats is participating in the roundtable talks, including LDP representatives Hans-Juergen Nagel and Gerd Robbe.

Which positions does the LDP advocate? The LDP demands:

—the military neutrality of both German states;
—taking the military contingents of the National People's Army [NVA] and of the Bundeswehr out of their alliances step by step;
—the reduction of both armed forces to a total of 250,000 men (the NVA's total strength would therefore be one-third of this, in line with the country's size).

The defense minister's roundtable has stood its test; this was shown by the discussion at the fifth meeting. After the elections on 18 March, the new, perhaps civilian, minister would be well advised to support a "consultative council" made up of representatives of political organizations and to respect it. With this, parliamentary work would not become superfluous but would be enriched.

With the essential participation of the LDP, military political guidelines (instead of a "military doctrine") have been decided so far. This concept, which is to be passed by the new People's Chamber, contains far-reaching ideas on disarmament and confidence-building. At the same time, the character and assignment of the NVA are defined and the structure of the armed forces is addressed.

In addition, at the roundtable the basic outlines of the GDR's military reform, starting points for working out a new organizational structure of the Ministry of National Defense, and a proposal on the material-technical safeguarding of the NVA by the national economy were decided. The proposal notes, for instance, that in more than 30 state-owned enterprises, considerable facilities are being freed and prepared for use in stabilizing civilian production. Or: The structuring as an army of permanent combat readiness is being withdrawn. The resulting reduction in burdens is to improve service, working, and living conditions for the Army members.

This is precisely what the LDP is supporting. The necessary reforms in the Army must not be carried out at the expense of the soldiers doing basic military service

and of the professional soldiers. While soldiers, who are threatened by unemployment after their discharge, are increasingly demonstrating their dissatisfaction with behavior that is unprecedented in the Army, longer-serving professional noncommissioned officers and officers are also looking at the future with pessimism. This situation requires a democratic institution in the troops and units, an organ that supports the commander, for which, among others, our party colleague Lutz Kiesslich, lieutenant in the command of the Leipzig Military District, is working. The LDP executive committees should support this initiative for military reform.

First Departing Soviet Unit Crosses Border

LD1303201890 Budapest MTI in English 1703 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—The set of carriages transporting the first Soviet military unit to be withdrawn from Hungary, has crossed the country's border on Tuesday, at Zahony railway crossing point.

The mechanised artillery battalion of the Soviet armoured vehicle regiment, stationed in Veszprem County (W. Hungary), arrived at the Hungarian-Soviet border at dawn, where transloading was started without delay. Soviet soldiers performed the transfer of military vehicles, installations and equipment themselves, from Hungarian railway carriages to the broad gauge Soviet wagons.

It was reported to MTI by the Hungarian state railway's Zahony director that the transfer station has taken necessary steps to ensure the smooth performance of the troop withdrawal.

Every assistance will be rendered to the departing Soviet troops and traffic is to be organized in a way so as not to disrupt goods transport either.

Parties Criticize Withdrawal Agreement

LD1303232990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Several parties have confirmed in a declaration that in their view the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary can be speeded up.

The Agrarian Association, FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], FKGP [expansion unknown], MNP [Hungarian People's Party], MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], and SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] also express concern over the lack of the phrase in the withdrawal agreement signed last week that the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary has no international legal grounds whatsoever.

At the same time, the parties mentioned are convinced that the Hungarian delegation which participated in the negotiations has represented Hungarian interests throughout.

More Criticism of Agreement Voiced

LD1303235990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Several Hungarian parties have confirmed in a declaration that they consider the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary to be too slow. [passage omitted]

Apart from this, the opinion of the Federation of Young Democrats is that the 42 billion forints the Soviets claim for reparations for the moveable property is unrealistically high. According to the Young Democrats, it must be definitely clarified before all else, what measure of damage the Soviet Army caused Hungary in the past 45 years.

In connection with the Soviet troop withdrawal, the Budapest organization of Independent Smallholders has protested because parallel with the reduction of numbers, 10,000 new Soviet soldiers are arriving in our homeland. [as heard] The Smallholders fear that this will increase the time of the Soviet withdrawal.

News Conference Called on Fuel Imports for 1990

LD1403045490 Budapest MTI in English 2010 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—At the Tuesday press conference of the Hungarian National Oil and Gas Trust, the attention was emphatically called that owing to the prolonged discussions with the Soviet Union on this year's goods exchanges, it cannot be told for certain how much petrol Hungary can import in the present year.

Reckoning with the regular yearly 6.5 million tonnes, the shortfall could be anything up to one million tonnes, based on the data of the first two quarters of the year.

The missing quantities could be imported by way of the Adria pipeline, connecting the Szazhalombatta refinery of Hungary with the Mediterranean (through Yugoslavia) to be pumped from tankers of Arab countries. In this case however instead of the present main market price, the government would have to recognise the border parity import rates, because the appx. 210 thousand tonnes of Iraqi petrol imported by the end of February, already caused a many hundred million forint loss to the oil trust. Further petrol imports are to be suspended until a decision is reached on the matter, trust officials stated.

In addition they hold it necessary to be granted a foreign trade right by the government, since a major part (60 per cent) of Hungary's energy requirement consists of hydrocarbons.

Domestic petrol production is expected to drop by 30-40 this year, a part of the outdated drilling equipment should be dismantled and lay-offs are also envisaged.

The possibility of purchasing about 100 thousand tonnes of fuel from departing Soviet troops is also under negotiation, 45,000 tonnes of this amount is motor oil. However, the Soviet side wishes to sell the underground storage tanks as well, but this would make the deal unprofitable for the Hungarians, therefore a final decision is still pending. Concerning the supply of natural gas, there is no disruption for the time being in Soviet delivery.

Szuros Sends Letter to Havel on Minority Rights

LD1303151390 Budapest MTI in English 2044 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 12 (MTI)—Matyas Szuros, interim president of the Republic, has sent a letter to Vaclav Havel, president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

According to information obtained by MTI, in the letter, the interim president of the Republic of Hungary recalls the agreement reached by the two presidents in the course of their talks in Budapest in that the most urgent task to be tackled in the process of laying the relations between the two countries on new foundations would be a reassuring settlement of the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary and the Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia.

Hungary regards the provision of individual and collective rights to the Slovak community as an indispensable part of democracy. Unfortunately, however, the situation of the Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia has not improved at a similar rate to that of the democratic transformation going on in Czechoslovakia.

Mr Szuros expressed worry over the increasing nationalistic manifestations mainly in Slovakia and surprise at the fact that when drafting the new Czechoslovak legal and institutional system, several of the decisions brought have ignored the rightful needs of the minorities, especially those of the Hungarian minority. Short of meeting this requirement, no full equality of rights and opportunities is possible, Mr Szuros warns.

Mr Szuros is concerned that these developments in Slovakia may jeopardize the relations of the two countries. Therefore, he requests Mr Havel to make the best use of his political and moral influence in order to make the situation of the Hungarian community of Czechoslovakia one of the concerns of the democratic transformation. This would involve giving the Hungarian community their own institutions and creating an atmosphere in which the Hungarians could feel at home in their birthland and participate in shaping the future of the country as equal partners, provided with all the necessary legal guarantees.

Szuros, Gal Meet With Czech Premier Pithart

LD1303225490 Budapest MTI in English 1647 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—Petr Pithart, head of the government of the Czech Republic, arrived in Budapest on Tuesday, and was received at Ferihegy Airport by his invitor, Imre Pozsgay, minister of state.

Mr Pithart was received by Matyas Szuros, interim president of the Republic. The Czech Government head was pleased to mention that Hungary was the first country to invite him for an official visit since he had been appointed a prime minister.

Speaking on the changes in Eastern Europe, Mr Pithart drew attention to the many similarities in the Hungarian and Czech political cultures. On the basis of common historical traditions, the philosophies of the Hungarian and the Czech people are very close, said Mr Pithart, adding that for the Czechoslovak opposition, Hungary was a kind of link to the West, as the professionals deprived of their freedom to travel could meet only in Hungary with Czechoslovak emigrants. Besides, the Czechoslovak opposition could obtain direct experience on how to dissolve a party state.

Mr Pithart thinks the member republics of Czechoslovakia will play an increasing role in shaping foreign relations. He sees a number of common opportunities for the Czech Republic and Hungary in this process. The Czechs are anxious to get familiar with the experience of counties in western Hungary acquired in their relations with Austria.

Mr Szuros stressed that in addition to the Czech Republic, Hungary wished to set up good relations with Slovakia as well. He pointed out that Hungary was baffled by the increase in nationality conflicts in South Slovakia which has a mixed population. He requested Mr Pithart to make the most of his personal influence in order to prevent nationality conflicts from jeopardizing the development of the democracy in the two countries. Hungary is making efforts to get rid of the prejudices influencing Hungarian-Slovak relations.

The summmit proposed by Vaclav Havel back in January to be held in Bratislava in April was also mentioned. Hungarian leaders had also received an invitation for the meeting. Mr Szuros had now asked for further details on the agenda and aims of the meeting, as well as the circle of participants. Mr Pithart said the summit would be aimed at convincing countries in the East European region not to seek their place in Europe through rivalry and efforts to ruin each other's positions.

Mr Szuros stressed that economic relations, especially the accounting system of the two countries, should be layed on new foundations. He welcomed the endevours in Czechoslovakia to get closer to the quadrilateral cooperation between Hungary, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia.

The meeting also touched upon the affair of the Gabcikovo Barrage. Mr Szuros reiterated the Hungarian position that expert negotiations should be launched on the future of the project as soon as possible.

Following the meeting with Matyas Szuros, Petr Pithart met with Zoltan Gal, secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior, to be briefed on the Hungarian election system.

Around noon, Deputy Foreign Minister Imre Szokai gave a gala lunch in the honour of the Czech prime minister.

Pithart Sees Opposition Representatives

LD1303233590 Budapest MTI in English 1930 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Petr Pithart, met on Tuesday afternoon in the parliament building with Peter Medgyessy, Hungarian deputy prime minister, to talk about the developments in economic ties.

Subsequently, Mr Pithart met with representatives of opposition parties, the Federation of Young Democrats, the Independent Smallholders' Party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats.

Pithart Discusses Nationality Conflict

LD1403000190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] The recently elected Czech premier is holding talks in Hungary for the first time. Szabolcs Udvarhelyi has asked Petr Pithart about his talks in Budapest.

[Udvarhelyi] I asked Petr Pithart why he chose Hungary as his first destination, before our elections, when in all probability the next time he will have to hold talks with different Hungarian politicians.

[Pithart in Czech, fading into report by Udvarhelyi in Hungarian] The visit is something of a gesture, and is directed expressly toward Hungary. As I said, we came because of Hungary, not because of any specific people whom we know will, in all probability, disappear from the political limelight, for the moment at least. We wanted to express with this visit that Hungary is of great importance. This is indicated by the fact that the Czech Government specifically sent a delegation here first.

[Udvarhelyi] We know from the reports issued on the talks that nationality problems were discussed. If only because of the particular Czechoslovak state set-up—Pithart is not just Czech premier, but also the deputy premier of the Federal Government—it is understandable that I was curious to know his opinion.

[Pithart in Czech, fading into report by Udvarhelyi in Hungarian] Pithart confirmed that the issue of the Magyars in Slovakia and the Slovaks in Hungary is extremely complicated. But, as he said, perhaps he can talk about this more freely and openly, in the knowledge that the Czech Government cannot directly influence these matters. However, discussing them does make it possible to more clearly define the problems and—I quote—a mediating role has its own advantages, and in this case we can perhaps play this role. So, we listened carefully to what our Hungarian friends said to us, or directed through us to the Federal Government. Naturally we will pass on their messages and complaints, and I can say we will try to resolve them, although this will not be at all easy. At any rate, we will do our best and, I repeat, as a neutral side we can perhaps play a positive role in smoothing out the nationality contradictions, said Petr Pithart, premier of the Czech Republic.

Spokesman Briefs Newsmen on Current Issues

AU1403092090 Budapest MTI in English 2251 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, 12 Mar (MTI)—In the wake of the government session held on Monday, spokesman Zsolt Bajnok said, among other things, that Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state for foreign affairs, had briefed the council on the March 10 agreement relating to the full withdrawal of Soviet troops. In accordance with the Hungarian-Soviet agreement, Brigadier-General Antal Annus, deputy chief of staff, was appointed commissioner in charge of monitoring the realization of the agreement.

The minister of justice put forward a proposal to the government entitled "Tasks of Harmonization With the Legal System of the European Communities". The draft, which was approved by the government, includes some important legal and political principles. Its message is that when drafting new Hungarian provisions, a harmony should be sought with the legal development and trends within the European communities.

The government also discussed the refugee situation. Some major figures revealed were as follows: The number of Romanian refugees arriving in Hungary between January 1 and December 31, 1989, was in excess of 34,000. Out of this number, 31,000 received residence permits, and 3,000 went on to a third country, while 689 voluntarily returned to Romania.

On February 15, 1990, the number of refugees in Hungary was 26,446. Altogether 969 left Hungary with the intention of going home.

The Council of Ministers had to state that in spite of the initial signs of a democratic transformation in Romania, no considerable improvement can be felt in everyday life in the relations between the two countries. This is why the bulk of the refugees in Hungary are staying on to see what happens, and only a few make up their minds to return to Romania.

The Council of Ministers also examined the question of government licences in the period before the new government enters office after the elections.

At the first session of the new parliament after the elections, the government will announce its resignation, but until the new government enters office which might take weeks or even months it is to continue functioning as an acting government. Under the relating legal provision, this means that it will be entitled to all rights of governing, but not to making international agreements. Besides, it will be allowed to pass decrees only on explicit legal authorization and in cases which allow no delay.

Being aware of the enormous significance of the forthcoming elections, the government decided to exercise political self-restraint in the post-election period, in other words, it will refrain from any decision that would have a major impact. It will confine its activity to making decisions required by the functioning of the economy and the state administration, as well as the social and existential security of the citizens.

Outside the agenda, the government passed a decision on declaring May 9 to be the day of commemorating the martyrs and victims of World War II. This day will also mark in Hungary the victory gained over fascism.

Horn, Austrian Ambassador Sign Agreement on Church

LD1403002190 Budapest MTI in English 2152 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 12 (MTI)—Gyula Horn, Hungarian foreign minister, and Franz Zosef Schmidt, Austrian ambassador to Hungary, signed an agreement on the use of a church in Szombathely on Monday.

Present at the event were Istvan Konkoly, diocesan of Szombathely, and Istvan Geosits, vicar of Klingenbach on behalf the diocesan of Eisenstadt (Kismarton).

Under the agreement St Imre Church, Felsoornok, located ten meters off the borderline on the Hungarian side, should also be available for the population of the nearby Austrian settlements.

The large neo-gothic church was erected for the people inhabiting the villages of the area consciously outside any of the settlements. First it was in the wake of Trianon that people living in the villages on the Austrian side, such as Borosgodor (Inzenhof) and Nagymedves (Grossmurbirsch), were deprived of the use of the church. Collective use was restored then, but the iron curtain installed in 1951 put an end to it, again.

The present agreement will make it possible for the Austrian people in the area to come to Hungary without border crossing papers, with only their personal documents, and go to church in Felsoornok.

National Assembly Apologizes for Stalinist Acts

LD1303195590 Budapest MTI in English 1558 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 13 (MTI)—The Hungarian National Assembly elected in 1985 is to begin its last session at 10 a.m. on Wednesday [14 March]. As the final note of the nearly five-year office of parliament, the MPs will discuss the government bills—a gesture to the nation—on annulling the illegal sentences passed between 1945 and 1963 and the decisions depriving people of their Hungarian citizenship.

The session is to be addressed by Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, and the closing address delivered by Istvan Fodor, acting speaker of the National Assembly who will thank parliament for, and evaluate, its work.

At noon there will be a ceremonious session to commemorate the anniversary of the 1848-49 revolution and war of independence, with Matyas Szuros, interim president of the Republic of Hungary as speaker.

The first part of the bill on annulling the illegal sentences brought in the period between 1945 and 1963 runs as follows:

"It is with regret that the National Assembly remembers the fact that after World War Two, the Stalinist regime that took over in Hungary deprived hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens of their freedom, making a mockery of humaneness, justice and law. People released from prisons and detention camps were to live like exiles in their own country. Granting pardons for the unlawfully persecuted was an inadequate way of remedying the grievances, as no pardon is required for crimes never committed. Therefore, the National Assembly apologizes to the nation, bowing its head before each and every victim of the unlawful acts, thereby expressing that the crimes were committed not by the citizens but the Stalinist regime."

The other bill cancels decisions based on four laws of 1947, 1948 and 1957, on depriving certain individuals of their Hungarian citizenship.

Government Statement on Ruble-Accounting Cited

LD1303222490 Budapest MTI in English 1946 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 12 (MTI)—According to a statement published by the Hungarian Council of Ministers, the government has taken further measures to tighten conditions for rouble-accounting exports. These include measures aimed at curbing profits in an attempt to reduce the interest of Hungarian companies in rouble-accounting exports: Export clearing rates will be restricted and the (?prompt)-cash system revised.

The statement points out that by late 1989 a very high surplus accumulated in Hungary's trade with every CMEA country. What this basically means is that the Hungarian state is providing an interest-free loan to these countries, giving thereby a boost to inflation and the deterioration in the convertible balance of payments.

Therefore, the Council of Ministers puts great emphasis on the need for the suspension of deliveries on credit, a fundamental condition for Hungary's acquiring convertible loans indispensable for the economy, in accord with agreements with international financial organisations.

The 1990 economic programme of the government forecasts a nearly 20 percent cut in rouble accounting exports. Yet, the situation is worse than expected, as Hungarian surpluses were continuing to grow during the first two months of the year.

The government took a principle decision on setting up a new venture in the form of probably a public limited company, in order to assist or transform companies facing difficulties because of the cut in rouble exports.

Poszgay Responds to Charges of Cowardice

LD1303232490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Imre Pozsgay reacted at an MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] election rally in Veszprem to an earlier comment by FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], in which they said that the minister of state is not willing to enter into a public debate with them in Sopron. Gyula Horvath reports:

[Horvath] Imre Pozsgay, MSZP Presidium member and one of the people leading the party list, reacted at the election rally held late tonight at the Veszprem country cultural center to the accusation voiced at noon today, according to which one of the fiery FIDESZ spokesmen called him a coward, saying Pozsgay did not have the courage to have political debate in his individual electoral constituency with his closest opponent.

Imre Pozsgay replied that because he has participated in a debate on French television, which 500 million viewers saw and heard in Europe, he is not frightened of a political war of words in Sopron either. He is of the opinion, however, that the Socialist Party and the organization concerned cannot take over Sopron's publicity for their own purposes. Let all of us candidates come forward before the audience, he proposed at the time to the leaders of the organization inviting him for a dialogue.

In Veszprem, Imre Pozsgay also said that the Socialist Party is not afraid of argument, because it has ammunition, it has a program, and it has credible election candidates. We only warn against impure election instruments, he said, because the election conditions proclaimed in the spirit of purification do not belong to free elections [as heard].

Opinion Poll Conducted on Upcoming Elections

AU1403104490 Budapest MTI in English 1939 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, 12 Mar (MTI)—In late February, 56.2 per cent of Hungarian voting citizens thought they would surely go to cast their votes on March 25, while 31.2 per cent said 'probably, or don't know', and 11.9 per cent would probably not, or not, attend the elections. This was revealed by a survey, Gallup Budapest, Ltd., a subsidiary of Gallup of the USA, carried out on a sample of 1,000 people, representing the population and selected from over 100 settlements.

At the press conference of Gallup Budapest held in Budapest on Monday, the two most likely favourites at the elections were said to be the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats.

If we take into consideration only those who have actually made up their minds to participate in the elections, the figures look as follows: 23.1 per cent would cast their votes in favour of the Alliance of Free Democrats [AFD], 21.5 per cent for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF—MDF], 17.4 per cent for the Independent Smallholders' Party, 8.7 per cent for the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP—MSZP], 7.7 for the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, 5.7 for the Federation of Young Democrats, 4.9 for the Christian Democratic People's Party and 3.8 for the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [HSWP—MSZMP]. The poll shows that it is the HDF and the AFD which will be able to mobilize most of their voters (83 and 78.9 per cent respectively).

52 cent of the people polled said they knew what party they would vote for. 68 per cent had a negative preference for one or the other party, with 42 per cent naming the HSWP, 8 per cent the HSP and 4 per cent the Independent Smallholders' Party as parties they would certainly not vote for.

The poll also included questions as to the person of the future president of the Republic. 24.6 per cent of the respondents went for Miklos Nemeth, 22.6 for Zoltan Kiraly and 12.3 for Matyas Szuros, out of a choice of eight names.

Socialist Party Supports Lithuanian Independence

LD1303213590 Warsaw PAP in English 1857 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 13—In a statement delivered to PAP, the presidium of the Chief Council of the PPS Polish Socialist Party stresses that it will not cooperate with Trotskyist groups like the PPS-RD (Democratic Revolution) or post-PUWP [Polish United Workers Party] groupings.

The PPS however wants to boost cooperation with the emigree PPS Central Foreign Committee and following future unification try to join the socialist international.

The leadership of the PPS adopted a resolution in which it "expresses great joy at the fact that Lithuania gained independence." The PPS expects the Polish Government to not only acknowledge this fact formally but also grant Lithuania economic assistance according to poland's possibilities and Lithuania's needs.

KPN Proclaims Support

LD1303213690 Warsaw PAP in English 2007 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 13—The day on which Lithuania was once again proclaimed an independent state is also a great day for us, reads a statement of the Confederation for an Independent Poland KPN, issued in connection with the proclamation of independence of Lithuania.

KPN's Political Council also announced a resolution in which it called on Poles, political parties, social and professional organizations to undertake efforts supporting Lithuanians.

The resolution also includes an appeal to the Polish Government to immediately recognize the Republic of Lithuania and to grant Lithuania all possible assistance, including the economic one.

FRG Agrees to Polish Role in German Talks

LD1403001390 Warsaw PAP in English 2240 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn, March 13—Bonn's government officials said today that the FRG will not object to Poland's participation in negotiations on German unification, held by four powers and the the two German states, in part dealing with borders, agencies reported in their dispatches from Bonn today.

Poland should have the possibility to express its stand in the frame lines of the two-plus-four talks at the level of senior officials.

REUTERS wrote that it was not clear whether this would take place through temporary increase in the number of participants in the negotiations or whether the participation of Polish senior officials would have an informal character.

Defense Committee Discusses Soviet Troop Presence

LD1303195890 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] A National Defense Committee met to discuss the course and conclusions of the visit to France by the president and prime minister. Certain aspects of the situation in Europe were also discussed, especially those relating to the question of the unification of Germany. Problems associated with the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland were considered.

The committee considered these matters in light of the as-yet-unclear new system of European security. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from our country should be coordinated with the developing international situation. Talks with the Soviet side on this matter, including the gradual reduction of these forces, are being undertaken. The committee recognized the need to revise the regulations regarding the temporary stationing of Soviet forces in Poland. Also needed is a significant reduction of the burden on society resulting from this stationing. The committee turned to the government to have the Foreign and Defense Ministries accelerate work on the subject of the Polish stance on the question of the new system of security in Europe. In connection with this, the committee will consider certain problems of defense policy. Familiarizing itself with the problems of the Defense Ministry, the committee pointed to the importance of strengthening the discipline and professional efficiency of the Army. It also recognized the need to support the forces of law and order in the struggle against crime.

Jaruzelski Discusses German Reunification

PM1303121690 Paris LIBERATION in French 9 Mar 90 pp 2-4

[Interview with President Wojciech Jaruzelski by Serge July and Pierre Vodnik in Warsaw; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted]

[LIBERATION] Sir, how do you interpret the change in position that was made in Bonn last Monday?

[Jaruzelski] This change is a tiny step in the right direction. There is a Polish proverb that states that one rotten apple spoils the whole barrel. Everybody knows that tactics must serve strategy and not the reverse. It seems that election tactics have dominated the strategy of historical conciliation between our peoples. But in the light of the recent West German statements, I wonder whether it is mere tactics: The delays, the double meanings, the changes of position suggest that the FRG reserves the right to have the last word on this subject when it can do so as one huge, powerful, and united Germany.

Changes are currently taking place in Europe that are not all to Poland's benefit. Bonn's change of attitude came about under pressure from public opinion in virtually all

the European countries, and from politicians, including French politicians, and we could add, without false modesty, that the announcement of the visit to Paris by the Polish president and prime minister had an influence.

The new German attitude is entirely inadequate. It does not take account of our expectations on the draft treaty that should be initialed by the two German states before the conference of six and signed by the future unified state. The Bonn plan only makes provision for a declaration of intent. Finally, what is even more significant is that the German coalition government's statement talks of "secure borders" and obstinately refuses to name this border, which is not just any border but the Oder-Neisse border. This document contains no reference to the 1970 agreement (Footnote) (Treaty between the FRG and Poland signed on 7 December 1970 in Warsaw by Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz relating to Bonn's recognition of the Oder-Neisse line). The problem therefore remains unsolved for Poland.

[LIBERATION] What do you expect your discussions with the French leaders to yield on this subject?

[Jaruzelski] We have just explained the Polish position and we expect the French president to reiterate his views on such essential problems on this occasion. This contact with France is extremely important. This is a crucial time for Europe. Everything is fluid. A new order is taking shape. If last year was the year of upheavals, 1990 will have to be the year when order is established in this part of the continent to guarantee peace and security in Europe.

Now that the Polish internal situation has changed and that this is in keeping with the wishes of President Mitterrand and the majority of French people, we are faced with new external problems, and it is necessary to renew the very special ties between France and Poland. We must give these relations a new quality.

[LIBERATION] Prime Minister Mazowiecki is accompanying you, others say that you are accompanying the prime minister, is this intended to give this visit a special dimension?

[Jaruzelski] I would like to express my respect for Francois Mitterrand who received me in Paris in 1985, although the situation was very different from the one which we are now experiencing and he then demonstrated great political imagination. In this connection, my present visit is a follow-on, but at a much higher level.

The prime minister and I, in fact, wanted this visit to have two aspects. In the international sphere, we want to stress the importance that Poland attaches to the German question. In the internal sphere, we want to show the very constructive nature of political cohabitation in Poland on all essential questions.

[LIBERATION] Do you expect France to give the go-ahead for Poland's participation in the conference of six—the two Germanies and the four 1945 victors—on German unity?

[Jaruzelski] We are counting on France's understanding. I remind you that Poland was invited to the Potsdam conference in 1945: It participated in the part of the discussions relating to the Oder-Neisse border. The USSR now supports the Polish demand to participate in the conference on German unity and I must say that it would be incomprehensible to us for France, so traditionally friendly toward Poland, not to share this position.

[LIBERATION] Chancellor Kohl has raised the question of war reparations. In 1953, Poland renounced the share owed to it by the GDR to help that country. On the other hand, in the treaty with the FRG signed in 1970, this question was not mentioned. Do you consider it to be settled once and for all?

[Jaruzelski] We did not raise it. But the problem is still open with regard to damages for Polish citizens who were victims of the Third Reich and who constantly make claims. Above all, this question has a moral dimension. It is not automatically linked to the question of the border, which is not open to discussion. With regard to the reparations question, we might return to it during negotiations on the peace treaty.

[LIBERATION] If there were sufficient guarantees on the border, if the Polish plan on this subject was adopted, would you regard German reunification as positive for Europe and Poland?

[Jaruzelski] If I had been asked that question a few months ago, I think that I would have answered yes. I can now no longer be as positive, because the process is not moving in a desirable direction. In particular, it is not going according to the wishes of France, which had always stated that Europe's unification must precede that of Germany. France then changed its position, invoking the parallel nature of the processes. We can now clearly see that German unification is leaving Europe's integration far behind it, with all the consequences that has: This is putting the cart before the horse.

[LIBERATION] Have the German chancellor's ambiguous statements about the border prompted a resurgence of nationalism in Poland?

[Jaruzelski] To say the least, it does not facilitate the process of conciliation between our two peoples that had developed very slowly over this last decade, especially among the younger generation that did not carry the legacy of the past. Recent events are reawakening old demons.

I have no complex about the Germans. They are a great people who have given much to Europe and to the world. I admire their discipline, their spirit of hardwork, but

history is the best teacher in life, as the Romans said.... When we raised these truths in the West, we were regarded with a degree of distaste, like somebody using vulgar words in an aristocratic drawing room. Everybody is now using these vulgar words.

[LIBERATION] Do you think that a unified Germany should be in NATO, should have a foot in each alliance, or should be neutralized?

[Jaruzelski] I do not want to give a categorical verdict on the subject. It is not the essential question: At pressent, the European balance is threatened with disturbances and that is worrying. We can be very critical about the means by which this balance has been guaranteed for the past 45 years, notably by terror, but whatever people say, this balance has given Europe 45 years of peace. In the new European constellation, we must now find a means of guaranteeing collective security. I would like our Western partners to understand that there is a feeling of threat in this part of Europe. That is why we understand Soviet anxieties, especially since the USSR is still the main guarantor of our security.

[LIBERATION] Do you understand the request by Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the withdrawal of Soviet troops?

[Jaruzelski] The time has finally come when the East European countries are no longer discussed as a monolith led by Moscow. It is futile to compare Portugal with Britain, or Norway with Italy, just as you cannot compare Poland with Bulgaria, or Czechoslovakia with Romania. These countries are different because of their past and their present development. With regard to Soviet troops, the question of their withdrawal concerns only two countries—Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In those two countries, the Red Army intervened for political reasons many years after the war, whereas in Poland, the presence of Soviet troops is the result of the war. Moreover, Poland plays the role of rear strategic base for the Soviet troops deployed in the GDR. Finally, we must not forget that Czechoslovakia's and Hungary's western borders, unlike those of Poland, are not in question.

[LIBERATION] Are we to understand that you think Poland remains an essential element of the Soviet military forces?

[Jaruzelski] That is true, but the USSR is also an essential element from the viewpoint of Poland's strategic security.

[LIBERATION] What do you think of Vaclav Havel's plan to create a "coordination of national policies to jointly return to Europe" that relates to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia? An initial meeting of the three countries' leaders is scheduled to take place in Bratislava on 9 April.

[Jaruzelski] Opinions within the three countries concerned are very different on this subject. Poland is very interested in creating a form of institutional ties aimed at going as far as possible. But we believe that the situation is not yet right in our partners' countries. We are prepared to participate in this process.

[LIBERATION] Your former Solidarity opponents often welcome your cooperation: Are you surprised by that?

[Jaruzelski] Times change and so do people. If the attitude toward me has changed, I would like to stress that my attitude has changed too. It was not the others who came to Jaruzelski, it was Jaruzelski who also went to them. And I think that this is a great success for Poland. We have met each other halfway, each respecting our nation's supreme values. In addition, there is the subjective factor: When you are at a distance, you only see the shadows and not the people; when you come closer, you can make out faces, and when you begin to exchange ideas, you see that everything is even more complicated. I have had very pleasant surprises with my political opponents: I suddenly understood that they were people with whom I had a great deal in common. I have great respect and even liking for Prime Minister Mazowiecki: There is enormous trust between us.

[LIBERATION] Will you complete your term of office?

[Jaruzelski] That is very tricky for me. The latest opinion polls show that 65 percent of Poles have a positive view of my action. But everything depends on the general situation and possible early elections. I do not think it is realistic to adhere to the constitutional length of the term of office, which is six years. But I am calm about what happens.

[LIBERATION] Are you in favor of early parliamentary elections?

[Jaruzelski] The forthcoming elections are scheduled to take place in 1993. I do not now know whether this date will be maintained but I think it would be harmful for Poland to hold elections too soon. There are two reasons for that. First, there is the old military principle that stipulates that you should not open two fronts at the same time: For us, the main front is the economic reform. Any election campaign is a form of combat that is likely to distract from the essential aims. The economic reform needs time. The second reason is that to hold authentic elections and not a people's plebiscite, as in 1989, real political parties must emerge with programs and leaders. Today, there is Solidarity, which is a very broad conglomerate of different forces and orientations united by common symbols. In addition, we have around 40 parties, each of which could fit onto my sofa, and finally an emerging left that is greatly reformed and that does not yet exist as a force that counts. In these conditions, pluralism as you mean it in the West could not be guaranteed.

[LIBERATION] Are you still a Communist?

[Jaruzelski] That depends on what you mean by communist. This word now has negative connotations. Real socialism has suffered a defeat, which does not mean

that the ideals of social justice are no longer relevant. The aim is to find ways of implementing them, using all mankind's achievements, including those of the social democratic and socialist parties in the West. I will not do the same as Marshal Pilsudski who, in his youth, was a socialist and who uttered this famous sentence: "I left the red streetcar at 'Independence' station." I did not leave the red streetcar at "Pluralism" station. As president, I would like to ensure that the different-colored streetcars follow their routes without colliding.

[LIBERATION] Why are you doing nothing to dispel the mystery surrounding the night of 13 December 1981—the proclamation of martial law—the secret of which you say you will carry to your grave?

[Jaruzelski] It is more complicated than you think. Although 65 percent of Poles think I played a positive role, only 45 percent of people in opinion polls find me likable. That proves that a majority view me with antipathy. I accept that. I do not know how to use the media, that is how I am after 45 years in the Army. The secret that you mention does not prevent me from fulfilling my current responsibilities because even those who criticize me recognize that after 13 December, I gradually adopted a course that culminated in the 1989 roundtable, which I initiated. And I still say that without martial law, there would never have been a roundtable.

[LIBERATION] You are 67 years old. Are there important decisions that you now regret?

[Jaruzelski] I see many tactical mistakes in the decisions relating to people. I could probably have done better but, in view of the situation, I did not make any strategic mistakes.

Solidarity Paper on Future Left Alignments

PM0103090490 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 5 Jan 90 p 7

[Janusz Pawlowski and Janusz Wegielek article: "Road to Nowhere: Will the Left Topple Mazowiecki?"]

[Text] The new editorial team of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC has initiated a new campaign under the slogan "Speak of Subjects on Which We Were Silent Before." One question that used to be shrouded in tacit silence until now is the internal split within Solidarity. Another is the tendency of the left-wing group within Solidarity to engage in a political alliance with the so-called reformers within the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR].

It seems that this latter question will have particularly significant implications for the future, so it is worth taking a closer look at it. To understand the political significance of the left wing-PZPR alliance, we must go back at least as far as 1980. It was then that the destructive nature of communism was definitively revealed. That system completed the process of methodical destruction of the Polish state and nation and then finally disclosed the truth of its civilizational impotence to the world.

In 1980 there emerged a possibility of eliminating that system, but the public exposure of its true nature that took place at the time proved to be an insufficient prerequisite for such a coup. From 1981 onward, socialism survived in Poland only owing to military pressure from the USSR. All subsequent chaotic attempts at rescuing the system from the condition of civilizational and moral collapse proved abortive.

At that time socialism also announced its bankruptcy in the USSR. From that moment **the system in Poland existed, as it were, in a vacuum,** and lost—at least temporarily—its support in the form of Soviet military guarantees.

Anyone observing the development of events could have asked how the system would try to save itself and what new strategy it would invent for this purpose. It was obvious that such an attempt would be made. This is because the most basic interests of too many people are tied in with continued preservation of the socialist status quo. It became clear that all the old defensive methods, the whole spectrum of renewals, "thaws", leadership changes, and even "New Economic Policies" would not be sufficient in the new situation. In order to save its skin once more, socialism would have to force itself to undergo a risky attempt at a systemic mutation.

Jerzy Urban sketched the basic framework of such a "grand-style operation" as early as 1981, in a letter addressed to Stanislaw Kania. Looking for a way out of the desperate situation in which the party found itself at the time, Urban pointed out that the following three goals would have to be reached:

1—An atmosphere of "major political breakthrough" should be created, in which the Communist authorities would distance themselves from their past, thereby avoiding responsibility for it. In Urban's opinion, the PZPR should outbid everyone else in disclosing and condemning the ills of socialism, and in this way it could place itself in the forefront of the opposition and retain its control over the state, this time as an opposition force. Admittedly, this maneuver was tried once before, in October 1956, but this time it should be done with much more vigor and its range should be wider, so that all analogies with 1956 could be effectively obliterated from public memory.

2—Another goal should be to reach a "compromise with the moderate forces within the opposition"—that is, those that do not question the existing system in its entirety, or at the most are only prepared to change the system slowly and by evolution. Thanks to such a compromise, the party would no longer come under direct attack from the public and could thus gain enough time to undergo an internal reconstruction and to adapt itself to the new situation.

3—Urban's plan also envisioned coming to an agreement with the moderate opposition on the future model of the political system in Poland. This new model would have to guarantee that Communists retain a significant role in the state in the present period and create conditions for them to regain their power in the future.

For many reasons Jerzy Urban's plan could not be implemented in 1981. However, an increasing number of indications suggest that it has been decoded in order to realize it now, in a situation where all other solutions have failed.

Attempts to put the first point of Urban's scenario into practice relied on wholesale criticism of so-called Stalinism. This was supposed to **create an impression of a complete turnabout in the party's orientation** and suggest that it was denouncing all its tradition. This, in turn, was supposed to provide a platform for integrating the authors of reforms within the party with the so-called constructive opposition and the antisocialist feelings of the whole population.

There followed the period of the roundtable debate and the so-called historic compromise that was achieved there. This was expected to arrest the progressive collapse of the system, place its evolution under joint control of the constructive opposition and the reformist party leadership. The party itself, which was temporarily removed from power, was thereby supposed to gain time for an internal stocktaking operation.

The roundtable debate did indeed bring significant changes in public life and created conditions for political freedom and ideological pluralism. However, from the viewpoint of the Communist elite its most important aspect was that it guaranteed it presidential power and postponed the moment of introducing definitive changes into the state system until 1993.

Contrary to the expectations cultivated by Communist reformers, all their moves to date have failed to bring them the advantages that Urban's plan envisioned. Thus, despite considerable effort, it has not proved possible to represent the bankruptcy of the socialist system as a major turning point in a grand style. The results of the June elections attest to this very clearly. The failure of socialism is still interpreted as a collapse of a contemptible, alien, and inefficient system.

Given this situation, the only solution that could still offer Communists the status of a positive force is a maneuver that is often applied by low-popularity groups contending for power. This consists in tying in their own political interest with the slogans and aspirations of another group that enjoys a high credibility rating with the general public. In this way, Communists hope to **gain at least some reflected prestige** and, by association, become a focus of a certain amount of popular hopes and aspirations.

From the viewpoint of the PZPR elite circles, the left-wing opposition is a natural candidate for the role of such a lifebelt. There are many arguments in its favor: ideological affinity; a sense of belonging to the same milieu (a predominant majority in the left-wing opposition is represented by former PZPR members); finally, an awareness of the shared threat of competition from the re-emerging groups representing center and right-wing ideological orientation in Polish thought and from their political exponents.

In its turn, the rating of the left-wing opposition group goes up or down depending on whether the public regards it at a given moment as a representation of Solidarity as a whole, a splinter group, or a minority faction. This is because it could only enter an alliance with the PZPR, bringing with it Solidarity's moral and political dowry, in the first instance, which would offer such an alliance an incalculable wealth of dividends. Consequently, the tactic of glossing over the differences and splits and identifying itself (a part) as the whole must be undoubtedly regarded as the left-wing opposition's best maneuver.

On the other hand, all the groups and individuals who refuse to grant socialism an extension of its life and allow its consolidation in a new form are duty bound to reveal these differences and splits in the public forum. It is worth adding here that any "new form of socialism" is a smokescreen that camouflages the old, unchanged mechanisms of the communist system, which will sooner or later inevitably lead the state and its economy back to square one.

Of course, it would be unthinkable for the lay left-wing orientation to enter into an alliance with the PZPR without spelling out specific terms of the deal. First of all, the partner must no longer be known as the PZPR, either by name or by its ideological declarations. Such a partner, having for many years been denounced in the name of "dignity," "morality," "democracy," and so on, would be simply unacceptable for both the Polish and the Western public. This is why it is to be expected that either the approaching party congress will result in a Hungarian-style split in the party, or the PZPR as a whole will "paint itself a new color"—most probably a social democratic hue. However, if we remember the great importance attached by Communists to preserving an alternative "pure" orientation (the so-called "hard-liners"), **a split is more probable.** The split need not imply a fragmentation of the whole communist infrastructure, that is, the enormous assets commanded by the party, its information centers, buildings and premises, modern technology resources, and so on. The mere fact of owning all these assets makes the putative alliance partner very attractive indeed and, to tell the truth, it gives him a very solid base from which to step in and claim a strong position within the new power structure. The dowry represented by commanding social prestige and public approval could be amalgamated with the dowry represented by the tangible assets, thereby creating a complete and convincing entity.

While we are talking about material assets, it would be difficult to overlook the matter of foreign loans, financial concessions, and in general all the other forms of assistance from the West. At the same time the question of the timing of the arrival of the material assistance obtained for Poland by Walesa and the Mazowiecki government is important insofar as Poland's economic situation could begin to improve after such an injection of finance, and this could even assume the shape of relative prosperity for our distressed and impoverished nation. Now the key issue for those at the helm will be to take the credit for the improvement and bask in the resultant glory.

Consequently, it appears that the best moment for the emergence of a joint front of all left-wing orientations and their assumption of power would be the period of aggravated economic crisis preceding the first positive effects of the economic reforms. And it is all too easy to aggravate the crisis artificially by the application of means and methods that have been already tried and tested by the Communists many times before: After all, the deepening crisis is in itself virtually a natural and inevitable phenomenon after 40 years of communist rule. Then the alliance would gain a valuable point that politicians have always rated highly: the argument of yesterday's decline against today's improvement. As a result, a return to socialist domination would be given at least partial absolution in the eyes of the population.

Thus, we can now see the emergence of a pattern of transformations to be observed in all states that were captured and seized by communism. Paradoxically, Romania's "conservatism" attested to its far-reaching independence of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the first stage of the transition period we observe the following processes of disintegration: an invigoration or even outright creation of certain thoroughly compromised structures (but never the fundamental socialist structures); inflationary phenomena; finally, a virtually cathartic exposure of the true condition of the state and the population.

However, we should be aware that the disintegration is a controlled phenomenon—controlled with a view to a future reintegration that would take place on a higher level. We are, of course, thinking here of an alliance between the left wing of the opposition—with all the moral prestige it commands—and the reform-oriented splinter group of the communist establishment. During this period it would be possible to avoid such dangerous pitfalls as spontaneous large-scale public demonstrations and to secure political, technical, and financial assistance from the West. This model, presenting a comparatively easy solution to the crisis of communism, could, after all, prove the most effective.

There are two factors that could prevent the creation of such an alliance in Poland: the independent stand maintained by Lech Walesa and a successful campaign designed to correctly condition the public against an alliance.

If an independent and powerful Walesa were to not give his blessing to a left wing-communist alliance, it would render such an alliance imperfect and deprive it of any real influence.

All the large-scale sociopolitical processes taking place in the second half of the 20th century depend to a considerable extent on the correct conditioning of public opinion—and we should remember that "correct" as considered from one viewpoint may mean "incorrect" as considered from another.

TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC has an extremely important task to fulfill here. Jozef Mackiewicz is right when he claims that the Polish nation found itself helpless in the face of Soviet occupation mainly because neither the London government [in exile] nor the Home Army saw fit to prepare public opinion for that danger before it became reality. A parallel situation could arise today. Solidarity—that symbol of national autonomy and independence that is even regarded as a symbol of our national identity (though we consider this a gross exaggeration) —could find itself being used to help Communists retain and consolidate their position of power; and the problem will remain the same whether or not they rename themselves social democrats.

If the communists' putative partners think that they could use the alliance for their own purposes—such as to create a new face for socialism—then they are wrong. They would only help to restart the old mechanisms that would eventually be bound to drag them again, along with the whole country, between the grinding cogs and wheels of the counter-civilizational destruction. Because, contrary to the desperately propounded myth, socialism does not have many faces, nor does it follow many roads. It follows only one road: the road to nowhere.

Electoral Law Provides for Sainte-Laguee System

LD0303215790 Warsaw PAP in English 1834 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 3—Sejm's extraordinary committee adopted today a draft electoral law to local self-government. It provides for the majority system of elections in small localities and the proportional one in larger towns. The State Electoral Commission will be replaced by a national electoral commissioner. The Sejm committee suggested that elections could be held on May 13.

The committee rejected the Senate's proposal to have majority vote. Such a system of voting is preferred in the communities having no more than 40,000 residents. Deputies spoke in favour of counting the votes by the Sainte-Laguee method applied in Scandinavian countries.

Following the committee's decisions, a vast majority of Polish communities will stage the elections according to the majority system while the proportional system will

be binding only in 105 communes, but inhabited by nearly 40 per cent of Poland's population.

Financial Official on Economic Program

AU0803150290 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Mar 90 pp 1,2

[Interview with Marek Dabrowski, Finance Ministry secretary of state, by Piotr Aleksandrowicz; place and date not given: "A Road Through Purgatory"]

[Text] [Aleksandrowicz] Judging from what economists and politicians are saying, it is not inflation that is currently the chief economic problem, but the recession. Do you agree?

[Dabrowski] Yes and no. Certainly, high inflation is already behind us, but there is still a danger that it might come back. That is why I think it is wrong to try and revive the economy rapidly. Without profound structural adaptation, this could only bring back inflation.

[Aleksandrowicz] What do you mean by profound structural adaptation?

[Dabrowski] I mean changes in the distribution of the factors of production—manpower, energy, raw materials, imported commodities, machines, and fixed assets. But it also means a change in the behavior of economic units, a change in the economic way of thinking.

[Aleksandrowicz] Why are these changes not taking place? They were supposed to be one of the results of the economic program.

[Dabrowski] We are already observing the first signs of change, but major adaptation takes time. The government program is only two months old. There is still a mental barrier in the minds of enterprise managers and work forces. In addition, a "wait-and-see" attitude persists among people. The actors on the economic stage think that financial restrictions will be eased this time as well. As a result, managers are sending their work forces on vacation, while they themselves put pressure on the government.

[Aleksandrowicz] What about the government?

[Dabrowski] I see no reason at all why the government should change its policies. I think that when the attempts to put pressure on the government prove to be unsuccessful and when several major enterprises go bankrupt in March and April, that will be a sign that the game is serious and that it is time to think about serious changes.

[Aleksandrowicz] But it is not heavy industry where output has fallen the most, rather the consumer goods industries, including food.

[Dabrowski] That is understandable, because it is the consumers who have adapted themselves to the new situation the fastest. They have restricted their consumption and altered their shopping habits. Food is no longer being wasted at home.

The next stage is to transfer this adaptation to the producers. Indeed, this has already started among producers of consumer goods, but soon a wave of change should hit the producers of supply and investment goods. As a result, there should be a relative improvement to the situation of the consumer goods industries. The trend will change.

[Aleksandrowicz] Why should it change?

[Dabrowski] Several factors will already appear in March. First of all, the interest rate has fallen considerably. Second, consumers reacted very sharply to the price hikes in January, when they still had stocks of food in their homes. Now these stocks have dwindled. One can also refrain from buying a coat or a pair of shoes, but only for a few months. That is why I think the demand for consumer goods will increase somewhat, especially because further income is expected in March—wage increases for employees in the budgetary sphere, pension increases, and bonuses payable out of profits.

A certain revival should occur in the consumer goods industries. However, heavy industries will encounter difficulties later, and these will last longer.

[Aleksandrowicz] Nevertheless, so far we have been dealing with a rather indiscriminate restriction of production in good and bad enterprises.

[Dabrowski] I think we are already on the road that goes through purgatory, albeit at its very beginning. Superfluous manpower is being laid off, and attitudes toward work are changing. Some enterprises are revising their trade policy. There are attempts to expand the range of products, sell off redundant machinery, and reduce stocks. Here and there, plants are considering changing the sources of their supplies and altering the structure of their production. Also, there is a considerable exchange of managerial personnel going on.

However, there is still an absence of bankruptcies and major changes in ownership. That is partly our fault, because not all the legislation was ready on time.

[Aleksandrowicz] Some economists think that the government should influence these structural changes. Do you agree?

[Dabrowski] I think the only thing the government can do is see to it that the rules of financial independence are firmly applied, and introduce mechanisms and institutions to facilitate market processes. I cannot imagine anyone on top forecasting who will win and who will lose. It is not the government that should be the arbitrator in the processes of restructuring, but the market and the economic units that exist in it, plus the private owners and foreign shareholders. It is they who should decide whether or not a firm that is in financial difficulties has a chance of breaking even, and whether or not it is worth rescuing it.

[Aleksandrowicz] However, more and more people are talking of a dramatic economic situation and the need to change the program. What do you think of that?

[Dabrowski] I think there is a great deal of exaggeration here, even hysteria, because no real analysis of the facts has been made. Unfortunately, we are dealing with both a lack of elementary economic knowledge, and a struggle by some people to preserve their parochial interests. Let me give an example. Everywhere we hear news that farmers are slaughtering their dairy cows, and that there is an immediate need to revise agricultural policy. However, the statistics provided by the main Statistical Office do not confirm this need. Apart from that, a certain drop in food production is inevitable because in this sphere, as in every other sphere, there are producers who produce too expensively.

One can comment exactly the same way about those who claim the private sector is collapsing. The statistics for January show that more firms have been created than closed down (excluding those who suspended their activity for a while).

Last year, thousands of private enterprises emerged, enterprises bent on rapidly winning profits by acting as intermediaries in the trade of goods, indulging in speculation, and exploiting the weaknesses of the state sector. It is obvious that under the present diametrically different conditions, these firms will be shut down by their owners because the golden era is at an end. Some of the traditional workshops are no longer efficient, and will also have to go.

[Aleksandrowicz] Nevertheless, more and more politicians and economists are asking the government whether it has any program for emerging from the recession, and when it is going to implement it.

[Dabrowski] There is no such thing as a decision on how to emerge from a recession, nor is there any mathematical formula on how to achieve it, because there can be no such formula. However, the stabilization program itself contains features that encourage a revival. These features are the elimination of inflation and the budget deficit, the opening up of the economy to the world, and a reduction in the rate of interest and inflation. Another feature is the elimination of quotas in imports and exports, and the reduction of customs tariffs, which has already been announced. Also, the tax-free allowance on wage increases should go up in May.

A second set of features consists of institutional changes, in other words the abolition of monopolies, privatization, and the appearance of chains of commercial banks and financial institutions.

[Aleksandrowicz] Nevertheless, every government has the possibility of reviving the economy by additional means. When should this possibility be exploited?

[Dabrowski] No sooner than the end of June, if at all. However, the recession may last six months, or it may last two or three years. The fall in output will be halted after a few months, but the scale of essential structural changes is so great that a major increase in the national income may only be possible after these changes have been carried out, in other words in two or three years time. If the radical reform had been commenced 10 years ago, the period of "purgatory" might have been shorter.

[Aleksandrowicz] The additional activity to revive the economy, what sort of activity could that be?

[Dabrowski] One can imagine the traditional policy of selective activity by means of tax concessions, preferences, and privileges. This is unacceptable, and would probably lead to a restoration of inefficient economic structures and higher inflation.

The second method is the classic Keynesian policy of increasing demand by increasing the taxation of the public sector. This achieved results in the 1930's, when there was no inflation, the zloty was based on gold, a long recession had just ended, and there were enormous reserves of production potential. Today, however, the same policy would cause stagnation, coupled with inflation.

Generally speaking, the state's activity should consist of restricting budgetary spending and reducing tax, especially tax on profits. The fall in income derived from taxation can be offset by reducing subsidies in the fuel and energy industry, accelerating privatization and the profits derived from it, and acquiring foreign credits.

It should be easier for foreign capital to establish a foothold in Poland, and the transfer of profits out of Poland should be more liberal. A further deregulation of the economy is called for. Finally, in line with privatization and the establishment of real owners of the economy, wage controls should be abolished altogether.

Sejm Amends Constitution on Self-Government

LD0803234690 Warsaw PAP in English 2134 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 8—The Sejm made amendments to the constitution linked to the reform of the territorial self-government. The most important amendments concern chapter no. 6 that got a new title "territorial self-government." The articles no. 43-47 are amended. The following are some amendments:

Article 43. 1. Territorial self-government is the basic form of the organization of public life in rural community.

Article 44. 2. The autonomy of a rural community is subject to court protection. 3. The rural community executes tasks ordered by government administration in the scope settled by laws.

Article 45. 1. A council elected by residents of a rural community is a decision-making body of the rural community. The law determines the principles and procedure of the election. 2. The council elects executive bodies of the rural community.

Article 46. The rural community has the right of property and other property rights. They make up municipal property.

The Basic Law envisages that by the end of the present term of office people's councils and local bodies of administration operate under hitherto regulations.

Discusses Self-Government Further

LD0903054390 Warsaw PAP in English
2250 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 8—There is not a single day passing without a demonstration, said an onlooker outside Polish parliament today watching an oncoming demonstration with green banners closing on the Sejm. That was a demonstration of farmers demanding a greater presentation of difficult problems, troubling Polish farming nowadays, in Polish TV. It is worth adding that a day earlier a "black procession" demanding a self-government for Warsaw had been vocal outside the Sejm, too.

Opening today's meeting of the Sejm, its speaker Mikolaj Kozakowiecz read a letter from Pope John Paul II with thanks for the wishes which Sejm deputies and senators had sent to him on Christmas. In his letter addressed to Poland's Primate Jozef Glemp and passed on to parliament, the Pope wrote about the responsibility and historic tasks befalling both houses of the Polish parliament.

There was another uncommon occurance in the house today. For the second time the same man, in the same term of office, took the deputy's oath. Marian Szatybelko had been deprived of his mandate because the election law had been infringed in his constituency (without his knowing it). On December 1, Sejm chose to hold by-elections which he won again.

The shape of the future local self-government and preparation of the elections came to be the topic no. one at the Sejm today. Speaking at the Sejm in January Premier Mazowiecki found the establishing of a true local self-government to be the most urgent task at present and he called it a building of grass-root democracy.

The vote at the Sejm was held at night. The Sejm passed basic laws on self-government.

The several-month long discussion on the reform of local self-government, held at first at the Sejm, next at the Forum of the Extraordinary Committee, was once again reflected by the plenary discussion at the Sejm today. Sejm deputies cited various pros and cons. There were also voices negating the bills altogether.

Earlier, however, the house heard the outcome of the extraordinary comittee's work on the bills submitted by the senate (the latter's first legislative initiative ever).

The new local self-government will be one-pronged.

The regional council will be the representative of the rural community in the voivodship while the national union of communities will do the same on the national level.

In reference to the anniversary of the March 1968 events, Deputy Speaker Tadeusz Fiszbach made a statement in the House on behalf of the Sejm presidium and in agreement with the Sejm seniors.

The Sejm is at one with the intentions of the Senate's statement on March 1968. The Sejm, too, like the Senate, sees the necessity for making a political and moral assessment of the background and course of those events. We expect action from the government, said the deputy-speaker, which will make amends for the harm done then to so many of Polish citizens.

On Friday, the Sejm will go into the second day of their deliberations.

Walesa Cited on 'Factions' Within OKP

LD1003230490 Warsaw PAP in English
1906 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—The agency UNIA-PRESS has turned to Lech Walesa to comment on Adam Michnik's article in GAZETA WYBORCZA of March 7 in which the latter called on the Citizens' Parliamentary Club (OKP) for maintaining its unity.

"Polish society is becoming pluralistic. Various tendencies, political factions are taking shape. No wonder that factions also emerge within the OKP which constitutes emanation of solidarity. This situation should not be treated as a sensation or a disaster," today's TRYBUNA daily quotes Walesa's answer to UNIA-PRESS.

In this case, if we get it right, Adam Michnik's appeal failed to win the support of the Solidarity chairman, commented TRYBUNA.

On Friday, the same paper carried UNIA-PRESS' poll of a number of other politicians on the article, among them two OKP Sejm deputies who presented conflicting stands on the issue: Andrzej Lapicki coming out for Michnik and Ryszard Bugaj to the contrary.

Rural Solidarity Backs Balcerowicz Hesitantly

LD1303141890 Warsaw PAP in English
1851 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—The "TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW SOLIDARNOSC" weekly of Rural Solidarnosc writes about the moods among Polish farmers and carries an extensive report on the debates of the national council of the organization.

On February 28 the members of the council met with deputies and senators from the Rural Solidarnosc lobby. The parliamentarians were at one in defending the government's policy, arguing that at this stage nothing more can be won for agriculture. Senate Deputy Speaker Jozef Slisz also took the government's side, saying that Finance Minister Balcerowicz's program, despite its many defects, is flexible and should bring tangible results soon.

The union's chairman, Gabriel Janowski protested against the thesis that Balcerowicz's program has no alternative. Marek Gruchelski of the National Centre of Studies and Analysis presented the provisions of an alternative economic program. In his view it is a mistake to accept that inflation is related to demand by nature (empty money on the market) and that faulty overhauling will cause: 25-30 percent unemployment, the collapse of a million farms, and deep economic recession. Western (German) capital will flow in to mend the economy "but this will not be our economy anymore or our state," Gruchelski stressed.

In his opinion, one should focus on increasing supply through better use of the existing capital and manpower. For 5-7 years the economy should operate continuously, without breaks. To this end it is necessary to introduce a longer daily working hours by 2 and introduce a shift system. Thanks to this there will be no unemployment and inflation will be eliminated for good in 2-3 years. In this period, nonetheless, it will be necessary to freeze a portion of the population's incomes (Treasury bonds).

Boosting production will increase the budget's income which in turn will permit the government to use tax and credit brakes [as received], particularly with regard to agriculture. Farmers would receive additional rebates for better use of equipment through cooperation between farms.

The trade unionists put many questions to the author of the program and expressed doubts. On the whole, however they backed it, unanimously empowering the Presidium to work out an alternative economic program heading in the direction charted out by Gruchelski, the TYGODNIK ROLNIKOW writes.

During a press conference the situation of the union was described as being "between the hammer and the anvil." "If we oppose the government too early, we will bear responsibility for blocking the Balcerowicz program. If we do this too late, we will be accused of not reacting even though we knew what was happening," spokesman of Rural Soldiarnosc Piotr Dabrowski said.

"However, we will not call for protest action up to the moment the alternative economic program has been presented," added Gabriel Janowski, the chairman of Rural Solidarnosc.

Walesa Meets Gdansk Farmers, Called 'Scapegoat'

LD1403050690 Warsaw PAP in English 2117 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Gdansk, March 12—"You are a scapegoat," one farmer said to Solidarnosc leader Lech Walesa at a meeting with private farmers of the Gdansk region and members and sympathizers of rural Solidarnosc in the village of Kielno today. "We are attacking you for all that the government and minister did against agriculture or what they did not do in its favour," the man told Walesa.

The farmers thought that the present agrarian policy led to destruction of agriculture. They held it against the government that it did not keep its promise that farming production would be profitable. They accused the government of not having any economic concept as regards agriculture. The agriculture minister was attacked for not being able to "get through" with the farmers' problems in the government.

Walesa said that he supported the "bandit-style" program of Balcerowicz because there was no better one. " I will back anyone who can provide such a better program. It would be the most stupid thing to destroy Polish agriculture. Agriculture was and will remain paramount. Don't believe that someone wants to finish it off. Agreed, there is an inappropriate agrarian policy but where can one find another program. The worst is behind us. Little by little everything should fall into place by itself, on the market. This government is barely into the middle of its first year," Walesa told the farmers.

In the context of the upcoming local elections, Walesa pointed to threat of a new Nomenklatura surfacing, stating: "I said a long time ago that if we fill in the vancancies left behind by the communists, things could even get worse. That is why I constantly call for new parties to be set up and new structures and mechanisms built."

Minister Calls For Annulment of Militia Reserve

AU1103191690 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Mar 90 p 1

['(JACH)'-signed report: "An Association That Goes Against The Process of Democratization"]

[Text] On 5 February, Justice Minister Aleksander Bentkowski filed an extraordinary petition to have the registration of the Association for Supporting Public Order annulled. Thus, the Association will not be permitted to exist.

The first report about the Association (GAZETA WYBORCZA no. 45—"Tremble in Peace, the Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens' Militia Is On Guard") caused an immediate reaction from a group of Citizens' Parliamentary Club deputies, who protested against it.

In his petition, the minister writes that the court deemed a coordination of the association's activities with those of the Interior Ministry to be a sufficient criterion for the association to exist. However, the association's statute reveals that its objectives and tasks are largely similar to those of the former Voluntary Citizens' Militia Reserve [ORMO].

The court, Bentkowski writes, has overlooked the fact that the association's participation in protecting the public order infringes upon the statutory powers of the prosecutors, militia, and interior ministry. This could lead to a covert inconsistency in the work of the authorities.

The minister also stresses that resurrecting an organization that is deemed to be a manifestation of state totalitarianism goes against the process of democratization.

Personnel Changes in Torun Militia

LD1303225390 Warsaw PAP in English 2055 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—A protest by militiamen in the Torun Voivodship has been suspended after the minister of internal affairs recalled the head of the voivodship office of internal affairs in Torun Col. Stanislaw Lukasik and the deputy head for security service in Torun Col. Zygmunt Grochowski. Col. Henryk Kuczkowski was appointed the new head of the militia in Torun.

The protest action had been initiated at the appeal of the voivodship founding commission of the Independent Union of Militiamen in Torun which agreed to suspend it until the internal affairs minister makes a decision regarding the remaining two deputy heads of the voivodship office and appoints torun's new militia chiefs.

In another development today, the interior minister dismissed Col Marian Strychowski, the deputy head of the voivodship office for security service affairs in Konin, at the latter's request.

February Economic Statistics Released

AU1303100590 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 8 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by Andrzej Leszczynski: "The Recession Continues"]

[Text] On average, the quantity of industrial output sold daily in February was 0.2 percent lower than in January. This means that the economic recession is continuing and has even worsened to a slight extent. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the preliminary statistical date for February released by the Main Office of Statistics.

As a result, the level of industrial output that was sold in the first 2 months of this year was 23.5 percent lower than one year ago. The sharpest drops to have been recorded were in the food sector, 39.1 percent, and light industry, 32.8 percent, that is, in those industries that feed and clothe us.

Commenting on these retrogressive signs, Krzysztof Lutostanski, Main Office of Statistics vice president, cited the demand ceiling several times. The ceiling still exists, although the rate at which wages grew in February was 14.9 percent higher than in January. However, after deducting the "13th" monthly wage payment, wages grew by only 6.3 percent. Earlier price increases caused the demand ceiling to grow firmer. However, statisticians are still not in a position to say all that much about prices in February.

Prices within the industry grew by barely seven percent, which may be a good sign. Foodstuff prices on 1 and 2 March were approximately what they were from 25 through 28 February.

The Main Office of Statistics also reports that limited domestic demand has caused producers to seek refuge in exporting. Exports more than doubled in February and exceeded the February 1989 level. The increase in imports was more balanced. However, two months into this year, foreign trade is still below last year's level.

There have been no changes in agriculture. There has been a modest increase in the number of apartments completed and available for occupancy. Although the recession is continuing, no bankruptcies have been recorded.

K. Lutostanski said: "If this continues, banks might go bankrupt instead of enterprises."

The number of unemployed has exceeded 150,000, but the Main Office of Statistics still does not know how many people are on unpaid leave or have been obliged to take leave.

SDRP Supreme Council Urges Law on Parties

LD1103231890 Warsaw PAP in English 2016 GMT 10 Mar 90

["SDRP Supreme Council Meets"—PAP headline]

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—The chief council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic at a meeting here today protested against the principles of personnel verification as proposed in the draft law on the prosecutor's office which—as they pointed out—bear features of collective responsibility.

The participants in the meeting also expressed their disappointment with Sejm's decisions concerning local self- government. According to the council, laws on self-government should guarantee more real power for people, more democracy as well as provide legal safeguards for local funds as a shield against voluntarism of administration.

Members of the council adopted a stand in which they condemned abuses and violations of law for political reasons in the past by organs established to ensure law-abidingness.

"It is a matter of urgency and necessity to pass a law on political parties," said the council in another resolution.

Poland to Resume Diplomatic Relations With Chile

LD1103225590 Warsaw PAP in English
1843 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 11—The governments of Poland and Chile decided to resume diplomatic relations on an ambassadorial level as of March 11. In connection with this representatives of both governments signed an appropriate protocol today.

The governments of Poland and Chile resumed diplomatic relations under the principles and provisions of the U.N. Charter and decisions of the Vienna convention of 1961 on diplomatic relations, in the conviction that this historic decision will permit fruitful cooperation between both nations and contribute to the strengthening of traditional ties of friendship between the two nations.

Premier Questioned on Fate of WWII Documents

LD1403094590 Warsaw PAP in English
2100 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 12—A group of six Sejm (Lower House) deputies issued a question to the prime minister expressing growing concern over the fate of documents associated with the Home Army—Poland's undeground army during World War Two—in connection with numerous reports of archives being destroyed in offices of the former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

A significant portion of these documents was held in the archives of the PUWP Central Committee. Various information goes to show that other documents still inaccessible to historians, especially those associated with political trials and the operations of the UB [Security Administration] security office, continue to remain at the disposal of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs, the parliamentarians' question reads.

The authors of the question ask the prime minister to take decisions aimed at immediately securing all documents associated with the home army and the fortunes of its soldiers during World War Two and following it.

Timisoara Proposes Limiting Former Communists

AU1203152090 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 0500 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] A mass rally took place in Timisoara's Opera Square organized by the Timisoara and Europe societies, the 16-22 December Confederation, the Independent Organizations of Banat Youth, and the Romanian-Hungarian Friendship Association.

A document entitled the Timisoara Proclamation was read whose main ideas we will now present:

The Timisoara revolution was not only anti-Ceausescu but also and categorically anticommunist, in keeping with the aspirations of all the millions of people in Eastern Europe. The Timisoara people also requested the immediate abolition of this totalitarian and bankrupt system, stressing that the ideal of the revolution is returning to the genuine values of democracy and European civilization.

All social categories participated in the revolution. Therefore it is necessary to avoid the threat of repeating the attempts at social discord. A civilized and constructive dialogue is necessary among the workers, intellectuals, students, and peasants in order to immediately restore the unity experienced during the revolution. At the same time, along with the Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Serbs, as well as members of other ethnic groups sacrificed their lives for the Timisoara revolution, people who for centuries have been living side by side in this city, a Romanian and European city in which the various nationalities rejected and continue to reject nationalism.

The idea of political pluralism was and is one of the dearest ideas. In the Romanian system of democracy the Communist Party could have existed, too, had it not been totally compromised by resorting to genocide and excluding itself from society. Therefore it cannot be tolerated (?in principle) irrespective of the name under which it tries to bring about its revival.

Timisoara, the declaration also emphasizes, started the revolution against the whole communist regime and against its whole apparatus [word indistinct] to serve as an opportunity for political ascent for a group of anti-Ceausescu dissidents within the Communist Party.

As a consequence, Timisoara proposes that the electoral law prohibit—for the first three legislatures—the right of former communist activists and of former Securitate officers, as well as the right of former communist activists to run as candidates for the position of president of Romania; this should be one of the symbols of our departure from communism.

Along with political pluralism, the document advocates economic pluralism. Proof of [words indistinct] privatization being demonstrated by the fact that several enterprises have already announced their intention to turn into joint-stock companies. Timisoara is determined to make use of the principle of economic and administrative decentralization. The document requests the setting up of a branch of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank to attract foreign capital more easily and more rapidly.

We want to mention another idea as well. Timisoara is awaiting all Romanian exiles with love, because their competence and even their material assistance is needed and it is necessary to reintegrate exile culture into the Romanian culture.

As far as establishing 22 December as Romania's national day is concerned, this is viewed as inappropriate because the person of the dictator would be immortalized by celebrating the day on which he fell.

The document requests that 16 December, the day of the outbreak of the revolutionary movement, should be established as national day. The authors of the proclamation, who participated in the 16-22 December events, do not view the revolution as finished. They emphasize that it will be continued peacefully but firmly.

Electoral Bill Produces 'Heated Discussions'

AU1303165690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1445 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 13/3/1990—Heated discussions revolved around article 10 of the draft electoral law, as opinions varied widely on the candidature of the former Romanian exiles. Among other proposals there was one that said the Romanian citizens who lived abroad in the last two years could not run in the election.

It would be a grave injustice to accept this, because there are very many Romanians abroad who think lovingly of Romania and are ready to serve the country's new interests, said Mr. Radu Cimpeanu speaking on this question. One should not distinguish between the people who served the country and those who serve the country, no matter where they are. One must not disconsider the history of the country in the past 45 years when the Romanian exile was one of the strongest signs of opposition to the dictatorship. He said that it was not the adventurers, but the people who fought and suffered for their country that struck the note in the Romanian exile.

Mr. Ion Caramitru supported that saying that Romanian values belong to the country, no matter where they may be.

Speaking on this item, Mr. Ion Iliescu showed that the article being discussed according to which only Romanian citizens residing in the country can run in the election was conceived in an undiscriminatory manner which makes further specifications unnecessary.

However, the last paragraph of article 10 was amended to the effect that the candidates must engage in a lawful profession or trade. Also the second paragraph was amended: It now says that only persons above 21 and not 18 years of age are eligible for the chamber of deputies.

The president of the country and the senators are eligible from a field of candidates above the age of 30 with no upper limit being set.

One of the articles of the voting bill which was heatedly debated by the PNUC was the one referring to the persons who do not have the right to elect and be elected.

A proposal of the "Fraternitatea" Trade Union was that those who had been in managerial posts in fascist and communist organizations could not be elected and then the association of former political detainees blamed President Ion Iliescu for having imposed article 11 because he did not allow discussions on a proposal referring to the creation of a political commission to check on those nominated for election.

President Ion Iliescu explained that such a commission could not be discussed referring to article 41 and least of all to article 11.

After the modifications were made, article 11 reads as follows:

Mentally alienated and retarded placed under interdiction and people deprived of electoral rights over a period under a judicial decision may not elect and may not be elected.

Persons who made abuses in political and administrative offices, who infringed basic human rights and persons who orgnized or were instruments of the repression in Securitate or police bodies may not be elected.

The interdiction is also valid for persons who may not be members of the political parties according to the law.

Article on Need to Overcome Psychological Wounds

AU1103223190 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 4 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Florin Gabriel Marculescu article: "Invitation to Truth"]

[Text] For whole decades an imported communism subjugated us and reduced us to an embarrassing silence. The opposition was eliminated mercilessly, while the souls and minds of those who remained free were methodically devastated and maimed by hypocrisy, denouncement, hatred, and violence, by insolent and arrogant lies practiced officially at all levels of our political, economic, and social activities. These were the weapons of a regime that came to power through electoral fraud and the decisive support of Soviet tanks.

Having hardly emerged from the darkness of one of the most ferocious dictatorships, we are making desperate efforts to regain our human identity while constantly battling with all kinds of duplicities. Regardless of age, we proceed with equal and ardent awkwardness along the road that will take us—through our daily struggle—to freedom and democracy, thus enabling us to return to the ranks of the civilized countries in this world. At every step we are assailed with questions to which we have to answer immediately and as sincerely as we can. What are human rights and how will we be able to guarantee them? What does pluralism mean? What does privatization mean? What are the great principles of our future democratic constitution? And finally, what is today's meaning of the idea of freedom in the name of which humanity has never tired to struggle for thousands of years? Good Lord, so many questions are revolving in our minds. Time is pressing. Our future is at stake. Events follow each other at breath-taking speed. We participate in demonstrations, we keenly and obstinately look for answers and solutions in any newspaper we can get hold of, we waste our nights in front of the television screen, we comment, argue, launch ideas before they are clear in our minds, and we have almost no patience anymore to listen to each other. All these are symptoms of our beneficial infatuation with freedom. It is a malady we do not want to be cured of, a malady that will lend us the boldness to apply our thoughts in practice.

A great philosopher and writer in modern Spain says: It is more important for us that we are the parents of our future than the sons of our past.... And we do not have to be afraid of a future whose foundation is molded these very days, through our will, in the concrete of truth. Nowhere and never has democracy been served on a silver platter as at the present. We will enjoy it to the extent to which we will know how to build it by demolishing, at the same time, the huge but shaky edifice of communism, bit by bit. Fortunately, we have tremendous and unsuspected moral and intellectual resources. Thanks to them we will be able to gradually broaden our horizon, basing our options on the indestructible values of truth and social justice.

Certainly, the road to democracy is not an easy road; however, we are not allowed to let ourselves be invaded by skepticism and to renounce action. On the contrary, let us continue to act discerningly and determinedly by avoiding violence and personal feuds by all means. Do I have to emphasize that we have to rid ourselves of fear? I believe so, because it seems that this paralyzing feeling has taken undesired scope of late as a result of subversive actions, all kinds of disinformation, instigation to commit violence devised and put into practice by those members of the Securitate who, throughout the years and during the days of the revolution, were involved in investigations, arrests, tortures, and homicides. They have at their side all those people who, out of flunkeyism or professional incompetence, did not shrink from unconditionally serving the dictatorship by certainly benefiting from privileges and material advantages. This is the social category—numerically small but to be feared because of its experience—that wants to incite enmities and to split our unity by banking on limiting the effects of an incipient democracy.

However, the memory of those who have sacrificed their lives, with touching generosity, compels us to implement the ideals of social justice for those in whose name the

liberating flames of the Timisoara revolution flared up. Contrary to the lies, darkness, cold, starvation, and physical and moral humiliation which we had to go through in the past, from which we are separated only by two months, we are now called upon to found a democratic society of tomorrow in which the dignity of the citizen is no longer at the beck and call of the authorities, trampled on, and despised. To achieve this we need dialogue, truth, and complete and objective information on everything that is happening in our country. We want to know the number of victims. We want all those who fired at the people to be put on trial immediately. We want those who are at the helm of the country on a provisional basis to abandon ambiguities, to discuss things openly with the citizens, to prove that man's political and social rights are accepted, and to abrogate the two decrees which try to suppress demonstrations. It is necessary to understand that social tension will not calm down as long as the idea exists that the revolution may be forfeited.

We accept the invitation to peacefulness, but not to the detriment of truth. Therefore, we launch a counterinvitation for truth, because without truth our restoration will not be possible. We detest instigation, vendetta, malice, and hatred, but we do not forget that our mission is to struggle with dignity and valor to establish genuine democracy. In this sense let us recall the words of one of the most honest minds of the Romanian nation: "Any weakness, any delay, any doubt means cowardice; any lack of struggling means noncreativity and the desertion of human dignity." I hope you have recognized Vasile Parvan.

Liberal Party Vice President Advocates Monarchy

AU0703103390 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Feb 90 p 5

[Interview with Liberal Party Vice President Mihai Constantinescu by Ion Stoica; place and date not given: "The Liberal (Freedom) Party Introduces Itself"]

[Text] [Stoica] When I learned that the Liberal (Freedom) Party's Headquarters was in the Hotel Dorobanti, I thought that this political group was at least renting an apartment. In the hotel I noted that this was not the case. In a small room I saw several offices, a few chairs and... a lot of people. There I met Mr. Mihai Constantinescu, vice president of the party. My first question was about this very subject—the inadequate room in which the party carries out its activities.

[Constantinescu] We have taken numerous steps, but in vain. We have approval in principle, but we are told that there is no proper space available. We are concerned by this delay, which we are entitled to interpret as pettifoggery that hinders our carrying out normal activities, especially since the elections are coming closer....

[Stoica] By the way, would you briefly present the platform you will come to the 20 May elections with?

[Constantinescu] Our program is based on freedom for the individual, the limit of such freedom being in accordance with the principle "my freedom should not harm the freedom of others."

[Stoica] What does this freedom mean in the economic, social, and human rights areas?

[Constantinescu] Starting on the basis of the people's well-being, we propose to eliminate all forms of totalitarian communist trends, to promote economic liberalization, and the granting and guaranteeing of the right to private initiative. We also aim for a political-administrative decentralization, the separation of state powers, the formation of a bicameral parliament, and the depolitization of the Army, police, and law. In our opinion, it is of great importance to fully ensure equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of race, nationality, sex, and religion, within a united Romanian state whose territory is inalienable and inviolable. We also advocate freedom in all social activities: health, education, art, and culture.

[Stoica] What do you advocate in agriculture?

[Constantinescu] We support private initiative based on a proper credit system. The farmer has to own the land and has to be assisted in procuring the means of mechanization. He has to freely choose the crop and method of tilling the land, without being hampered by some artificial rules.

[Stoica] Is there any special reason why you felt the need for redundancy in the name of your party? Liberal (Freedom)...

[Constantinescu] We did this to avoid confusion, to facilitate a distinction between us and the other liberal political groups.

[Stoica] You are fervently and directly advocating a return to the monarchy. Why?

[Constantinescu] We justify our position by the fact that the election of a president for a 4-year term is very costly. In addition to this, as a native, a president would take a subjective stand. The monarchy rules out the struggle for power.

[Stoica] This is your opinion....

[Constantinescu] We view the monarchy as an apolitical institution with representation duties and limited prerogatives stipulated by the Constitution in accordance with the principle "to reign, not to govern," the monarch should be the guarantor for the application of the constitution, the people's freedoms, and for the strict separation of powers. We believe that the form of government in our country has to be established on the basis of a referendum. None of the parties has the right to decide on the form of Romania's Government on behalf of the people.

[Stoica] What social categories do you represent?

[Constantinescu] We view ourselves as the representative of all social categories. The freedoms and rights we struggle for are those of the whole nation and we express the ideals of those who have sacrificed themselves from 1948 up to now.

[Stoica] How do you view the restoration of the Romanian economy?

[Constantinescu] Through privatization, with the exception of some areas such as: the railways, postal services, telecommunications, energy and mining, tobacco and alcohol, except for wine growing.

[Stoica] How should the privatization process be carried out in your opinion?

[Constantinescu] By permitting private initiative along with preserving industrial giants to protect the labor force. The elimination of the giants, which have proved insolvent, has to be done gradually. We tolerate any form of privatization—joint ventures, investment of foreign capital, even without Romanian participation, but controllable.

[Stoica] How many members do you have in your party?

[Constantinescu] Some 300,000. We have branches in all counties, except in Suceava County.

[Stoica] How do you finance your activity?

[Constantinescu] With registration fees, membership fees, donations by members and supporters. As far as we are concerned—and these inadequate headquarters prove it—the declarations and promises have not been honored. Moreover, in some counties we are threatened. There are also other attempts to discredit our party's program, for instance the one in connection with King Mihai's daughters, who were reported to have taken valuable things from our national patrimony, statements which, according to Agence France Press, are tendentious.

[Stoica] Do you think the date of the elections is appropriate?

[Constantinescu] Yes, except that our material situation places us in an inferior position compared with other political groups.

Platform of Peasants Party's Youth Organization

AU0803123290 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Mar 90 pp 1, 5

["Youth and the Parties: Topical Answers by Raluca Demetrescu-Vasile of the Central Youth Organization of the National Peasants Party (Christian Democratic) to ADEVARUL"; place and date not given]

[Text] The National Peasants Party has truly written history. It participated actively in the great events that led to the formation of Greater Romania and it made a contribution of the greatest importance to our country's economic, social, and political development. It took a heavy and bloody toll in the struggle against dictatorships which brought it into bad repute and killed its glorious representatives, torturing them and shutting them up in prisons. One cannot speak of the great unification without recalling the decisive contribution made by Iuliu Maniu and the Romanian National Party in Transylvania, and the bloody sacrifices made by tens of thousands of peasants who fell on the battlefields. The Peasant Party in the Old Kingdom [Walachia, Oltenia, and Moldavia], founded in 1918 by Ion Mihalache, a hero of the war for the reunification of the nation, inspired by the peasants' struggle for land, freedom, and democracy, had the same ideals as the National Party and naturally united with it. From 1926, the date of the merger, the National Peasants Party firmly pursued the implementation of its political program: application of the agrarian reform, elimination of censorship, the consolidation of rural property, encouragement of cooperation, administrative decentralization, freedom for trade unions, and the country's economic modernization—these being just a few of the initiatives incorporated in the program and implemented in the short time of governing from November 1928 to April 1931 and from June 1932 to November 1933.

With a mature ideology, our party always promoted the interests of young people. Conditions were created for youth to bring out their own newspaper and to organize study circles with the help of political and cultural figures. Outstanding men of our country rose from among the ranks of the national peasants youth: such as Virgil Madgearu, Ion Raducanu, Dimitrie Gusti, Mihail Ralea and many, many more to name just a few. The party's program of action clearly emphasizes the problems of education of all grades and its organization on the principles of autonomy in leading youth.

The National Peasants Party is aware of the changes that have taken place in the educational, moral, and cultural areas and especially in interhuman relations—which affected youth during the more than 40 years of tyranny and humiliation. Therefore, our party proclaims that it is necessary to organize a re-humanized education grounded on high ethic and religious principles capable of creating the conditions for molding a political and moral awareness without which one cannot build a genuine democracy in freedom and social and economic progress. The school is the one who ensures the prerequisites for cultivating intellectual inquisitiveness, and hence the interest in becoming acquainted with the great values of Romanian and world culture. It is also in school that one sets the foundation for the future civilian and moral awareness.

Young people need incentives in education—competent professors, models of moral conduct and professional, highly qualified teachers, and scholarships at home and abroad for the worthy ones. Without a high quality education the cultural revival of our people is not possible. This is why the National Peasants Party supports youth so that they are not a mere spokesmen for the

benefit of grownups as has been the case so far. In its program of action, our party very firmly stresses the "struggle toward the reorganization of education on humanist and democratic bases and university autonomy, for a democratic education and instruction system for all young people, for involving young people in the work of national restoration, and for promoting them to leadership positions."

Aware of their value, demonstrated in the martyr cities and throughout the country, young people want organizational autonomy. Young people in villages—workers and intellectuals—must therefore be promoted without delay, in accordance with existing possibilities, to responsible positions, because the work of national restoration requires great efforts, and the contribution young people can make will surely be of great benefit and of high quality. However, on one condition: We have to prepare for this. Let us open up to schools, secondary schools and universities, because all of us—Romanian, Hungarian, Germans, and all the others—have the same aim. We will not forget that we descend from a people of workers of the land. As Blaga [Romanian poet] said so beautifully and sadly: "Eternity was born in the countryside."

The National Peasants Party and this party's youth call on all young people in villages and towns to join efforts—through learning and work, a great deal of honest work—in order to change the image of our country. Thus, let us have confidence in the broad democratic platform proclaimed under the flag of our great predecessors: Iuliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache. Let us rally under this flag and, with joint efforts, place our country on its natural road. Let us not forget the verses which have not yet been recorded in the national anthem: "Priests with the cross on their brow because the Army is Christian." And we are that Army!

Public Biographies of Politicians' Urged

AU0703153790 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Florin Iaru article: "The Communist Precedence"]

[Text] "Ana, Luca, Teo, and Dej [names of former Romanian politicians: Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, reference to Teo unknown], strike terror into the bourgeoisie"—this used to be a slogan that tickled many ears and heated many brains with a different level of intelligence, in a period in which Little Father [Stalin] seemed to be deciding the future of mankind. But who were the representatives of the bourgeoisie's terror? With all my reduced bibliographical knowledge and with all the lack of information, which is typical for the creators of the "new type of man," I still got wind of something: a refuge in the pay of the Komintern, which among other things also appealed in the years 1945-1946 to the misguided Iron Guard brothers to return to the bosom of the party and appealed to a couple of common criminals. They might have been common, but they were communists as well! So it is no wonder that the Romanian state placed itself in guard against fascist extremism and the red threat. If the delinquents make policy too—let them make it. Among them, in a lower position, is another convict, a small social parasite, propelled by the dictatorship of the proletariat to "the highest peaks," who had been educated in the USSR and who learned the Romanian language, throughout the years, with a mad need, from some obscure or almost dissident teacher. Here it is, in a few words, the social composition of the peaks of the new Romanian society, half a century ago. A handful of inefficient, vagabond illiterates, and (the process proves it) complete imbeciles.

I will be asked, however, what is now the use of raking over old coals, as if we did not know who has been leading us for such a long time. Well, I do not want to rake over old coals, but rumors, disclosures, press campaigns, and self-denunciations of late have made me look through this communist precedent. And what do I see? I see that Mr. Dan Iosif was a common criminal; that Mr. Vincze imitated him perfectly, adding fraud to the crime of violations of the law; that Mr. Circiumaru was suspected of some embezzlement; that Mr. Gelu Voican was not in prison for political reasons, but for different reasons altogether; that Mr. Petrina and Mr. Iftene are famous for less famous positions during the "golden era;" that Mr. Cazimir Ionescu's life has spots like the sun; that the young Isopescu is a psychopath with a mother complex; and that the famous Augustin Sbora does not seem to be a model of revolutionary-painter-writer anticommunism, and so on and so forth. Hence, as the chronicler would say: This is a frightening thought. How come? Are these the most representative ambassadors of the Romanian people? Are these the brightest minds among the 23 million of Brucan's "stupid people"? Will they be the ones who establish laws, the ways of our behavior, and the future (at least the near future) of Romania? Are they the presumptive candidates for presidency and for the parliament? I do not say that all the accusations are true—and it is true that there are thousands of rumors. Does the public have any kind of control over these personalities? Can anybody be sure that under a revolutionary coat there is not hidden a red lining with small green slant lines? [as published]

Good people, this cannot work, no matter how great is my sense of humor! Before we allow ourselves to be led (where?) and be deluded with Ceausescu-type threats of foreign intervention and of orchestrated malversations, one thing is required from the beginning: complete biographies and pictures of all politicians involved in the current process of reconstruction, all clearly printed and posted everywhere, so that people can recognize their neighbors and their "more equals." As it could be seen, documents have disappeared (I myself am rushing around, ready to purchase my own, complete file), however, people's memory has not faded. No sooner rises a small secretary than people start backbiting him, and in a 45 year-long war you can tell many stories! In this way

we could be protected from the odious wave of imposture and suspicion. In this way we could point at false pretenses and some could see themselves the way they really are.

But there is one more problem, that of Mrs. Doinea Cornea, for example. She proved to possess courage, perseverance, and stubbornness during the dictatorship, and I believe that everybody appreciates her for that. Unfortunately, her statements of a political nature are saddening, up to desperation. Her lack of knowledge about the rules of the game of power, slowly, slowly makes her lose the stripes gained on the battle field. Well, what do we do about such people? Do we progress on the communist path of threats or of promotions? In my opinion, a pension on merit should be granted to Mrs. Doina Cornea, as to many other people who have a combat spirit and many wounds. Maybe in this way, we will also take care of our own people.

* Future Timisoara Trial Called 'Parody'

90EB0321A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Petre Mihai Bacanu article: "The Somber Image of Justice"]

[Text] First, a few explanations.

The military structure of the Socialist Republic of Romania incorporated the troops of the Ministry of the Interior, whose supreme commander was the dictator, who approved and ordered all operations. At the county level, military commands functioned in special situations under the command of the first county party secretaries, including the commanding officer of the garrison of the Ministry of National Defense [MND] and the Interior Ministry [MI] chief inspector. The counties also had MI units of various sizes (Securitate and militia) whose task was to maintain order and repress rioting; those troops were under the direct command of the MI chief inspector.

In the case of the events in Timisoara, Ceausescu departed from the rule and appointed Ion Coman as sole commander, which did not mean that the other commanding officers or military heads lost the direct command of their troops. This configuration also applied to certain MND and MI Commands and Central Directorates heads, who were in Timisoara on 16-23 December 1989. As of 17 December 1989 at 1800 hours, when the dictator had his teleconference and ordered the Armed Forces to open fire on the demonstrators, the county command chiefs became responsible for passing on the order; together with the heads of the MI cadres and the commanding officers of the MND units, they are responsible for the consequences of the implementation of the above order. Note also that until 1800 on 17 December 1989, no demonstrators had been shot, killed, or wounded, although the MI troops and workers had been "in position" in Timisoara since 16 December 1989.

The penal trial of those responsible for suppressing the demonstrators is being carried out by the military prosecutor's people, and they are being guided, coordinated, and overseen by the deputy prosecutor general and head of the Military Prosecution Directorate. Investigations are also carried out by former Securitate officers who were kept on at the Investigations Directorate belonging to the staff of MND Second Bureau; throughout the country, military prosecutors are "assisted" by former Securitate workers employed by local military units. So far, as is known, aside from the militia officer tried in Sibiu for attempted murder, no one else has been put on trial for terrorism, only for complicity to genocide and for aiding and abetting criminals; the defendants are Securitate and militia cadres who took part in dispersing the demonstrators but did not personally shoot into the crowd nor order their men to do so. Thus, two months after the triumph of the Revolution, the authors of the crimes, responsible for hundreds of deaths throughout the country, have not been identified.

Very few persons are currently under investigation, under arrest, or charged with terrorism; in some localities, like Arad, no criminal has been identified, although there have been victims, and although trials have been promised, no details have been released as to the number of men arrested for such deeds.

The trial scheduled for 2 March 1990 in Timisoara, the cradle of the Revolution, already announces itself as a parody, because neither the sole commander, Ion Coman, nor any of the killers who bloodied the city until the last day of the past year, will be in the defendants' box, although they are the ones the people want to see receive their deserved punishment. On trial will be local Securitate and militia heads; General Emil Macri, head of a counterintelligence directorate; other high ranking officers of the State Security Department and the IGM [expansion unknown], as well as lower ranking MI officers who spirited away the bodies from the morgue of the Timisoara County Hospital and had them incinerated in Bucharest. But, as usual, none of the defendants fired any shots nor ordered others to fire, so that they are only charged with complicity in the genocide ordered by the dictator. And so, we no longer want to ask where the dead of Timisoara are, but where are their killers? Perhaps the worthy generals who personally witnessed the events can tell us, since they were present at the scene up to 22 December 1989, when they returned to Bucharest where they were promoted in rank, probably for "combat duty" performed in Timisoara, because in Bucharest the Revolution was over.

The generals arrived in Timisoara on a military plane on 17 December 1989 at 1650, together with Ion Coman. Gen. Emil Macri, Constantin Nuta, Velicu Mihale, and other important officers from the Securitate Department had been given difficult missions, but we must honestly admit that we have no idea whether former General Ilie Ceausescu was on that plane, too.

The first shots were fired into the crowd in Timisoara around 1900, after the teleconference, which in truth was not attended by some of the generals who were absent from the county committee building because they had been in a hurry to meet with their faithful troops.

Well, Generals, it was on the Calea Girocului that the demonstrators were fired upon, and that is where many people of Timisoara died, including the most innocent victim, a two year old girl. Hence, the people of Timisoara will never forget that street, and if one general saw another (armed) general in the vicinity, he should tell us about it, so that we do not sin by making all sorts of suppositions. Tear gas was used against the demonstrators even on 17 December 1989, so there was no need to spend money on bringing chemical grenades from Sibiu and Bucharest to toss only four of them (although only into the bushes, as witnesses claim).

We also know that prisoners, more than 700 of them, languished in the basements of the Securitate and in prison, without legally issued warrants, although the deputy prosecutor general was in the neighborhood, namely at the Timisoara Military Prosecutor's Office which is next door to the prison.

Consequently, once again we must delay the moment of confrontation between the killers and those they chose as victims; once again we must listen to the defendants lament that they allowed themselves to be dragged by the dictator into wrong ways, and ask ourselves—for the now hundreth time—why do we keep postponing the day of reckoning for those who committed acts of genocide with their own hand; we cannot continue to hide them forever, shifting them from one ministry to another.

All that is left to do to complete a truly somber picture of justice is to put on the judges' bench those who until the other day used to sentence people to death for stealing 22 piglets worth 6,000 lei, burning several bushels of corn cobs, or so-called offenses against the state (actually against the dictatorship).

Who are the 40 defendants tried so far? We'd like to know them all!

* Conflicting Reports on Ceausescus' Escape Try

90EB0321B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Feb 90 p 3

[Victor Dinu article]

[Text] The trial of the four officers of the famous Fifth Directorate in charge of the personal security and safety of the Ceausescu couple, continued yesterday. Painstakingly, patiently, and professionally, the judicial team is considering from all sides the evidence filed, seeking to obtain from the defendants and witnesses statements apt to illuminate the contorted path of truth. So far, this path is far from being clear; what has contributed to the muddle are contradictory statements made by both defendants and witnesses. That is what occurred yesterday. To illustrate this assertion, we will sum up the statements of one defendant and one witness concerning the same event: the travel of the two traitors from the moment their helicopter made a forced roadside landing.

Thus, from the site of that improvised heliport, the Ceausescu couple and the two securitate "boys" were planning to hitch a ride. As we recall, Captain Rusu Marian Constantin stated that one driver offered to take them; he introduced himself as "the cousin of Sandulescu, your furrier." Major Rat Florian at first told an approximately similar story. Somebody, the owner of a red Dacia 1300 with Bucharest licence plates, offered to give them a ride. The two Ceausescus and Rat, the securitate man, climbed in, while Rusu was left to come in another car. During the drive, the car owner said to Ceausescu: "I know you, we have common relations. I have never appealed to you so far, because I was embarrassed." Ceausescu asked him if he wanted to come along with them, to which the driver answered: "I can't, I have children, but I'll take you wherever you want." They took a less busy road. At one point, the driver thought they were being followed. Someone said it may be Capt. Rusu. No, in the car behind them there were four persons, and Elena Ceausescu, who had become a tower of rage, said: "He's left us, too." The driver tried to reassure them, saying: "Never mind, I'll get rid of them for you." And, after several maneuvers, in the area of the Vacaresti locality, he stopped a few meters from a black Dacia 1300 whose owner, Petrisor Nicolae, was washing it. The first driver said he knew him. After a short exchange, the two agreed on how to transport their shipment. The cars were started and at the first curve in the road the passengers were transferred from the red to the black Dacia. Maj. Rat then said, after the black Dacia drove off, that its driver allegedly said to Ceausescu: "You're lucky you found me. I'm an Adventist, but I'll save you." And he offered to take the two to his work place, explaining that he couldn't take them home because it was daylight and the neighbors would see them.

After various adventures behind the Special Steels Combine of Tirgoviste and around the former party county committee, Rat parted with his masters. "Having seen lots of people and much of a stir, I decided to abandon them and go back to Bucharest," he said. But who do you think he met at the city limits of Tirgoviste, entirely by chance? Capt. Rusu, who, as you may remember, had said that he had hitched a ride in the other direction, toward Bucharest.

Now let's see the version of witness Petrisor Nicolae. "It was my birthday, I was 35, and I had left work early. Around 1300 I was washing my car in front of the yard. A red Dacia stopped three to four meters from me and Rat Florian came toward me. I didn't know him. He was agitated and nervous. He asked if I could lend him some gas. I picked up the hose. Just as I was going to draw gas, the other car's door opened and I recognized Ceausescu. I swallowed gas, and I shouted to my wife: Viorica,

Ceausescu is in the car. Rat came up close and showed me the machinegun under his coat, then he told me to shut up and stop drawing gas. He told me to follow them in the car. I waved goodbye to my wife, because I was convinced we wouldn't see each other again. On the way, they signaled to me to stop. I was thinking of escaping, but the car, with the choke out, was not racing anymore. In the end I stopped. The Ceausescu couple got out of the red car and into mine. Lots of people had come out to their gates, having recognized him. The villagers were yelling at me: 'Nicu, don't take them, they'll kill you.' I turned into a dead end street, but Maj. Rat asked what I was doing. I claimed we were being followed, but he got out into the road with the gun out, and after meeting with the driver of the red Dacia, assured me that we weren't being followed."

Concerning the arrival at the Dimbovita County party committee, the statements of the defendant and the witness are fairly the same. But from here on we unfortunately have only the version of witness Petrisor Nicolae, because Maj. Rat got out to make inquiries and didn't come back. "Shortly after that, some young men started shouting: 'There's the tyrant,' and I was forced to drive off with them," the witness said. He took them to the building of the Vegetation Protection Inspectorate, where "I buy my supplies, and there I abandoned them."

* Military Cadres Present Appeal on Radio, TV

90EB0321C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 14 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed Article: "For the Correct Information of the Public"]

[Text]

Communique

On 12 February 1990, a delegation of representatives of the Air Force Garrison and the Technical Military Academy of Timisoara arrived at Victory Square headquarters. Between the hours 1640 and 2330 the delegation had talks with Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican as President Ion Iliescu's personal delegate.

The purpose of the discussions was to prevent further instability among the Armed Forces, by accepting and implementing the proposals included in the officers' appeal broadcast on the Free Romanian Television [TVRL].

The Ministry of National Defense [MND] brought pressure to bear on the delegates through its representatives.

In view of the fact that the meeting with Mr. Ion Iliescu had to be cancelled because he was detained by pressing problems until very late,the delegates stayed at the headquarters, with the agreement of Mr. Gelu Voican, until the dialogue could be carried out.

The talks, which proceeded in a serious and principled atmosphere, were taped by radio, television, and ROMPRES teams.

The tape of the first part of the talks was scheduled to be aired by the TVRL, but it suspiciously (to say the least) disappeared before the program time; consequently, the contents of the appeal had to be broadcast live in hasty conditions. However, copies of the tape exist.

Television is morally obligated to broadcast that and subsequent tapes to complete the picture of the discussions and their character.

We decided to circulate this communique to preempt any attempt to distort the purpose of the initial move and of the fact that the delegates remained at headquarters.

Appeal to the President of the National Unity Council, Broadcast on Monday Evening on TVRL

We are representatives of several military units from Timisoara and of the Air Force who want to prevent further instability in the Army in the case that the principles of democratization are not applied to military affairs, too.

These are our demands:

1. Establish the truth concerning the role of the Army in the Revolution, particularly on 16-20 December 1989 in Timisoara.

2. That the MND military cadres who were compromised after 16 December 1989 by being direct partners of the ceausescu [lower case as published] dictatorship and attempted to compromise the Army, be removed from the Army; similarly, we request that the generals reactivated during the Revolution be retired from the Army, in view of the fact that there are sufficient competent young cadres to fill responsible positions at all the levels.

3. Retire the minister of national defense, who issued orders which led to a state of tension in the Army.

4. Retire the minister of the interior for having been a direct participant in the reprisals against the demonstrators of Timisoara.

5. Appoint a civilian as minister of national defense to represent the Army's interests in Parliament.

6. Promote military cadres to leadership positions at the current stage on the basis of criteria established at national level and in consultation with the entire Army.

7. Apply the laws and decress issued at the national level to the military cadres, too, without the addition of subsequent stipulations by the MND.

8. Dismantle the Army Directorate and Burcaus of Patriotic Education.

9. Permit military cadres to resign. 10. Eliminate opportunities for using the Army to solve differences among political groups and parties, the role of the Army being to defend the national territory and intervene in the case of natural disasters. 11. Establish a National Committee for national defense and military matters under the command of the country's president, and abolish the position of senator for military cadres. 12. Ensure that the political parties specify their position toward the Army and toward national defense issues. 13. Dismantle the politically compromised presidential units.

The President Did Not Have Time

On 13 February 1990, Mr. Gelu Voican informed the military delegation that he was going to communicate to Mr. Ion Iliescu its insistent wish that, after the proceedings of the Provisional National Unity Council [PNUC], he give priority to the issues broadcast on radio and television and under the Appeal of 12 February 1990, which it continues to firmly support.

The following events occurred in the meantime: 1) Fourteen more delegates from other major units in the country joined them; 2) representatives of other units communicated by telephone their agreement with the Appeal broadcast; 3) units and residents of Timisoara held a solidarity meeting; 4) cadres, soldiers, and civilians continued to spontaneously fraternize in the Victory Square despite orders to troops to stay at base; 5) leading MND generals attempted to present conciliatory proposals which evade the major demands of the Army—these were Major General Opruta Horia, commander of the Air Force; Major General Puiu Dumitru, main adviser to the minister for aviation and anti-air defense; Major General Gabor Dan, commander of the paratroopers; and General Culda, head of the Patriotic Education Directorate; 6) Air Force Gen Puiu Dumitru issued ultimative measures to his corps; 7) the higher MND leadership ordered measures designed to ban our access to the media and our secession; 8) we were promised that no measures would be taken against us if we give up, having forgotten that taking advantage of democracy is not punishable; 9) and after two days and two nights of uninterrupted (but not undisturbed!) work, we continued to wait for a meeting at the same level as those given all categories of citizens in Romania.

MND Communique

On the evening of 12 February 1990, a group of officers who introduced themselves as representatives of certain units of the Timisoara garrison, broadcast on television a list of demands concerning the activities of the military establishment, which conveyed serious accusations against the military establishment and some of its bodies and staff.

Some of the issues cited demonstrate a poor knowledge and understanding of the realities prevailing in the Army at present and of the measures taken by the ministry leadership in the past few weeks.

The means these officers chose to solve the problems concerning them is in itself a violation of military regulations and constitutes an attempt against the Army's fundamental values, which ensure its stability and unity, both of which are extremely important at the moment.

We are aware of the fact that much remains to be done in the process of democratic reconstruction of the Army and that not all the problems can be immediately resolved, but we are determined to intensify the process of change in the immediate future.

Impatience, nervousness, and attempts to impose hasty measures under pressure can work against genuine substantial, long-term solutions to the difficult problems of the Army inherited from the dictatorship period. This is also the reason that many soldiers and officers from commands and units disassociated themselves from these actions, which they viewed as inopportune.

We want to express our conviction that all military personnel will reasonably and professionally find the most efficient means of participating in the democratic reconstruction of the Army. (ROMPRES)

Censure of Officers Not Validated

From Constanta, we learned the following:

On Tuesday 13 February, the Navy Command ordered protest demonstrations against the Air Force officers who appeared on television on Monday night, as a declaration of loyalty to the minister and a condemnation of the officers who requested his removal. The same day, Navy cadres gathered at the Navy Command Club. Fifteen officers voted for censure and loyalty [as published], five voted against, and 56 abstained. Although the vote did not validate the censure, a cable of support for and loyalty to the national defense minister was dispatched.

The same day, the commanding officer of the Constanta Navy Institute was ordered to summon the teaching staff officers and take a vote on their loyalty to the national defense minister and on censuring the Air Force officers who appeared on television on Monday night. Out of 70 teaching staff officers only four voted in favor and all the others against.

A Change of Guard

Yesterday evening the guard at the Free Romanian Radio and Television was changed. The MND reported that the unit of paratroopers that had been on guard was replaced by soldiers from other paratrooper and infantry units.

* Caution Urged in Moving Toward Market Economy

90EB0323A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 5

[Dumitru Fundatura article]

[Text] It is being said that we are in a period of transition. From what, we know; to what, not as well. Still, there are some indications. Thus, it is being increasingly recognized that we must rid ourselves of the administrative system par excellence of economic management and of excessive centralism in the establishment of a very wide range of obligatory indexes; at the same time, we must give a free rein to individual and collective intiative, liberalize means of action, and add flexibility to, and expand the opportunities existing for our potential partners.

Willy nilly, three types of economic relations are objectively required among enterprises. First, the familiar type of relations, in which, on the basis of plans and allocations, the essential clauses of economic contracts are established by the center. Then there are economic relations determined by the transition from the central level to the level of industrial centrals and enterprises, or of the coordinators of a considerable number of resources, out of an increasing list of finished materials and products. And finally, there are market relations, determined by the emergence of new forms of ownership in industry, agriculture, trade, transportation, etc., the development of small industry and services, and the privatization of certain economic units and activities.

The situation concerning economic relations today is entirely new, and we have neither the necessary theoretical support, nor the legal regulations, nor the experience. Moreover, we have to handle situations that were never experienced in other countries, not even in those that are ritualistically proclaiming their transition, even gradual, to a market economy. For that reason, we should move cautiously, analyze carefully, and adopt the most efficient solutions on the basis of serious considerations. The special current characteristics of the economy are such that the effects of a solution adopted for a certain problem do not emerge at once and in a single area.

In view of the measures taken to decentralize economic management, expand partners' competences and initiative, diversify and multiply forms of ownership, and initiate and develop new activities, we must soon devise new regulations concerning the economic and legal relations among those who participate in production and in material assets turnover. The current law of economic contracts, the backbone of which is the system of excessively centralized allocation of material resources, which favors and creates a producer's market par excellence, no longer meets our needs. One solution would be to draft, crystalize,and implement a commercial code as the basis for contractual relations among partners in the production, distribution, and turnover of material assets. We must then reconsider, reorganize, and rechannel the structures that ensure the commercial role of enterprises. Along this line, we should introduce market or marketing studies, with which we are already familiar. Also, we should restructure the concept concerning the role and function of the network of bases and stockpiles within the system of consumer supplies. Even a partial transition to a market economy will considerably increase the role of producers for supplying social needs, something that channels the latter toward organizing their own wholesale networks and marketing their own products. Similarly, networks of intermediaries may also appear, but clearly geared on the principle of production marketing, rather than actual technical-material supplies as such.

And finally, the new economic relations must take into consideration the possibility of competition. It is neither feasible nor humanly possible that the same product should be manufactured absolutely identically in two similar enterprises. Each of the producers may have either more skilled workers, or better equipment, special technologies, applied innovations, a better organization, etc., on the basis of each it can turn out better products at lower prices.

There is also the matter of prices. Can two enterprises manufacture the same product for the same amount of money? If we consider alone their different equipment or workers' level of qualification, or the mere fact that there may be professional differences between their technical or economic managements, we must objectively accept that products made by different enterprises cannot have the same price. Hence the need for a certain price flexibility that should permit fair competition, so that the better producers can draw greater profits. Setting price ceilings or equal prices leads to passivity and even to a reluctance to improve product quality.

Equally topical is the issue of achieving, or rather ensuring sufficient resources. In the absence of resources and with limited production opportunities there can be no competition, modernization, or high quality; as a consumer, one is forced to purchase what is available, one has no choices, nor alternative solutions for one's needs. This search, without secure prospects for resources, has a demoralizing effect on any entrepreneurship.

However, the only solution for progress is a market economy. Consequently, more or less centralized forms of allocation of resources cannot last for long. But we must be prepared—primarily psychologically—for radical changes: The producer's market is going to be replaced by a consumer's market.

* Need To Facilitate European Economic Aid Seen

90EB0323B Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 6

[Eugen Dijmarescu article: "Help Europe Help Us"]

[Text] For a good many years, the words "Europe" and "European" stopped designating merely a geographical location. A social, economic, and cultural community has been painstakingly but resolutely in the process of being forged, which gives Europeans a new pride,

derived from the feeling of belonging to a wider space than national borders, a feeling born from people's common aspirations, freedom of movement and communication, and exchanges of cultural and social, political, and economic values. President Mitterrand won his second term with a political platform that proclaimed: "France is our homeland. Europe is our future." This is a truth that we are feeling, too, through the sympathy and aid the French people have been awarding to the Romanian people.

Rejoining Europe is for us, Romanians, an organic need, which we feel as keenly as the need for individual freedom and social democracy. However, we cannot enter Europe either with only one foot or through the back door. Neither political declarations, nor passports, nor cultural reintegration suffice. Europe expects us as an equal, as a partner, not as an orphaned child. I felt some embarrassment upon hearing a group of representatives of the European Parliament ask what aid Romania expected from the EEC countries. I refuse to accept any longer the idea of us being a tolerated enclave on the continent. We have something to offer our European friends, and we must no longer delay the moment of stating our potential.

This spring, the spring of our liberation, a pan-European economic conference will be held in Bonn; this is a major element of the Helsinki process, which we have every reason to describe as the most important economic meeting in the post-war era. The new East European democracies will bring to that forum a new, open position, as well as a loyal competition, designed to actively incorporate them in Europe's future economy. The economic bases of the planned European confederation—or, in other words, of the common home of the continent—will be laid there. Whatever we choose to call the future European edifice, it will not be able to survive only through political principles or cultural cooperation. For all the nations of the continent and for each individual separately, this edifice would have only dubious value if it did not permit each European citizen to improve his well-being.

For painful and protracted reasons, Romania must now travel a long road in a short period of time, a road on which others embarked earlier. Because the European economy is primarily a market economy, this is the mechanism on which we must base our entry into the continent's economy. Similarly, no idea of political democracy based on party pluralism can secure real benefits without an economic democracy based on a plurality of forms of ownership. Still, stating this is not enough. These principles can begin to be implemented only after the necessary legislation is in place, and any delay in this respect will prolong the chronic disease afflicting our economy. Along this line, several initiatives must be put on a priority list: a law concerning foreign capital in Romania, rather than mere cosmetic changes in the regulations concerning joint companies which would keep them in the same uncomfortable position as in the past—that of a foreign body grafted on a suffering organism; a privatization law that should clearly regulate forms [of ownership] and encourage an enterprising spirit, free of the fear of being suspected of exploitation or of uncertain employment; a law to encourage research and innovation, designed to unfetter people's creativity; a law concerning commercial associations, which can take over and develop the positive elements of the Civil Code; and a privatization department within the Ministry of National Economy.

We must under no circumstance accept any confusion, even apparent, between technocracy and bureaucracy, because nowhere in the world has the latter produced anything but excuses and self-protective instincts. The examples are edifying and the bottle necks created are numerous throughout this country. Genuine decentralization cannot have economic results as long as the bureaucracy at all levels believes its existence justified by the need to coordinate (read: centralize) out of feigned concern for the national wealth. Such concerns, which some people arrogate to themselves and expand to imaginary dimensions, produce an undesirable state of expectancy and a narrow view of liberalization due to the refusal to see the whole and to take immediate long-term steps, favoring instead the logic of tiny steps. However, from tiny steps we can expect only negligible results.

It has already become an axiom that Romania needs new technologies, capital, and a multitude of cooperation ventures, both for the domestic market and to manufacture competitive goods; that it needs to import raw materials, energy, auxiliary materials, etc. How can we achieve all that without radical changes in our economic policy, not only pro forma, but in reality? We expect Europe to help us with all that, but that won't be possible unless we give it opportunities and a framework for helping us.

A diseased economic mehanism like ours requires that we roll up our sleeves and begin working responsibly, that we meet the government half way in its actions, without waiting for it to tell us what to do all the time. Otherwise, the Romanian revolution will remain just a political turnover, slowly and certainly undermined by the lack of economic initiative.

* Iron Guard Slogans, Murder, February Events

27000006A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Anton Uncu article: "Who Is Setting the Fire?"]

[Excerpts] This time it is no joke. On 18 February a group of hooligans devastated the government building. In Bacau, an extreme right group, called "the Anti-Communist Iron Guard Army," made its appearance

and a man died in a commune in Bacau County. All this seems to be channeled in the direction of distracting public opinion and compromising the Provisional National Unity Council and the National Salvation Front. This is what actually happened:

"The Iron Guard will struggle against all those who support any leftist ideology"...."We will not yield until we eliminate all communists, socialists and other filth-"...."Power is our credo"...."Someday we will strike-"...."Our time has finally arrived. The country will be ours again. Heil Hitler! We will conquer!" These are, in brief, the elements of the program of an illegal extreme right group which demands that the Bacau newspaper DREPTATEA [as published] printed. What are these crazy people hoping for? To get members? To involve the masses in crime?

All things seem to emanate from the mind of someone who has just escaped from the madhouse. A normal mind could not produce such ideas. However it is true that this sinister mania could be the work of a people who are almost normal and somewhat clever, but who, because they are in a hurry, have taken unmasticated formulas from the 1938-1940 period, without realizing that, at that time, the Communist Party, a party of activists, had only a few hundred members and that it is one thing to promote the idea of liquidating several hundred and another thing when it is a matter of almost 4 million. We might think that it is a question of a group of desperate people forced into crime if they had not stated their intention to control the country someday. It is obvious that such a "program" can only bring them adversaries. Haven't they realized this? Or aren't they what they say they are? Perhaps these "Iron Guard members" who are more dangerous and more treacherous than authentic Iron Guard members are wolves in hyena's clothing trying to push the government and the Provisional National Unity Council [PNUC] to take extreme measures which will put it in conflict with the people? Such a supposition does not seem at all fantastic to me, and I am submitting it to the attention of the PNUC in good faith.

On 18 February, several thousand people, organized or not, by whom, we do not know, met in Victory Square. With what slogan? "Down With the Securitate!" There were other cries, but this slogan dominated the demonstration. At 1430 hours a rather small group appeared and began to engage in violence, involving others in their actions. [passage omitted]

The soldiers on guard demonstrated completely unallowable laxness and 100 madmen, perhaps even fewer, went inside the building, followed the example of the few agitators, and devastated it. In addition, they gathered in one of the rooms and discussed the formation of a new government. [passage omitted]

The entire country found out about this and was in solidarity against the demonstrators, the several thousand demonstrators who were crying "Down with the Securitate!" However, everyone forgot this slogan since they were concerned with the revolt which the hooligan actions set in motion. But who were the boys with the crowbars? Besides, after the building guards remembered that they had obligations, after the devastation had occurred and Mr. Voican had been molested, the group of guard jumpers was isolated and arrested—we do not know if the crowbar carriers were among them—and reinforcements were brought in and the demonstration dispersed. Good move, wasn't it? They distracted attention from the target of the demonstration, shouted "Down With Iliescu" which was repeated as they arrived at the corner of the street. The repetition of this slogan reminded us of the "spontaneous" demonstrations of the past. [passage omitted]

The same day, at about the same time that the demonstration began in Victory Square, Vasile Veliscu was killed by someone named Motoc in the village of Poeni, Rosiori Commune, Bacau County, right after he had posted some signs for the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party. He was a member of the permanent bureau of the respective organization in Bacau and chairman of the Rosiori Commune organization. What "sacred" patriotic sentiments would have prompted Motoc to kill him? Or what criminal mind put the axe in Motoc's hand? People who know that there have been confrontations between the National Salvation Front and the National Peasant Party will draw conclusions. Who has been hurt by this story? Doesn't it seem to you that it is a subtle denigration of the National Salvation Front and the Provisional National Unity Council?

Who had anything to gain from it? We shall see. Everyone has forgotten the slogan with which they were demonstrating on 18 February in Victory Square; the military guard of the building showed signs of weakness and ignorance. Who knows better than the Army how to guard a building? Don't tell me because I know. The hooligans were arrested and...Who knows best how to cross examine some hooligans? I will not tell you because you know.

On 19 February, the miners beat their fists on the table at the Provisional National Unity Council: "We want law and order!" The minister of the interior promised to give it to them. How? The personnel have been thinned out and the problems have increased. There might be some specialists in such matters but...

Doesn't it seem to you, good people, that all this is like the story of the firemen who set the city on fire to prove that the municipality could not get along without them? I hope to God that I am wrong.

* Opposition Parties Lack Attention to Economy

27000006B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 Feb 90 p 3

[Radu Negrea article: "The Urgency of Presenting Economic Reforms in Romania"]

[Text] Only three months remain until the elections. The political parties which have announced their platforms

so far are all strongly attached to the sacred principles of democracy. That is very good.

But what about the economy? Indeed, this is a big problem, an area about which the least is known.

First of all, some organizational aspects must be clarified. Everywhere in the world where free elections are held, political groups set up a corps of experts and draw up detailed economic programs, supported by numerous calculations and leaders who are confronted with precise issues during the election campaign. The moral obligation to the Romanian voter demands that he be informed of the issues which the representatives of a party will support in the parliament if the party is elected. The fact that, in different publications, competent specialists are asking in what direction Romania should go, does not clarify matters if there is no concrete statement from the parties. The voters will be choosing soon, by a majority of the voters, well-defined ways and means, which are believed to respond to the interests of the nation.

By raising, in ROMANIA LIBERA, the issue of the restoration of the worth of our country, the writer of this article has tried to draw attention to the natural succession of events. The privatization of the industrial sector which has been discussed at length cannot be implemented only by the adoption of a law. Such an option requires a long process, with stages, proportions, institutional changes, and actions of a social nature which should be specified at the beginning and not left to endless parliamentary discussions while activity stagnates in an unclear atmosphere.

The Romanian citizen has the right to find out from the person who is asking for his vote the concrete and immediate measures which will be proposed in the legislative forum, so that the exit from the economic disaster left by the dictator will not remain a goal but will soon become a tangible reality.

The truth is that basic questions are raised and the responses invite rather than dispel ambiguity. For example, in agriculture, will the final result be only peasant farms or do they intend to maintain and make profitable large cooperative and state farms? In particular, the issue of subsidization of agriculture, practiced throughout the world, cannot be ignored.

What will happen in industry? Will the state remain the almost exclusive owner of the enterprises, the owner of half of them, or of about five percent, as in England? Why is such a formula preferred? What are the advantages? What are the difficulties?

A crucial question is whether the doors should be open to foreign capital. Are we restoring and rebuilding Romania with our own efforts and some carefully secured loans? Or are we putting everything up for auction, including natural resources?

We have not seen any in-depth discussion of the complicated situation in the services sector, which in a developed economy, such as in the United States, has a weight of 70 percent. What solution is proposed by each party? Not in regard to the small trade sector but in the area of banks, insurance companies, transportation firms, tourist networks, and other things.

In particular, we would like to have a well-documented explanation of the future of the trade sector. What about the OCL Alimentara [the local trade organization for food]? And the vegetable and fruit enterprises? Or do they envision the instantaneous disappearance of food lines if hosts of small merchants appear? No matter how important it is to provide a human existence, the framework in which goods will be circulated must be given deep thought, along with all related economic issues.

It is clear to each one of us that the replacement of an economic system with another system, which is truly functional, is not achieved merely by stating the intention. Innovative, solidly documented measures cannot be announced at the last minute. There must be a time for reflection. Discussions, explanations, and clarifications are necessary. The young people have only brought democracy to us.

* Program of Democratic Agrarian Party Presented

27000006C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 21 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Dumitru Teaci, member of the Provisional Coordinating Council of the Democratic Agrarian Party, by Engineer Th. Marcarov]

[Text] [Marcarov] The Democratic Agrarian Party is No. 22 on the registration list of political parties, in the order of registration. Why this delay?
[Teaci] Actually, there was no delay; the idea of establishing a party which would be a defender of ancestral rights and of the life of the Romanian state as the basis for the rebirth of the national economy appeared immediately after the December 1989 Revolution. Some time was needed to collect our ideas and to clarify them and to determine our options and, last but not least, to learn a few things from democratic life.

[Marcarov] Who do you propose to enlist into your party?

[Teaci] We want to participate, as an equal partner, in the general effort of the nation for the economic, political, social, cultural, and ethical rebuilding of the new Romanian society. We are addressing ourselves to workers in agriculture, the food industry, forestry, water resources management, and production cooperatives, and consumer cooperatives in rural areas, as well as to other democratic forces in the villages and cities who contribute through their work to providing "our daily bread."

[Marcarov] I understand that, mainly, you are addressing yourselves to the peasants.

[Teaci] In principle, we are, but we are not ignoring any of the other social categories. We do not want the peasants to be simply a "hard-times ally" of the other social categories; we believe that they are dignified and equal in rights to all these categories. At the same time, we want to express the interests of all those who have common fates and aspirations with the peasants, with the great families of the Romanian villages.

[Marcarov] What are your objectives?

[Teaci] Agriculture should occupy, among the other sectors, a decisive role in ensuring the rapid economic recovery of the country, as a result of the natural resources and industriousness of the workers in the fields who are capable, under normal conditions, of producing, on almost 15 million hectares of agricultural land, sufficient food for the people of Romania.

[Marcarov] What is your strategy and what are your tactics in this area?

[Teaci] First of all, we are working for the return of the land to those who work it, guaranteeing support to farms through long-term bank credits for the purchase of animals, equipment, chemical fertilizer, and other things; through encouragement of animal husbandry by restoring the production capacities of communal pastures and of fodder bases and by liberalizing prices for agricultural products so that they will provide incentives for farmers. Also, we believe that it is necessary to create agro-industrial structures which will be distributed properly throughout the country, to ensure the full processing and utilization of agricultural products, ensuring the redistribution of the profits resulting from the use of the finished product.

For the rebirth of the village we think that it is especially necessary to have the economic and juridical support of the citizens and, in particular, of the youth from the cities who want to return to their ancestral homes. They will be given plots of land to use, new jobs will be created, and they will be given credits for housing, for farm building projects, etc. We think it is fully justified to raise the wages of all categories of specialists and other types of workers in rural areas and to use funds from the state budget to pay the wages of agricultural specialists whose job is to ensure the practice of modern agriculture.

Among our objectives let me mention: developing education, scientific research, and design to establish an agriculture with high productivity and efficiency; protecting, conserving, and increasing the fertility of the land, forests, and waters by land arrangements and amelioration projects; subsidizing mountainous areas and other zones where the soil is infertile and developing agrotourism; supporting all measures which contribute to the revitalization and modernization of the villages by providing municipal and socio-cultural buildings; developing and modernizing the road system; providing adequate pensions to ensure a satisfactory life for all older agricultural workers; and honoring those who preserved the traditions of culture, art, and industry of our villages during the cruel times of the dictatorship.

* Parties Shun Meeting on Privatization

90EB0308A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 22 Feb 90 p 3

[Ion Stoica article: "An Unkept Promise"]

[Text] We would like to contribute, as much as we can, to understanding the processes taking place in Romania at this time. As readers may have noticed, we try to do so by reporting primarily on issues apt to enable our citizens to form informed opinions. We believe that to be in the spirit of the democracy for which we work with our specific means. It was along this line that an idea emerged to organize a round table with representatives of registered parties to discuss the issue of privatization. As we know, great attention is centered on this issue, which, whether included or not in the parties' political platforms, will certainly sway electoral votes at the May elections.

Well ahead of time we sent invitations to several parties; the date chosen for the round table was Wednesday, 21 February, 10:00 am. The following political groups promised to attend: the National Salvation Front [NSF], the National Liberal Party [NLP], the Ecological Movement of Romania, the Christian-Democratic National Peasant Party [CDNPP], the Romanian Social Democratic Party [RSDP], the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], the Socialist Democratic Party of Romania [SDP], the National Democratic Party [NDP], the Democratic Labor Party [DLP], and the Free Democratic Social Justice Party [FDSJP]. Yesterday, however, only four parties responded: the NLP, RSDP, FDSJP, and the CDU. Shortly before the scheduled beginning, we received a phone call from the CDNPP saying that because of some difficulties at headquarters having to do precisely with the privatization issue, it could not dispatch a representative to the discussion organized by our newspaper. Could it be that the party had not reached a common conclusion for publication, of is the party short on experts in that area? We doubt it. What then? In any event, the CDNPP at least showed respect by calling to say it wouldn't be attending. Which is more than can be said about the other parties, which sent no word to let us know that they wouldn't be honoring their promise. Consequently, it is only natural that we should want to ask them and ourselves: Why? Are they afraid of debates likely to become public? Or can it be that they don't have a clear position or arguments?

It is not our intention to insinuate anything, but we are free and justified to interpret the absences noted as a means of avoiding public engagement in a problem that attracts much comment and controversy. In the final analysis, however, it was a matter of honoring a promise.

Not having kept it may also send signals on how the parties absent from our meeting intend to implement their programs.

In view of the specific situation to which we referred, such a conclusion is not to be ruled out. The rest remains to be seen.

P.S. In one of our future issues we will report the debates of the privatization round table.

* Ceausescu's Economic Policies Analyzed

90EB0308B Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 28 Feb 90 p 1

[Silviu Brucan article: "The Strategy of Underdevelopment"]

[Text] A new international division of labor is emerging toward the end of 20th century. The North is increasingly computerizing its society, something that permits a higher level of development and wealth, while the industries that require the largest amounts of raw materials, energy, and manpower are moved to, or built by multinational corporations in, the underdeveloped South.

And where does Romania fit in this context?

All of dictator Ceausescu's investments followed the Stalinist model of placing emphasis on the steel and machine-building industries, which require great volumes of energy and raw materials and are labor intensive. Because of massive imports of modern technologies in the 1970's we were producing a range of machine tools almost on a par with that of France, and almost equal in terms of per capita production with the FRG, the largest exporter of machine tools in the world. It was one of the crassest examples of Ceausescu's ignorance to believe that the first generation of workers from the farm could overnight begin to manufacture machine tools competitive in the international market, since the main objective of these huge enterprises was to export! To implement these extravagant investment projects, Romania imported iron ore and coking coal from Brazil and India, and recently even from far away Australia; obviously, the high transportation cost raised the production cost of Romanian machinery so much that in fact, we were losing on exports. Moreover, in the past 12 years Ceausescu stopped importing new technologies, which meant that a Dacia car exported to Israel needed technological improvements to the tune of $1,000-1,500 apiece; nevertheless, Dacia was the cheapest car on the Israeli market, because it cost so little to import! While Romanians who had dollars were required to pay $5,000 for a Dacia, in Israel the car sold for $2,500-$3,000.

As for the oil processing industry, it was developed to an enormous capacity of 36 million tons annually, while oil extraction in the country was dropping visibly under 10 million tons, and geological estimates forecast further gradual drops in our oil reserves. The difference was covered by imports from Arab countries, mostly on a barter basis.

An American expert, who was one of my students in the United States, told me that Romania was losing almost $20 on each ton of oil products exported, something that did not stop the dictator from reducing to a minimum the gas sold domestically, thus creating some of the longest lines in the history of the communist countries, which in the provinces reached three to four kilometers.

Perhaps the most disastruous of Ceausescu's investments, at the tune of dozens of billions of lei, was in the thermal power industry, in which he built a myriad of plants burning coal from Oltenia, which has a very low caloric value and is full of crystals that systematically destroy the machines. Frequently, in winter, oil had to be used as fuel to ensure that those thermal power plants functioned.

While the greatest stress was put on investment projects which were energy, raw materials, and labor intensive, neither the five-year plans of the 1980's nor even future plans for the years 2000-2010 envisaged serious investments in key technologies, not even one large plant for computers. In one sentence, Romania was the first country in history which was deliberately planning its own underdevelopment!

In point of fact, in his latest speeches, the dictator talked primarily of economic relations with the Third World, after that with the socialist countries, and only as a last recourse with developed Western countries.

This economic strategy was perfectly coordinated with social and cultural policies. We had a division of labor between cabinet one and two. Nicolae was destroying the economy, and Elena the culture. Plainly speaking, in the past two decades Romania was led by two people with fourth-grade educations. Although both were talking a lot about the scientific-technical revolution, in the 1980's Romania practically turned its back on that revolution. After a demagogical phase in which Ceausescu insisted on presenting an alternative policy to Gheorghiu Dej's, he became the most extreme incarnation of the "cultural revolution" in Eastern Europe, by implementing an anti-intellectual policy across the entire cultural and artistic front. As of 1988, measures designed to reduce cultural activities followed in rapid succession. The decision to award Academy members a monthly bonus to exempt them from material cares, was repealed; author rights for scientific books and articles were drastically cut. Subsidies for theaters dropped considerably; funds for movies, opera, symphonic orchestras, and for art purchases were mercilessly cut. The number of students was reduced every year (181,200 in 1982; 174,000 in 1983; 166,300 in 1984; 159,800 in 1985); not one single classroom was built since 1985 and students began to be squeezed in three shifts. In stark contrast to official rhetoric that was extolling the merits of the scientific-technical revolution (a whole five-year plan was dubbed

by that name), all three channels through which information about this revolution could get into Romania were practically blocked;

A. Imports of scientific books and magazines were cut to a minimum; tragically, researchers were forced to acknowledge that collections of such publications at the Academy Library or the Central State Library ended in 1978 or 1979;
B. Our scientists and technological experts participated in almost no international congresses and symposia;
C. There were no Romanian students at any foreign universities.

By the beginning of the 1970's the Mathematics Institute was dismantled, at a time when Romanian mathematics was third in the world, after the Soviet and American. As a result, the best mathematicians left the country, so that we now have the largest number of compatriots at Western universities: more than 250 first rate Romanian mathematicians teach or do research in the West.

The Data Processing Institute, which under Draganescu's management had become the most advanced in Eastern Europe, was simply decimated and reduced to a mere subsection of another institute. The most talented members and the most original minds came to the conclusion that there was no opportunity for them in Romania and yearned to leave. I now realize that when in September 1988, in an interview with Nestor Rates for Radio Free Europe, I said that the passport policy should not be liberalized as long as Ceausescu was in power, I caused a real storm among those who wanted to leave! But what would our country do now if the best and brightest in our science, technology, and art had left the country?

My seven years in diplomacy and the repeated classes I taught at foreign universities gave me an opportunity to meet with many Romanian emigres. The truth is that in the best case, most of them will come just to give a course, a lecture, or some advice, but very few Romanians are disposed to stay here to pitch in to work!

In short, I must state that put together, all the above issues crystalize into a whole concept with its own logic. As Polonius said in his famous response in Hamlet: There is method in his madness. Turning our back on the computers and data processing revolution, dismantling the Mathematics Institute and the Data Processing Institute, blocking the channels of penetration of the scientific-technical revolution to Romania, continuously cutting the number of students and channeling young people to vocational and technical schools, and the repression of the arts, combined with raw materials and energy-intensive industries based on cheap labor, were nothing but the perfectly coordinated elements of an underdevelopment strategy designed to halt Romania's historical advance so as to allow the Ceausescus to say in power. The tragic result is that Romania is trailing behind the West European countries by 15 to 20 years; to become a truly European state, our main strategy now must concentrate on making up for this backwardness as soon as possible!

Albanian Students Demonstrate at University

LD1303235890 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] As previously announced, approximately 5,000 Albanian students of Pristina University gathered today as well at the Faculty of Engineering. The students again demanded the lifting of the state of emergency in Kosovo, the annulment of the amendments to the Serbian Constitution, and the clarification of cases where the police overstepped their authority. The students are against the decision to proclaim 28 March a public holiday, and against the recolonization of Kosovo, as they call the decision on the resettlement of Serbs and Montenegrins in the province. The students did not change their decision to refuse to move out of House No. 5, which is envisioned as accommodation for Serbian and Montenegrin students.

Albanians Send Protest Letter to Loncar

AU1203202490 Pristina Domestic Service in Albanian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] On 1 March, the media informed the Yugoslav public about a letter sent by Foreign Affairs Federal Secretary Budimir Loncar to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in which he reported on the rights and constitutional position of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo. This has prompted a group of 29 Albanian intellectuals to send to Budimir Loncar an open letter which, among other things, states:

Apart from various explanations that might be offered for the statement of the federal secretary for foreign affairs, there are some matters that he left unsaid and remain a source of suspicion not only for the outside world, but, as the Albanian intellectuals emphasize, for us who live in Yugoslavia also.

They later state that the federal secretary should have mentioned in his report to the UN secretary general that the Albanians in Yugoslavia are treated as a minority although, in terms of their numbers, they are nothing of the sort. He should also have informed the secretary general of this world organization that Albanians who today demand democracy and more freedom are called nationalists, separatists, and, recently, terrorists.

He failed to inform Javier Perez de Cuellar that many young people, children, and old people were killed in recent events, including even people who were on the street by chance, merely because they asked for democracy and more national rights and could not resign themselves to being deprived of democracy at the very time when the wave of democratization in East Europe is becoming ever stronger.

In the open letter, the Albanian intellectuals also stress that Budimir Loncar should have informed the UN secretary general about the numbers of people sentenced and mistreated by the judicial authorities and the police, or dismissed from their jobs and places in education, about the use of what are called dum-dum bullets, and about the initiatives not only for the recolonization of Kosovo but for the institutionalization of apartheid in this part of Europe.

Kosovo Committee Calls for Cadre Changes

LD1203103290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1447 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Pristina, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—All the branches of the Bozur Association for the Return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo should make a list in the next 10 days of those officials in the provincial municipalities—Albanians, Serbs and others—who do not carry out the agreed policy. Also put forward should be the names of those who are capable of carrying it out. This was concluded at today's meeting of the Bozur Committee in Kosovo Polje, which said that this must be done because the pressures on the Serbs and Montenegrins are not abating.

Cadre differentiation is the first condition for a calmer situation. This is because those who are in power now, in the opinion of the committee members, have demonstrated their inability to secure a law-governed state and implement the agreed policy.

The Bozur Committee maintains that the establishment of a law-governed state, peace and order for all and, above all, the return of those who emigrated from Kosovo are the sole prerequisites for starting to resolve the crisis and the guarantee of the security of the Serbs and Montenegrins. It was also proposed, as explained by Rade Tomic, that all those who had emigrated should return, while their present employers should support them until they find a job.

By proposing cadre changes, Rade Tomic demanded that the provincial executive council and its president, Jusuf Zejnulahu, be dismissed immediately for their failure to implement the measures in education and the compulsory work order. He also said that the Serbs and Monenegrins presently in power are those "who have been rewarded for their obedience." In this context, he mentioned Djorde Arsic and Radman Milosavljevic, and also proposed that Petar Kostic of Elektroprivreda and Milorad Laketic of Trepca be supported. [passage omitted]

Kosovo Alternative Protests 'Ethnic Segregation'

AU1303174890 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 7 Mar 90 p 6

[E. Bajcinovci report: "Appeal for Restraint"]

[Text] At yesterday's news conference organized by representatives of the Coordinating Council of the declaration "For Democracy—Against Violence" and the Youth Parliament, spokesmen of this section of the Kosovo Alternative again tried to blame "the situation in Kosovo" on the state authorities in the province and Serbia. Their communique, which was again issued only

in Serbo- Croatian, goes on to state that the state authorities are doing their utmost to at all costs prevent pluralism and the legalization of democratic institutions in the province. The alternative movement emphasizes that among the reasons for the authorities' behavior is their awareness that the processes of democratization will allegedly cast doubt on the policies pursued hitherto in Kosovo. The spokesmen demanded that the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Executive Council, and the state authorities in Serbia and Kosovo should take steps to prevent and reject demands and activities leading to what they call ethnic segregation. The Albanians should form groups and councils, it was stressed among other things at the news conference, to make contact with local Serbs and Montenegrins in order to gradually create mutual trust.

The Coordinating Council of the declaration "For Democracy—Against Violence" and the Youth Parliament called on Kosovo parents, pupils, and teaching staff to handle with care the decision of the state education authorities of Kosovo and Serbia to segregate Serbian and Albanian pupils in classes. Those who feel offended at this decision, the alternative movement said, must seek the annulment of this decision through legal channels.

After presenting their views, standpoints, and demands, the representatives of the Coordinating Council of the declaration "For Democracy—Against Violence" answered many questions from journalists. They did not reply to a question regarding possible contacts with the state authorities, or the results of these contacts if any had taken place.

'Tendency Toward Stability' Seen in Area

AU1303153890 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 5 Mar 90 p 5

[C.I. report: "A More Stable Situation"]

[Text] Titova Mitrovica, 4 Mar—A tendency toward stability has been noticed in Titova Mitrovica. It was quiet today, and the Trepca Combine worked as normal.

About 70,000 people attended the funeral of Abaz Ibrahimi, who died from injuries sustained in an accident when he was run over by a militia vehicle on 25 February. Speeches at the funeral spoke out against violence in Kosovo.

Communist Party of Slovenia Forms in Ljubljana

AU1303124290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] A group of 26 mainly young Slovene citizens have founded the Communist Party of Slovenia. The party has already been registered in the Siska commune in Ljubljana. Its president is Joze Smole, who has no connection with the Socialist Alliance of Slovenia president.

Slovene Ministry Explains Detention of Priests

LD1303144190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1541 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—The Slovene Internal Affairs Secretariat claims that following a public meeting in Ljubljana on 1 December, which took place despite a ban, two Orthodox priests were not arrested but only detained so that their identity could be checked.

Having refused to obey an order by a competent official to disperse, the priests were detained so that their identity could be checked and charges brought against them. At a later stage, in accordance with Slovene law on public peace and order offences, the priests were also fined.

This explanation of the events and their outcome are contained in a reply by the Federal Executive Council to a question by delegate Ljubisa Savic, who wanted to know that law had been enforced when the two Orthodox priests were arrested in Ljubljana.

Slovene Electoral Campaign Begins

LD1303145990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1342 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—In Slovenia the electoral campaign for the forthcoming April parliamentary elections and those for president of the collective head of state of the republic of Slovenia started today. Milan Kucan, Dr Marko Demsar, Dr. Joze Pucnik, and Ivan Kramberger are candidates for "the first Slovene."

Today Ljubljana television begins broadcasting electoral messages and features at its peak viewing time—before the beginning of the second news bulletin. All the parties taking part in the elections will present their programs in a special television broadcast, including the presidential candidates' personal appearance.

The elections for president and members of the Republic of Slovenia Presidency and deputies to the republican parliament (except for the Chamber of Associated Labor) will be held on 8 April and the local elections on 12 and 22 April. The second round of the Slovene presidential elections will also be held on the latter date.

Slovene Socialists Protest Deportation Plan

LD1303144390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1534 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—The Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] of Slovenia—Socialist Party has sent a demand from its session today to the SFRY Presidency and to the Federal Executive Council [FEC] that the Federal Assembly immediately discuss the intentions of individual socio-political organizations in Serbia to "deport all dishonorable Albanians who came into Yugoslavia as immigrants."

Sharply condemning such an intention, the Executive Committee of the Slovene SAWP—Socialist Party also stressed that it has already met with a negative reception in the world, "as an unprecedented act in Europe."

"There is no legal basis whatsoever for such deportation, and this, in advance, closes off our entry into Europe even more," the Executive Committee statement says.

Consequences of Slovene Assembly Decisions Viewed

AU1403114290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 90 p 1

[Slavko Curuvija commentary: "With Both Feet in the Rubicon"]

[Text] What has happened in the last three days in the Assembly of Slovenia seems to have destroyed the last misconceptions. The "package" of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] concerning changes to the SFRY Constitution was not endorsed, and it received the comment that a part of this initiative could be adopted only under the condition that the FEC renounces all ambition to strengthen the economic functions of the federal state (although without these, the FEC claims, there will not be even incipient reform). The proposal by the SFRY Presidency that the formulation of the new SFRY constitution be begun now was rejected. The adjective "socialist" was removed from the official title of Slovenia and from public use, despite the SFRY Constitution. It was decided that the economic independence of this republic would be proclaimed whenever it was so decided by its assembly or executive council....

Has the Assembly of Slovenia thus, of its own accord, suspended the SFRY Constitution, among other things? It undoubtedly has! After all, it was first claimed in the Slovene Assembly Constitutional Commission and then in the Assembly itself that the declaration that had been adopted on independence "introduces independent decision-making in Slovenia—outside Yugoslavia's legal system," and that it brings with it "elements of self-determination."

Is Slovenia actually crossing the Rubicon?

It is difficult to give a quite reliable answer to this question at the moment, but it is certain that the decisions that have just been made in the Assembly of Slovenia are very dangerously testing the patience, the varying tolerance, the relative willingness to compromise, and, finally, the goodwill of the other members of the Yugoslav state, a state that continues to be a federation and not a confederation.

It is understandable that the pre-election struggle continues in Slovenia and further afield and it is understandable that this republic's present leading team must woo the voters a little and even more than a little. However, one gets the impression that the aforementioned radical and one-sided moves by this republic regarding Yugoslavia are probably making two major mistakes: To judge by everything, concessions are being made to the petite bourgeoisie in the republic, and the rest of "Yugoslavia" is being put into a position that it will not be able to swallow so easily.

Therefore, the Slovene Assembly's decisions have three possible and very disturbing consequences: They halt the previously relatively successful economic reform; they radically, and at the will of only one side, destroy the present legal system of the Yugoslav state; and, what is worst of all, they feed the forces that have been strong and conservative until now, even causing some new conservatives to finally pound the table with their fists and shout: Enough is enough!

The responsibility is really too great.

Simic Remarks on Slovenia Viewed

AU2802201990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 90 p 7

[Unattributed report reprinted from Ljubljana DNEVNIK: "The Army Is Out of Step"]

[Text] I fear that the speech by Petar Simic in the Organization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] in the Yugoslav People's Army will have an unfavorable influence because of its content on the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis, Andrej Marinc, Presidency member of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, has written in NEZAVISNI DNEVNIK. His stands and assessments certainly express the views of the LCY Army organization and not only of those officials who are part of the state structure and whose views have to be subordinated to official state policy. Differences between these two organizations have in the past been negligible. It would have been best for the 14th LCY Congress had this "high degree of unity" not existed. Why do I want that to be so?

As a soldier, Simic states that it was possible to foresee the denouement of the Extraordinary 14th Congress. His basis for such an idea was the assessment of the 11th Congress of the League of Communists [LC] of Slovenia. Why did the Army organization not pay more thorough attention to the congresses and conferences of, for example, the LC of Serbia, the LC of Vojvodina, and the LC of Kosovo? They basically had the opportunity to do this. Simic's introductory assessment that "essential differences exist between the concepts of carrying out social reforms and of the transformation of the LC" was encouraging, as was his statement published in NARODNA ARMIJA.

It would be pointless and reckless to put all the blame for this act solely on the LC of Slovenia.

The causes are mixed up and reach, above all, into conceptual differences in implementing the social reform and the transformation of the LCY. It was to be expected that this recognition would be a solid basis for

comprehensive political assessments by the LC Army organization on the causes that had an influence on the course of the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress and also on the congresses and conferences in the LCY republican and provincial organizations.

Unfortunately, Simic falls or comes under the influence of the analytical methods that have been rejected by time, which are outmoded, and therefore inappropriate. Heaping all the blame on a system that made possible the development of bureaucratized elites that have hindered the interests of the whole because of their particularist interests and that have consolidated themselves at the center of republican, provincial, and national interests is an oversimplification.

Simic ascribes the main sins to the LC of Slovenia. It was obviously intransigent and unwilling to accept the stand of the majority. The LC of Slovenia did not come to the congress to set imperatives. Apart from that, the delegates expressed their arguments and stands. However, it is true that we had limited opportunities for debate when it came to the vital issues of our organization within the framework of the LCY and in connection with the conceptual issues of development. We could not accept decision-making by the majority on these and some other issues. However, I am surprised that the Army organization nurtured expectations in this sense. This is worrying since they have so far demonstrated greater willingness and understanding for the democratic processes in Yugoslavia.

Simic gives a milder assessment of the stands of the LC of Croatia. He is worried about a possible division on a national basis in the LC of Croatia. A harsher tone can be perceived when he demands that the League of Communists of Croatia clarify what binds its parts and what is in the interest of the state and the LCY. In this respect, he does not mention the LC of Serbia that could also be justifiably criticized for, for example, its attitude to the blockade, which is the crudest violation of the SFRY Constitution and interethnic relations in Yugoslavia. Although analysts in the Yugoslav People's Army are well aware that the stands of the League of Communists of Croatia are similar to Slovene ones and that the processes of democratization have spread throughout Yugoslavia, he gives a much harsher assessment of the Slovene orientations. If they think that they can do this because we are few in number, they are seriously deceiving themselves. This is a way of thinking from the position of force. Life rejected such methods a long time ago.

The final part of Simic's speech is particularly crude and imprudent. It is indisputable "that events at the Extraordinary 14th Congress were a serious blow to the LCY, which is unfortunately incapable of playing a crucial social role," since in the pre-congress period it was not possible to reach an agreement regarding the most important programmatic starting points and a miracle could not have happened at the congress, although many of us hoped after the favorable beginning that something was shifting. Unfortunately, to judge by Simic's speech, the LC in the Yugoslav People's Army is lagging behind in the processes in Yugoslavia. This is not a good sign. The president of the LC Army organization is encouraging members and organs of the LC of Slovenia—the Party of Democratic Reform to express their dissatisfaction with its programmatic orientation and to organize themselves, and is a move that should not have been allowed. On the contrary, the Army party cadres should in fact advocate quicker political reforms in society and political reforms in the Yugoslav People's Army.

Army Party Chief Petar Simic Criticized

By Democratic Alliance

AU2202092390 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 90 p 4

[D.D. report: "One Gets the Defense One Pays For"]

[Text] Ljubljana—In its latest statement, the Executive Committee of the Slovene Democratic Alliance, which includes Dr. Hubert Pozarnik, Dr. Rajko Pirnat, Janez Jansa, and Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, sharply criticizes a speech made by Petar Simic, president of the Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav People's Army. The speech of 14 February, the signatories cite, makes a mockery of all earlier statements by the Yugoslav party on political relations in Slovenia.

It is cited further that the Slovene Democratic Alliance is not interested in quarrels in the Yugoslav Communist party but at the same time they stand in defense of the Slovene Communists because, as they say, "this involves obvious intrusion in Slovene political relations." Petar Simic called for party unity that guarantees the unity of Yugoslavia. "Simic's speech proceeds from the assumption that the Yugoslav People's Army is superior to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, this League of Communists of Slovenia, and Communists are superior to non-Communist citizens."

The signatories and members of the Executive Committee of the Slovene Democratic Alliance stress further that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has finally lost its powers for organizing Slovene and, they hope, Yugoslav social relations. It seems absurd to them that the Army organizes party matters and social issues through the party. Therefore, it is demanded from the League of Communists of Slovenia that if they want to show that they are a party for a democratic transformation, they should energetically renounce the aforementioned Army ideology.

In their statement, the signatories deal with the restructuring of the Yugoslav People's Army according its own will and desire. The Army should be under the scrutiny of the Yugoslav Government, which Slovenia must participate in. In the future, state Jansa, Rupel, and colleagues, "Army matters should be reorganized in such a way that the Slovene state manages the part of the defense organization that it finances. The Army on the

territory of Slovenia should be a Slovene army and that means that young Slovene men will do their military service in Slovenia. In the future, the Slovene government must reach a defense agreement with other army units and the army command."

At the end, the Executive Committee of the Slovene Democratic Alliance again addresses the Slovene Communists asking them to think about "the situation whereby non-Slovene generals propose help to supposedly dissatisfied Slovene Communists when it comes to opposition to the League of Communists of Slovenia." Let them think about this, the opposition councils, if they are not the most hard-bitten Stalinists and opponents of the dignity of the Slovene people.

Commentator Jez

AU2302123290 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Feb 90 p 6

[Boris Jez commentary: "Strange Political Help"]

[Text] The appeal by Petar Simic, Army party chief, to set up a new League of Communists of Slovenia could be commented upon with the statement that the Communists in the Army simply have the right to have their own opinion about everything. However, since we know from experience that their views are, in fact, also the official views of the Yugoslav People's Army, some of Petar Simic's statements, to put it mildly, cause concern.

Simic's analysis of the events at the past party congress shows that the vote of the Army in favor of discontinuing the congress was exclusively tactical in nature. In his report read at the latest session of the Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Organization in the Army, Admiral Simic clearly spoke in favor of everything that Slobodan Milosevic offers to Yugoslavia. And considering that we know that Milosevic's policy is at loggerheads with at least half of Yugoslavia, Petar Simic in fact decided in favor of one of the disputed sides. All this would somehow be admissible if Petar Simic were just "anybody," but in fact he is a representative of 70,000 Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army, which means virtually the entire officers corps. Has the military apparatus decided for one side in the present Yugoslav political struggle?

How is it that some military ideologists do not comprehend that the politicization of the Yugoslav People's Army pushes the Army into interference in daily political frays. In these frays it may participate either on one or another side, or as an independent political subject; I hope that this last possibility is not being considered in the Army leadership, otherwise it may happen that the Yugoslav People's Army will one day win the elections and the Yugoslav comedy will be complete. How is it that the generals do not comprehend that the politicization of the Army necessarily leads to its disintegration, and thus of course to the disintegration of Yugoslavia?

However, in his opting for the most centralist views, Petar Simic goes even further and performs his political acrobatics on rather thin ice. He first denies the legitimacy of the Party of Democratic Reform, which may even win in the spring election, and then he offers his League of Communists to a republic. The Army is thus willing to help the Slovenes so that they may get a "proper" party again. For heaven's sake, the world has not seen anything like this before! I have believed that the Army helps to build roads, bridges, and the like (by the way, almost all the armies of this world do this), but I have not known that it also offers "political services." Joking apart, the admiral in fact wants to interfere crudely in Slovene internal political life, although of course he is sending the federal party to fight the Slovene renegades.

More than obviously, some generals and admirals have their own political ambitions, otherwise they would not cling so desperately to social realistic formulas about a "people's army," the vanguard role of the party in the Yugoslav People's Army, and so forth. Do they want to say that the Yugoslav People's Army is a people's army, while other peoples have "some sort" of armies that are somehow alien and superfluous? And how it is that they do not see that entire East Europe is deciding in favor of depoliticizing the armies? This will certainly also happen in the USSR soon, and obviously we will—in the company of some "banana republics"—soon be the last country where the army still participates in the political life in this manner. Do they not notice at all that, with their ideological single-mindedness and dogmatism, they are becoming a peculiar anachronism not only in Europe but also in the rapidly advancing Yugoslav political sphere?

The generals probably know full well that they would actually find it more comfortable if the Army would, above all, protect the constitutional order (one probably need not waste one's breath about "external enemies" in present-day Europe). But no, at least some of them obviously set great store by being at the very center of decision-making on the present and the future of Yugoslavia. For instance, is it possible to interpret the fact that all the Slovene boys must serve the Army outside Slovenia in any other way but as a political act that willy-nilly is directed against a people? And some people then wonder why the Slovenes do not display such uncritical enthusiasm for the Yugoslav People's Army as is manifested in Serbia, for instance!

The representatives of the Army often try to present their political activities as supranational and unburdened by individual "particularist" interests. Of course they must be contradicted, or they contradict themselves: For instance, is the great similarity between Simic's and Milosevic's views purely accidental? And finally one must face the truth that the great majority of the officers in the Yugoslav People's Army is of Serbian or Montenegrin nationality and that this certainly cannot be without any consequences. The very national composition of the officers corps supports the request

that political life must get out of the staffs and the barracks in every case, whether in a single-party or a multiparty system. If this does not happen soon, internal conflicts will certainly begin to accumulate in the Army, too, which no sensible state can afford.

If anything like that happens—and let us hope it will not—some Army "ideologists" will of course try to shift the blame on the multiparty system. In fact, their political ambitions will be, above all, to blame.

Slovene Poll on Media, Reporting

AU2302202990

[All figures as published]

[Editorial report] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene on 17 February on pages 1 and 3 carries an 800-word report by Marko Pecauer on a "pilot telephone poll on the role of the media in Yugoslav politics" that was conducted on 13 and 14 February among a sample of 416 inhabitants of Slovenia, who are not further specified.

The results of the poll are presented in six bar charts and a pie chart as follows:

Question 1: "If you compare the reports of the Slovene media and the media of other republics, which are more objective?"

Slovene more objective	51.5 percent
Others more objective	6.8
All equally objective	21.1
All equally unobjective	8.6
Others	8.3
Don't know	3.8

Question 2: "Do you read newspapers, watch television, or listen to radio from other republics?"

Yes	64 percent
No	36

Question 3: "What in your opinion should be the position of the media in the future, considering the multiparty system and elections?"

They should be independent	58.9 percent
They should be party media	15.1
Under Assembly control	7.2
Don't know, others	18.7

Question 4: "Until now, the media have been financially subsidized. How, in your opinion, should these problems be solved in the future?"

With the assistance of parties	5.8 percent
With the assistance of the government	17.3
Through the system [sistemsko]	17.6
Leaving it to the market	27.5
Becoming private	10.4
Don't know, others	21.5

Question 5: "Which of the listed Slovene newspapers or magazines do you read, and do you watch television or listen to the radio?"

DELO	25.5 percent
LJUBLJANSKI DNEVNIK	23.1
VECER	19
MLADINA	18
TELEKS	3.6
NEDELJSKI DNEVNIK	51
DEMOKRACIJA	2.9
DRUZINA	13.5
Regional newspapers	26.9
Television	83.4
Radio	69

Question 6: "In your opinion, who or what should be believed more as regards reporting on political events?"

Press agency reports	6.5 percent
Correspondents	54.1
Commentaries by journalists	7.7
Rumors	0.2
Everybody a little	22.8
Don't know, others	8.7

Question 7: "Which newspaper sections do you read regularly?"

	Yes	No
Internal politics	64.4 percent	35.6 percent
Foreign politics	45.7	54.3
Culture	36.5	63.5
Sports	42.8	57.2
Economy	57	43
Local reports	48.3	51.7
Letters to the Editor	51	49
Advertisements	45.7	54.3
Others	100	

Commentary Discusses Confederation

AU1303192590 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
9 Mar 90 p 1

[Igor Guzelj "Topic of the Day" commentary: "The Direction: Confederation"]

[Text] The SFRY Constitution and some federal laws of fateful importance for the country have for a year now resembled a timetable displayed at a bus stop that the buses have long stopped passing. Because the appropriate people do not react, only the question remains: Who is crazier, the one who asserts that nothing is wrong or the one who in spite of ascertained facts is waiting at the stop hoping for a miracle?

The Constitution and the laws are more and more a dead letter on paper because the SFRY Presidency, the SFRY Assembly, and the Federal Executive Council, because of their internal divisions of interests, are not capable of ensuring respect for them. The Serbian boycott of Slovenia is only the most blatant example. What is at least equally dangerous are public threats that real or artificially created interethnic conflicts anywhere in Yugoslavia will be solved according to the Kosovo recipe: with force. The process is under way, and therefore, the decision of the Slovene Assembly on an independent adoption of measures that are to ensure existential protection of our republic and its inhabitants is rather late than early. The situation in Yugoslavia is abysmally bad, and Serbia's holding back and its various diversions are beginning to infringe on the sovereignty and stifle the development of Slovenia. It is, therefore, inevitable that in addition to the measures adopted and to be adopted in self-defense, we also begin preparing for a confederal status within or without Yugoslavia, which as a spent federal creation obviously is not capable to offer satisfactory prospects to anybody.

Of course a confederation must not be just a cheap trump in anybody's election game. We may say that it demands an extremely serious approach: Before it becomes reality, we must know exactly what it is bringing us. This knowledge must be more precise than the knowledge provided by the answer to the question: What "surprise" awaits us if we remain on the ruins of AVNOJ [Anti- Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia.

Slivnik on Confederation Issue

AU1303163890 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
10 Mar 90 p 2

[Danilo Slivnik commentary: "Fasten Your Seat Belts, We Are Taking Off..."]

[Text] We do not know how you control yourself, because there is no general prescription for keeping your cool, but we can assure you that you will need control in the coming days because politically they will be extremely stormy. A response to our confederal challenge adopted by the Slovene Assembly on 8 March will come from the federation, and it will not be tender at all. It may well happen that they will hit us with some heavy federal weapon on this occasion, as they have tried in the past, particularly since one could already perceive calls in the Belgrade press yesterday that somebody should finally bang his fist on the table (and thus restore order in Slovenia).

It is nicer to write commentaries that deal with the past, but the events in the country have begun to develop with such speed that this time, for a change, we will deal with the future. We cannot predict it, just as you probably cannot, although we try to get out of the quandary in various ways, most frequently with extreme cynicism, which frequently infuriates the old political guard and drives our editors up the wall. Anyhow, it is a fact that the coming month, until the Slovene elections, will be decisive for a transition of Slovenia to democracy and no one can be excessively surprised if the advocates of state unitarianism will for the last time try to "intervene" in our republic during this time and to stop the coming changes. It is not just that they are worried about the "extreme Slovene scenario," which is to say secession, because theoretically everything is possible after the 8 March session of the Slovene Assembly, but they also fear the new Slovene authorities confirmed at legitimate elections, which will forever prevent any kind of federal operations to replace leaders under the motto, "poor leadership, good people...."

Of course, we do not want to frighten anybody, because the demand for a confederate status of Slovenia is the only useful answer to the situation in Yugoslavia, but at the same time we must well know that in this way we have opened a completely new political option in the country, an option that has not so far been recognized, and we are thus riding a tiger whose exact destination we do not know. We must cherish no illusions about Yugoslavia at present because it is a mixture of all possible politics in which conservativism is prevailing, and you cannot count upon reason anywhere, not even in the highest state leadership. Therefore, we will be predominantly left to ourselves in the coming days, but it is encouraging that with its 8 March step, Slovenia has overcome one of its weakest points in its policy so far: It has gone onto the political offensive on the Yugoslav scene and has thus protected its flanks, which until now have been constantly exposed to various federal political attacks and political intrigues under the Serbian or some other sign. This in itself means something, because it puts into proper perspective the bitter remarks made in the past few days to the effect that we are "so small (nationally), but so brave."

The strongest mitigating circumstance for us is, of course, that the political situation in Croatia changed considerably this week and that Zagreb, in fact, renounced any possible link with unitarian political forces. In this respect, we do not even think so much of the clearly expressed stand by the Croatian opposition that the Yugoslav state should be based on a confederation, as we do of the criticism addressed at the Markovic

government that showed that Zagreb has put an end to the illusions that "the most popular Croat" in the country, Ante Markovic, is automatically working for Croatia.... We do not know what they discussed with him behind closed doors and whether he succeeded in refuting the reproaches that Croatia in Yugoslavia is "fated to have Suvars all the time," but it was possible to deduce from the criticism that the republic does not intend to support the premier any longer unless his government makes appropriate corrections to some of its program premises. This, of course, is a great turn that makes for many radical changes in the country, but it heralds some new uncertainties in addition to the prospects that may be realized in the coming months.

Thus the time at present is, above all, the time of general readiness: We have decided on a project that our ancestors had considered, but did not know how to accomplish; we are on the way to provide an answer, but a number of other unforeseeable things may happen. In this connection, we also must not overlook some minor points, such as for instance the "mysterious behavior" of Zivko Pregl, Federal Executive Council vice president. This is always a good sign that the Federal Executive Council is again preparing something.... As one can hear in Ljubljana, Pregl is again rather "taciturn" these days....

Macedonian SAWP Elects New Officials

LD1303143690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1736 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Skopje, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—Kiro Popovski, member of the present Presidium of Macedonian Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP], has been elected the organization's president. Popovski was elected to the post today at an electoral session of the Macedonian SAWP Republican Conference. In a secret ballot he received 97 out of 100 possible votes.

Zejnel Begovic was elected the organization's secretary with 57 out of 100 possible votes. Begovic was also a member of the Macedonian SAWP Republican Conference Presidium.

By a majority vote, Cvetanka Ilijeva was elected president of the Conference for the Social Activity of Women of Macedonia. She is an editor with Skopje TV.

At today's session, the Macedonian SAWP Republican Conference also elected the organization's new Presidium, its delegation to the SAWPY Federal Conference, and members of the SAWPY Federal Conference Presidium from Macedonia.

The Macedonian SAWP Republican Conference today also endorsed a program of the organization's activities up to its transformation into an independent political party. The new leadership will carry out its duties until an electoral law is enforced transforming the Socialist Alliance into an independent socialist party.

Macedonian Action Movement Elects Chairman

LD1203102290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1545 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Skopje, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—In Skopje today at an electoral rally, the Movement for All-Macedonian Action [MAAK] in the presence of about 1,000 members and adherents, elected the prominent Macedonian writer and academic Dr. Gane Todorovski as its chairman. A program declaration of this movement, which will soon grow into a political party in the Soviet Republic of Macedonia, was also approved. MAAK advocates an AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia and in this framework also a federal system for the country. [passage omitted]

Macedonian Political Scene Viewed

AU1103181090 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3-4 Mar 90 p 2

[Dragan Nikolic article: "Public and Private Trials"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is being maintained that the "opposition" within the League of Communists [LC] of Macedonia has its "strongholds and troops" in the City Committee of the LC of Skopje, at the University of Skopje, in some committees in the interior, and even in the Central Committee itself. It can be heard in places that these are the "party warriors" of Milan Pancevski, whose candidate (Mihail Danev) was defeated at the 10th Congress of the LC of Macedonia, and "certain regret" can be felt for the good old days of "stringency within the party." For now, however, it is not certain that in Macedonia a rift could arise in the LC of Macedonia (between Social Democrats and orthodox Communists) even though these "currents" seem to be gradually being "articulated." It has not occurred to the Macedonian party leadership to "differentiate" their ideological opponents and then, according to old party practice, force them into "ideological isolation."

The leadership advocates "democratic unity within the party," in the framework of which "all 100 party currents" will have the right to flourish and only the one that receives a party majority will be responsible for the policy that the party advocates. The other currents would be "critical opponents." Only time will tell whether the formula of "democratic unity" will prevent a schism within the LC of Macedonia. As regards the Macedonian party leadership itself, it has finally overcome "party differentiations" and, in this connection, the persecution of "ideological opponents." It also declares itself to be against a resumption of the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] if all of its parts are not willing, because the "continuation of an incomplete congress" would be the beginning of the LCY splitting into two parties and the "party sanctioning" the country's division into two parts: "the north-west" and "the south-east." Petar

Gosev says that the present Macedonian party leadership will not participate in the task of splitting the party and the country.

Skopje City Committee President Todor Pelivanov, promoted as an opponent of "party radicalism," says that the 14th Congress should continue because even a "human organism lives if a part of it is amputated." He is against "driving" the party out of work collectives, that is to say, he is against the so-called "territorial principle" of party organization. If such a law is adopted, he supports illegal organization by the party in cells in enterprises, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia. He is against a party of 2 million being dictated to as to "what it will do and how it will do it." These parties "filch the program of the LCY" and "affirm themselves by cursing the party" that has allowed the Macedonians to express their national entity," and without which "they were nobodies, and without which they would again be nobodies." He is a critic of the commission of the LC of Macedonia Central Committee Presidium for social reform because "the non-Communists in it give advice to Communists on how to organize themselves," as well as of the press, because "it is only amenable to the stands and opinions of alternative groups."

The Theater Is Yet To Come

As regards the speech by Milan Pancevski at the last session of the LC of Macedonia Central Committee, the forum on whose behalf he was speaking, it is said that his "firm party stands" do not proceed from the programmatic document of the 10th LC of Macedonia Congress or even from the latest program for the resumption of the 14th Congress, which is proposed by the very forum that he heads. It is claimed that if only some of these new concessions by the party leadership of the country—which Pancevski disavowed in his speech—had been made at the 14th Congress, the work of the congress would not have been interrupted. Even at the session itself, Milan Pancevski was told that there had been enough differentiation in the LCY and enough anti-Communist anathemizing of its democratic current. Vanco Mladenov, member of the LC of Macedonia Central Committee, was brief: "I only want to tell the truth: For me the interruption of the Extraordinary 14th Congress quietly eliminated the LCY from the political stage. We must admit that the LCY ceased to exist from then on." Petar Gosev said that the LC of Macedonia should be "prepared to prolong and conduct" the LCY congress "if general agreement is reached among the republican organizations." However, it is believed in Macedonia that there will be no "general agreement" while Milan Pancevski is at the head of the party leadership of the country. This means—never, since it would supposedly never occur to him to submit his resignation.

While the LC of Macedonia is caught between "party democracy and party tyranny," MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] has been the "most successful" of the new parties. Some people say that this is a "nationalist movement" (that it aspires to "the spiritual unification of Macedonians"), but Ante Popovski, one of the initiators, tells us that it is quite the opposite—an "anti-nationalist movement." He says that this is a movement that "believes that a spiritual force exists that will overcome Balkan (anti-Macedonian) chauvinisms." However, democracy requires "much less poverty than presently exists in the Balkans." Ante Popovski tells us that the flag of MAAK with three colors (blue, mauve, and ocher and the work of the painter Petar Mazev) does not represent three Macedonias but the three dominant colors of Macedonian reality (sky, land, and national costume). MAAK is also not asking for the rehabilitation of the "victims" of recent Macedonian history but the truth about them so that there are no controversial personalities (for example, was Andrija Cipov—who died in poverty in Macedonia after the war—the secretary or general secretary of the Communist Party of Greece; was the trial of Cento, the first Macedonian president, fixed; was Satorov an orthodox Comintern supporter or traitor....).

As regards the "political testament" of the recently deceased MAAK member Kostadin Dinevski, which demands a "public trial for Kolisevski" (which was tumultuously applauded in the Assembly), Ante Popovski says that this is an "initiative by an individual and not an initiative of the movement until all facts have been examined."

Otherwise, MAAK wants the signs of barracks to be in Macedonian and the military oath to be taken in Macedonian, too.

The Macedonian "political theater" is obviously changing both time and habits. However, it seems to be doing this with difficulty, because "old party times and old party habits have supposedly grown up of their own accord" (they have not been imposed as in the communist countries of East Europe). It is said, for example, that "committee power" in the interior "has still not even been touched." Therefore, it seems that real reforming "political theater" is yet to come in Macedonia.

Macedonia's Gosev Discusses Future of LCY

AU0803161390 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 90 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Petar Gosev—Joint Decision-making"]

[Text] The Macedonian League of Communists is ready to make its full contribution to renew the organization and functional basis of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], but on the foundation of new programs and statutes.

In order to attain this goal, we are ready to welcome every form of constructive cooperation with all republican organizations together or individually. However, we responsibly point out that every hasty, inadequately

prepared, and uncoordinated decision on the part of republican party organizations could do irreparable damage to the Yugoslav character and integrity of the League of Communists.

We have received two proposals from party organizations in the communes. Some of them have advocated continuing the 14th Extraordinary Congress, and others call for a new, unnumbered congress to be organized. We must be prepared to accept both the continuation of the old congress, or the organization of a new one, insofar as we achieve the full agreement of the republican party organizations for a common basic program on decision-making in LCY organs, new statutory principles, and, above all, cadre decisions. In either case, we must support a decision to reduce the agenda, by, for example, adopting a declaration without controversial amendments, and making a decision to draft a new LCY program and a new statute and to elect new leaderships. However, both variants must involve a different kind of decision-making in LCY organs, including the congress itself.

Proceeding from the independence and equality of the republican party organizations, decisionmaking must be a joint matter, with full agreement and on the principle of the majority. Decisions regarding program documents, statutory regulations, the way LCY organs are constituted, and, especially, questions concerning the way the policy of national equality in Yugoslavia is carried out must be reached on the basis of full agreement. Besides this, as soon as agreement on these questions has been reached, it will be necessary for us, before the start of the congress, to prepare the appropriate statutes and procedural regulations that will enable decision-making to proceed in this way.

Serbian Council Accepts Plan for Kosovo

LD1303040690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1109 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Belgrade, 12 March (TANJUG)—The coming month is the time by which the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs should take urgent measures in order to establish the number of persons from Albania who are not citizens of the SFRY, and examine all cases of Albanian emigrants living in Kosovo who have abused the hospitality of our country, and in cooperation with the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs undertake the appropriate legal measures.

This is envisioned in the operative plan of the practical implementation of the program for achieving peace, freedom, equality, democracy, and prosperity in Kosovo, which was today accepted by the Executive Council of the Serbian Socialist Republic.

Paper Indicates Possible Rift in Serbian LC

AU1303115390 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 90 p 1

[TANJUG report: "Democratic Transformation of Party on Agenda"]

[Text] After fairly long preparations, the fourth session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia has been scheduled to take place on 13 March. As the announced agenda states, the discussion will be held on the proposed basic orientations of the League of Communists for operating under the conditions of political pluralism.

The highest organ of the League of Communists of Serbia will also discuss the question of the party's democratic transformation. The attempts will be made to put into practice the tenets of the 11th Congress of the Serbian Communists on a radical reform of the party and find answers to the questions that have arisen following the significant changes and novelties on the political map of Serbia and Yugoslavia on which alternative movements and parties are gaining more and more territory.

One of the questions that will be before the Communists of Serbia is the question of whether or not to change the party's name. So far the prevailing view has been that the essential question of the party's work is not in the name, but in the program, and that therefore one should direct energy to creating as substantive as possible a program and democratic relations in the party. The name should be retained, especially in view of the fact that the League of Communists, despite some significant failings, has achieved positive results in the past.

Recently, however, especially after the dramatic events in East Europe, and major changes in Yugoslavia, there has been an increasing number of views that the League of Communists of Serbia should change its name. A number of prominent Communists in Serbia have stressed that the original socialist ideas are deeply embodied in the being of the workers movement of this republic, recalling Svetozar Markovic and Dimitrije Tucovic [Serbian socialists at the turn of the century] and mentioning that they should be the inspiration for the transformation of the party.

The final answer to these questions should not be expected at the upcoming session of the Central Committee, but from a public debate that will be open in party organizations after this session.

As expected, the Central Committee session of the League of Communists of Serbia will also discuss the situation in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia after the adjournment of the 14th Extraordinary Congress.

Serbian LC Denies Report

AU1303150990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 90 p 3

[TANJUG report: "Statement by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia: Socialism Rich With Democracy"]

[Text] Belgrade—On 13 March, the Central Committee of the League of Communists [LC] of Serbia will discuss the basic orientations of the LC of Serbia as a modern political party in the conditions of a multiparty system.

The starting point of our program, the statement of the Serbian LC Central Committee Presidium points out, is the endeavor for socialism as a rich and democratic society, as an economically successful society, a society founded on the broadest possible freedoms and rights of citizens, on citizens' equality regardless of their national, religious, and political affiliation, on a democratic state governed by the rule of law, political pluralism, the mixed market economy, self-management, solidarity, and social justice.

The discussion will include the questions of the organization and application of modern methods for conducting activities, relations with other parties, and cooperation with the parties with similar orientations.

The discussion will also focus on our orientation toward an efficient and modern economy in the conditions of market and commodity production, the development of agriculture and rural areas, the freedoms and rights of citizens, self-management in enterprises, and in this connection the adoption of the new constitution of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The proposals concerning the basic orientations of the LC of Serbia will be discussed among the membership of the LC of Serbia and the public after the Central Committee session.

The transformation of the LC of Serbia into a modern political party in fact marks the beginning of the preparations for the new program and statute of the organization. They will almost certainly include the orientations, practice, and the new identity of the LC of Serbia that was created after the eighth session and 11th Congress. The approach of the LC is such that it assumes the decisive contribution and influence of the membership.

The Central Committee of the LC of Serbia will present its views on the document of the Central Committee Presidium of the LC of Yugoslavia, which contains questions and proposals concerning the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the LC of Yugoslavia.

At the 14th Extraordinary Congress, the LC of Yugoslavia raised the question of the name of the organization, at both the federal and republican levels. Democratic relations in the LC of Serbia assume that the decision on this issue can only be made by the membership. As regards the name, proceeding from the fact that a public debate about this open question among the members will offer the best answer and solution, the Central Committee Presidium of the LC of Serbia has not adopted a specific proposal for the Central Committee

In some reports that have recently been announcing the session of the LC of Serbia Central Committee, the question of the name was put in the foreground. TANJUG went the furthest. In a report carried yesterday, it completely arbitrarily, without asking the Central Committee for information, invented and suggested divisions in the LC of Serbia. This is otherwise something that is desired and counted on by the enemies of Serbia who have as their target the unity of the leadership of the LC of Serbia all the time. The mistake in this calculation is that it has been overlooked that we are talking about unity that is being democratically achieved, unity that has in the last 2 and one half years, after the eighth session, always been the expression of the tenets, mood, and will of the membership of the LC.

Serbian Alternative Parties Meet

LD1003150490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2252 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Belgrade, 5 March (TANJUG)—A meeting of the representatives of the alternative parties of Serbia, devoted to the question of Kosovo, began this evening with the ritual removal of Tito's picture from the wall above the chairman's table, and ended with the expulsion of Vuk Draskovic from the party of Serbian National Defense—something Draskovic did not accept.

The leaders of 11 alternative movements and parties set up over the last few months in Serbia took the floor in front of a packed hall in the Engineers' and Technicians' Club in Belgrade. The chairman of the meeting, writer Aleksandar Petrov, frequently called on the nervous and noisy public to calm down because it is precisely the goal of the meeting "to listen to all views in peace."

This, as they put it, "historical" meeting of noncommunist parties of Serbia was opened by Democratic Party of Freedom Secretary Dusan Boskovic demanding that Yugoslavia immediately break off diplomatic relations with the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, that the Kosovo Academy of Science be abolished, and that Serbs and Montenegrins return to their hearths. Boskovic's party proposes the unity of all parties in Serbia on the subject of Kosovo but "wishes never to collaborate" with Kosovo alternative groups.

A representative of the Peasants' and Workers' Party read a letter from Simo Dubajic that pays tribute to "the president of all Serbs," Slobodan Milosevic, which provoked rare whistling and a silence in the auditorium.

The audience reacted stormily to the plan to resolve the question of Kosovo that was stated by the leader of the Movement for Democratic Renewal, Srbobran Brankovic. He advocated that Albanian and Serbian leaders in Kosovo sit down at the same table and not get up until they reach an agreement.

In contrast to this, Vojislav Seselj received frenetic applause and shouts of approval when he expressed the demand of his party, the Serbian Freedom Movement, that a state of war be declared in Kosovo, that a military administration be introduced, that people be moved out of a 50-km zone along the border with Albania and that this area be placed under the control of the Army.

Speaking in support of the struggle for human rights, the majority of speakers called for the release from prisons in Kosovo of all political prisoners, including Azem Vlasi. All of them, with the exception of the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) representative, also called for the accountability of Josip Broz Tito for the situation in Kosovo, and for the accountability of the "Serbian collaborators," as they called them, who in their view are responsible for the tragic fate of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo.

Loudly applauded by his numerous supporters, Vuk Draskovic called for an end to the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. "If the Serbian National Renaissance wins in the elections, we will bring to trial all terrorists and those Albanians who have committed crimes against Serbs in Kosovo," he declared.

It is quite possible that Draskovic's statement that "we guarantee to the Albanian [shqiptar] minority all the rights enjoyed by Serbs" did not please the other leaders of the Serbian National Renaissance, since the party's chairman, Mirko Jovic, later proclaimed his expulsion from the Serbian National Renaissance, stumbling and explaining that "in this party not all are equal."

Draskovic immediately reacted saying that all this is "childish" and claiming that "the Serbian National Renaissance has 200,000 members who will elect their own leaders." Jovic said nothng in reply to Draskovic's self-confident remarks.

The representatives of other parties were much more moderate in their proposals for solving the Kosovo issue, for instance leaders of UJDI and of the Yugoslav Alliance were booed, though they managed to put forth their proposals.

Seselj's proposal on the unification of Serbian parties with regard to the Kosovo issue was accepted. The only issue that gained general consent was the one that Kosovo should remain within the framework of Serbia forever.

There was another conflict at the gathering, though there were no reactions from those present. National Radical Party representatives were represented by two leaders who represented two factions, because a few days ago this party with the longest tradition in Serbia—it was founded in the last century—was split.

Despite a considerable number of similar assessments on the need for fundamental changes in the policy on Kosovo and a fairly mild mention of the responsibility of the Serbian League of Communist, this meeting of Serbian alternative parties and movements did not come up with a concrete program of joint action. Only Seselj, Draskovic, Democratic Party of Freedom representatives, and the Liberal Party from Valjevo managed—shaking hands and kissing each other—to "cement" their decision on the future joint stand as far as Kosovo is concerned. Their "alliance"—at least that is the impression—was met with rather cold reactions by other party leaders. Seselj—as he said it himself—was annoyed by the program of the radicals and some other democratic parties because he found it too mild, while he rejected UJDI's "Kosovo initiatives" with strong words.

Serbian National Party Ignores Ban on Gathering

AU0803174590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 90 p 3

[B. Lazukic report: "If It Is Not the Croatian Democratic Community, Then It Is the Serbian National Renewal"]

[Excerpts] Novi Sad—Despite the official ban issued by the Zabalj Secretariat for Internal Affairs, the Serbian National Renewal presented itself to some 500 people of Curug the night before last. The announced meeting was supposed to be held in the cinema hall or the handball stadium, but shortly before the beginning (scheduled for 1630), Aleksandar Milin, the Serbian National Renewal's local committee president, was handed a document of the Zabalj Secretariat for Internal Affairs banning this meeting on the basis of the provisions of the law on public gatherings. However, one hour later the party did present its program aims in the open air, in Radnicka Street, in front of the house of the Curug local committee president, where an improvised sound system was installed.

It is interesting that neither the document on the ban of the meeting of the Serbian National Renewal in Curug, where a branch of this party was supposed to be set up, nor the presence of a fairly large number of patrol cars and militiamen swayed the gathered people from acquainting themselves with the program and activities of the Serbian National Renewal, and above all, from listening to Vuk Draskovic, who was on this occasion accompanied by his wife and Serbian National Renewal President Mirko Jovic. [passage omitted]

The first speaker Serbian National Renewal President Mirko Jovic, who said that since its founding (in Topola on 27 January) the party has founded 150 local committees and attracted nearly 300,000 members, and that branches are being found in Australia, Canada, the United States, and throughout Europe. [passage omitted]

After that the crowd was addressed by Vuk Draskovic, who was greeted with great enthusiasm. He, first of all, asked those present not to spoil the dignity of the meeting with banners, shouts, or booing, and to "remain worthy of the Serbian and St. Sava's traditions." And indeed, one could not see even a single banner nor hear

euphoric reaction except frantic rounds of applause with which Draskovic was frequently interrupted during his speech.

"Ever since the founding of our party, attempts have been made to present us as the counterpart to the Croatian Ustashas. This evening, many journalists came here hoping to find the similarity between the Serbian National Renewal and the Ustasha party of Franjo Tudjman. I have to tell them that this similarity does exist, that it exists to the more or less same extent that similarity, the equals sign, has existed since 1945 between Jasenovac [notorious World War II camp], that is, those who created Jasenovac and those who lost their lives in Jasenovac. There is the same similarity as that between the biggest cutthroat and quisling Ante Pavelic on the one hand, and General Mihajlovic on the other hand. There is the same kind of similarity between us and the Ustasha party, which presented itself in the Lisinski Hall in Zagreb, as there between the spiritual father of genocide, Alojz Stepinac, on whose grave Ustashas recently laid flowers, on the one hand, and our martyrs, patriarch Gavrilo Dozic and Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic, who spent World War II as German prisoners in a concentration camp on the other hand." [passage omitted]

Draskovic then went on to say: "It is a horrible thing, as Mr. Nijaz Durakovic, Central Committee president of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina was saying yesterday, that the emissaries of the Croatian Democratic Community roam through Bosnia, particularly through poor Muslim villages, offering German marks for the membership in the Croatian Democratic Community, offering money that God-knows-who provided, not for honest intentions, but for recruiting Ustasha janissaries. We must provide help to our Muslim brothers who are also threatened by the aspirations for a Pavelic Croatia. They must know that the Serbian people will not allow an exodus of anybody from the other side of the river Drina. [passage omitted]

Trifunovic Addresses Serbian LC

LD1602134390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1816 GMT 15 Feb 90

["Bogdan Trifunovic's Closing Address at Serbian LC CC Session"—TANJUG headline]

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—By its total policy and by all its new measures and those already initiated in the sphere of state legislation, economy, education, and so on the Socialist Republic [SR] of Serbia should again confirm that the settling of the situation in Kosovo, equality, a peaceful life of citizens, and economic progress are of vital importance for the republic as a whole. How else can modern economic development and democracy come into being in Serbia? How else can one have good international relations in Serbia, where substantial parts of other nationalities—that is, the most numerous ones—live? The Serbian LC [League of Communists] and the Republic of Serbia have firmly committed themselves to a modern market economy, democracy in socialism, and full national equality, Bogdan Trifunovic [president of the Serbian League of Communists] stressed in his closing address at today's session of the Serbian LC Central Committee.

Only malicious people can construe the theory that we are allegedly favoring the policy of repression in Kosovo, while they ostensibly advocate democracy. Neither the SR of Serbia nor the SFRY can or will allow the destruction of its constitutional order, the secession of any part of its territory, changing its borders, and terrorism, Trifunovic said.

The Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo is an inseparable part of this republic, part of its territory, where its citizens live and will live —that is, its citizens of different nationalities—in the conditions of full equality and equal and human and democratic rights. A modern and prosperous Kosovo is in the vital interests of the entire SR of Serbia. Everything we shall be doing will be to this end.

In the document we propose a number of significant measures for curbing the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins, the return of those who emigrated, and the arrival of those who want to work and live in Kosovo, Trifunovic said. He added that it is in the interest of the Albanian nationality, too, to have a peaceful shared life and legal order established at last to enable all in Kosovo and entire Serbia to focus on work, development, and progress.

Big and various investments in Kosovo are proposed: through big systems, new investments, communications, small businesses, scientific projects, and the development of education and health services. This is an opportunity for all young Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and others in Kosovo. Is there any need to convince anyone how difficult it is in this time of crisis to earmark funds for these purposes? The citizens of Serbia are, we believe, willing to do this and enable Kosovo to overcome its underdeveloped status but also its present crisis characterized not only by separatism and pressures but also by absenteeism, negligence, and the damaging of social property. The latter cannot be tolerated. No one from the outside will pay for absenteeism and chaos. The proposed measures are addressed to all who want to work and prosper in Kosovo, Trifunovic stressed.

The necessary state measures against the separatist rebellion in Kosovo, aimed at calming the situation and guaranteeing the personal security of all citizens and that of their property, question neither the firm orientation of the SR of Serbia toward democratic development nor the right of citizens to organize themselves politically in a free way according to the constitution and law in this part of the republic. A republican law will soon be passed. At least it is already clear that those political

parties and organizations whose activities aim to destroy the constitutional order of the SR of Serbia and the SFRY cannot be accepted.

The Kosovo LC will not have a monopolistic status. Being a multinational organization it will, however, undoubtedly advocate its solutions to the Kosovo crisis in the interest of all the nations and nationalities living there, their equal and peaceful life, and of Kosovo's modern development, despite the fact that today it is facing fierce pressures on the part of the nationalist and separatist forces.

Only the politically irresponsible or the people overwhelmed by their hatred of Serbia may claim that Kosovo is not a Yugoslav problem, Trifunovic underscored. Encouraging Albanian nationalism and separatism, through the renewned attacks from Slovenia and Croatia on the Yugoslav policy for Kosovo—that is, on the policy of the SR of Serbia—while qualifying it as a policy of repression cannot possibly be justified. The Serbian Republic can forgive no one such acts since this issue entails the fate of a great number of people and the country's most severe problem. I believe that an ever greater number of progressive people among the Albanians will condemn and reject these irresponsible and dangerous acts and toying with the Albanian nationality at the hands of certain people, attempting to drive it into a civil war and armed confrontations with our state. It is high time for this to be stopped. The unity of the implementation of the Yugoslav policy in Kosovo is the key prerequisite for its success.

We will do everything to make the people in Kosovo, in Yugoslavia, and abroad realize the following truth: While the Albanian separatist movement in Kosovo offers the Albanian nationality war, terrorism, and secession from Yugoslavia, the Serbian LC and the SR of Serbia offer a realistic program for peace, freedom, equality, democracy, and Kosovo's prosperity, Bogdan Trifunovic said as he brought his address to a close.

Serbia's Minic, Trifunovic, View Kosovo Problem

LD1602131490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2125 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia must tackle the problem of Kosovo urgently, effectively and integrally, so that genuine peace and democracy based on full national equality can be ensured in the Province, Milomir Minic, secretary of the League of Communists of Serbia Central Committee Presidency, said here on Thursday.

In his inaugural address at the Central Committee session, Minic condemned the attempts by Albanian separatists to create another Albanian state on Yugoslav territory and criticized "support which the separatists receive from the west of the country."

"There is no force which can take Kosovo from Serbia," emphasized Minic.

He proposed that the Yugoslav state take all the necessary state, political and economic measures to settle the Kosovo problem.

On the so-called positive programme of Kosovo's development, Minic described the action of resettling 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins in the province as particularly significant.

According to official data of the Yugoslav Government, about 260,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have moved out of Kosovo under pressure from Albanian chauvinists and separatists since World War Two.

A debate, in which over 40 Central Committee members took the floor, was summed up by Serbian Communist leader Bogdan Trifunovic, who said that the necessary state measures against the separatist policy in Kosovo would not jeopardize "Serbia's firm orientation towards a pluralistic and democratic development" or the citizens' right of "free political organization in conformity with the Constitution and the Law."

The Central Committee session ended by adopting a special document entitled "The League of Communists of Serbia for Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy and Prosperity of Kosovo."

The document calls for decisive and effective measures for the sake of peace, freedom and equality of all Kosovo citizens irrespective of national or religious affiliation. It also urges the elimination of effects of the unlawful and unjust acts committed over the past few decades against the Serbs and Montenegrins who were leaving their homes in large numbers under pressure from Albanian chauvinists and separatists and moving to other parts of Serbia.

The document says that the immigrants from Albania living illegally in Yugoslavia should be expelled.

Paying special attention to economic problems in Kosovo, it urges changes in its economic structure, integration of its economy into those of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and substantial investments into its mining, power industry and agriculture—the basic levers of the Province's economy.

The session also proposed the setting up of a republic fund to stop the exodus of Kosovo Serbs and help those who have left the province to return.

Serbian Group Protests to SFRY Presidency

LD2202204190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1911 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Pristina, 22 February (TANJUG)—Bozur, a section of the association for the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo, sent a protest to the SFRY Presidency today, which characterizes the introduction of the curfew in the province as "a political farce" which will resolve nothing because, it is alleged, the Albanian terrorists are organizing their actions in factories, mines,

schools, and the university during the day. In the protest, members of the association say that the presidency has once again assured them that it does not have sufficient courage to stop Yugoslavia being broken up over Kosovo.

The association energetically requests that, until new workers are employed, all enterprises in which there has been no work for several days be temporarily closed, that strikers be fired, and that their leaders be replaced. It is also requested that temporarily, at least for one year, Pristina University, which, it is alleged, is a stronghold of Albanian separatism, be closed down. The association requests that the student halls of residence be closed permanently.

It is also requested that, in addition to the emigrants who settled in Kosovo after 1948, 200,000 Albanians and their families—about whom, it is claimed, during the war they were settled by fascist Italy with the aim of creating a greater Albania—be expelled from Yugoslavia.

It is requested that the UN convention on terrorists be respected and that "all Albanian terrorists and their families" be expelled from Kosovo. The protest says that from 1968 to today they have worked to destroy Yugoslavia and have been soldiers of the Enver Hoxha regime.

Yugoslavia, they believe in Bozur, should urgently abandon any financing of Kosovo, because in this way Albanian separatism and terrorism is also financed. It is requested that the SFRY Presidency propose to the Assembly that money intended for Kosovo be channelled into the construction of new manufacturing plants.

Bozur draws attention to the fact that unless the Presidency adopts a standpoint on these demands within seven days, it will address the working class, students, and schoolchildren throughout Yugoslavia and come to an agreement with them on the measures which should be taken.

Bosnian SAWP Becomes Party, Hits Nationalism

AU0903091690 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[E. Demirovic, J. Custo report: "What to Call the Party"]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo—In its social character, the Socialist Alliance is an independent political organization with a left-wing, democratic, and socialist stance. Citizens, who make up the political base, regardless of their ideological convictions or national or confessional allegiances, may voice and present within the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] their personal or common immediate or long-term interests and needs that relate to society's social, material, and cultural development.

The Socialist Alliance will, equally with other parties, join the nomination process and elect its own candidates as representatives in assemblies, and will propose to citizens a program of social opinions, exercising democratic and public control of the work of office holders in the system of assemblies and state bodies.

These are the basic stands of the reform platform of the Bosnia and Hercegovina SAWP, examined today by the Republican Conference Presidium.

Apart from this, the platform elaborates many details and other aspects of the SAWP's work as a political party, equal to all other past, present, and future political organizations. Nevertheless, it especially stresses that the party will admit competition of programs and ideas and will work together with everybody, including alliances, associations, and movements thay do not wish, as groups, to become its members, but whose programs and goals are close to those of the SAWP.

The motto of the Socialist Alliance's political activity will be the struggle for democratic renewal, socialism, progress, democracy, a common life in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Yugoslavia, and for the widest possible individual rights and freedoms of people and citizens in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres, and elsewhere. The Bosnia and Hercegovina SAWP accepts and supports as its programmed goal the Federal Executive Council's program of measures designed to surmount the crisis and the situation in which we find ourselves. [passage omitted]

The session of the Bosnia and Hercegovina SAWP Republican Conference, among other things, condemned Tudjman's statement at the Croatian Democratic Community's conference. This conference went so far as to grossly misuse freedom of citizens' assembly and to threaten the territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the SFRY. It was stressed that Tudjman's speech and the general political and ideological direction of the Croatian Democratic Community and its leadership are in essence a resurgence of nationalism and a further spread of the nationalist, chauvinist, and hegemonic ideas of the Maspok movement of the seventies and the prewar and wartime years.

The view was taken that, under the guise of supposed demands for democracy and pluralism, the Croatian Democratic Community is in fact a murky appeal and an outright sellout of the borders within Yugoslavia, as well as being a reassertion of the Ustasa movement and the Independent State of Croatia. This program is directly against the historical interests of the Muslim, Serbian, Croatian, and other peoples and nationalities, whether in Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, or Yugoslavia.

Attempting to rehabilitate the so-called Independent State of Croatia, Tudjman and his fellow thinkers accuse Communists and Comrade Tito of every evil and every failure of our people in an attempt to sow discord. There is no place in their thinking for a federal, socialist Yugoslavia, for republics and provinces of any kind, and in particular for Bosnia and Hercegovina, which they

treat as Croatian territory. There is no place for individual peoples, and especially for Muslims, and the position of the Serbs both in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina is called into question. [passage omitted]

Montenegrin LC, Groups on Party Policy

LD1203000590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1151 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] Titograd, March 11 (TANJUG)—If the 14th Yugoslav party congress is not continued, the Montenegrin League of Communists will become an independent political party, Montenegrin party chief Milo Djukanovic said on Sunday in Danilovgrad, Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro.

If this happens, Djukanovic said, the Montenegrin party Central Committee will establish links with all political parties in the country which have opted for socialism, democracy and a Yugoslav federation.

The 14th special congress of the League of Communists [LC] of Yugoslavia (LCY) was broken off in January following a walkout by the Slovenian communists in protest against the defeat of their proposal on the transformation of the LCY into an alliance of independent republican-provincial parties.

The LCY Central Committee Presidency last Wednesday proposed that the 14th congress be resumed, but with a new program and organized according to new principles, thus rendering possible the participation of all parts of the party, including the LC of Slovenia-Democratic Renewal Party.

Miodrag Perovic, president of the republic's opposition group, the Democratic Alternative, told today's issue of the Montenegrin daily POBJEDA, that LC's national homogenization policy "necessarily produces fascist nationalists."

They should not be feared "if the economic reforms are successful and if the democratic opposition wins soon," he said.

"A democratic redefinition of Yugoslavia implies a state organized as a federation with the republics having some formal rights characterizing a confederation," Perovic said.

Adam Demaqi's Alleged Release Denied

LD1902125390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1040 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Zagreb, 19 Feb (TANJUG)—Adam Demaqi is still serving his term of imprisonment, amd as yet there is no official confirmation that his sentence has been reduced or terminated, or that he has been pardoned. A representative of the republican Secretariat for Justice and Administration told TANJUG today that Demaqi is still serving his term of imprisonment in Stara Gradiska.

The information about Demaqi's release from prison was reported yesterday by Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, president of the Croatian Committee for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, at that organization's founding assembly. On being directly asked by journalists there about the time of Demaqi's release Cicak specified that this took place three weeks ago.

Suvar 'Optimistic' About Reforms, Changes

AU2202094390 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 90 p 7

[G. Gojak report: "We Can Be Optimists"]

[Text] SFRY Presidency member Dr. Stipe Suvar addressed the delegates at the joint session of all three chambers of the Socialist Republic of Croatia held on 15 February. Speaking about the efforts of the Presidency that have been concentrated on strengthening and developing democratic changes and on the economic and political reforms, Stipe Suvar said that he thought that the initiatives with which the Presidency had approached the Federal Assembly regarding acceptance and entry in the Council of Europe and those concerning the adoption of a new constitution and support for the economic policy of the Federal Executive Council, as well as the stands and measures concerning Kosovo, clearly reflect the commitment to our country finding a place and role in Europe, to Yugoslavia being structured as a modern and democratic state, to preserving the identity and equality of all peoples and nationalities, to the statehood and sovereignty of the republics and to the real autonomy of the provinces, to multiparty political pluralism, and to the full freedoms and rights of individuals, which should all lead to a democratic socialist society.

In this sense, one should abandon many old dogmas and not fall slave to new ones, Stipe Suvar said. On the basis of the now-already-completed positive program and despite all differences in outlook, conflicting interests, and even sharp political confrontations accompanied by campaigns of accusations and invoking the people and nations, we can be optimists and, if we persist in the program of economic stabilization that was conceptualized by the Federal Executive Council, we will soon be able to count on economic recovery and a new cycle of development.

It is quite certain that the great majority of people in our country are committed to this even though they are still fearful. Hawks and storm troopers are increasingly losing ground, regardless of which nation or republic they come from. Not even all the "old" and "new" nationalist leaders who are now renewing national myths and obsessions and threatening division and delineation in the name of one or other people will probably succeed in making us suffer again, said Stipe Suvar. It is also not necessary to mention how important relations between the Croats and Serbs, particularly in Croatia, are for the stability of Croatia and Yugoslavia. Everything should be done to surmount the certain shifts in these relations that arise in some communities.

In the Socialist Republic of Croatia, if I can say this, there really should be a thorough orientation toward new developmental projects and new production methods that will have a chance on the Yugoslav, European, and world markets, Suvar said, mentioning that we need another 10 years for the reform to take deeper root. Furthermore, as the member of the SFRY Presidency from the Socialist Republic of Croatia, I think that accusations about Croatia supposedly betraying Yugoslavia have no justification and are in fact shameful. This also relates to such accusations that are leveled at our other peoples and republics.

He then recalled the session of the Presidency two days ago at which it was decided to formulate a totally operative program of short-term and long-term policy so that much of this can happen in Kosovo in a way that we all want. It seems to me that we all realize too that Kosovo cannot remain outside the democratic processes in the whole country and outside the pluralist currents as some kind of isolated area, and that the struggle for real democracy, which certainly assumes the elimination of all violence, is the main and ultimate cure even for the serious ills of Kosovo. Finally, he summed up that the Presidency's activities are directed in three basic directions: economic reform, the new constitution, and entry into European integrational institutions.

Croatian Daily Views 'Enemies' in Kosovo

AU2302090990 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 90 p 1

[Branko Podgornik commentary: "Enemies"]

[Text] Some people have estimated that about 40,000 Albanians have recently left the League of Communists in Kosovo. If this continues, the membership of the ruling "cohesive force" of Yugoslav society will soon have been halved in this province.

Even though people are increasingly leaving the party in other parts of Yugoslavia too, not one single party leadership has so far interpreted this as "desertion" and "the expression of solidarity with the unacceptable demands of enemies of all hues." But this is the way that this has been assessed by the party committee in Titova Mitrovica and the leaderships of the League of Communists and the trade union (!) in the Trepca enterprise, where around 330 members have either left the League of Communists in the last few days or announced their intention to do so.

Moreover, the party leaderships of this commune have warned that none of the "deserters" can remain in an electoral post and have made it known that the interminable spiral of "differentiation" in the province is being deepened—even if the League of Communists were to lose its last member—particularly among the ranks of the Albanian nationality.

After the most recent demonstrations in Kosovo, it would be wrong to think that the fiasco that the League of Communists is experiencing in Kosovo is only the result of erroneous policy in the sphere of interethnic relations, as seems at first glance. It is obvious that dialogue in Kosovo is not even possible under the patronage of the party leadership, which is one of the last Mohicans in Europe trying to forcibly prevent democracy.

Let us try to be realistic. There has been separatism and nationalism among the Kosovo Albanians for years. This will certainly continue to exist in the future, regardless of whether force or even (inevitable) democracy prevails in Kosovo. Various forms of national extremism have most often continually existed in every nation and they are particularly fertile when social, economic, and political life is at a low level.

If, however, there continue to be attempts in Kosovo to use force to restrain not only extremists and terrorists but also the democratic aspirations of the people who live there, it is certain that the number of the former—enemies of this state—will be constantly increasing in the province. Some people say that this would be particularly dangerous if Albania were to be overtaken by a sudden wave of democratic changes.

The solution should then be clear to every reasonable person. The time is overdue for friends to be sought in Kosovo but definitely without the help of those who do not know—even now that the 11th hour struck a long time ago—how to do anything but increase the number of their enemies.

Presidency Examines Economic Reform Results

LD2202220690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1408 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade, 21 February (TANJUG)—During the SFRY Presidency session today, chaired by President Dr. Janez Drnovsek, there was a briefing on the initial results of the economic reform and anti-inflationary measures.

On the basis of introductory reports by Ante Markovic, president, and Bozidar Marendic, a member of the Federal Executive Council, and of the discussion, the SFRY Presidency noted that positive initial results have been attained, especially on slowing down the growth of prices, foreign currency reserves, economic relations with other foreign countries, and prompter discharge of the commitments implicit in the federal budget.

Some negative developments, too, have been pointed out, says the statement issued from the session, especially in the area of distribution of personal income and monetary policy, and in the need for measures to be taken to curb these developments, especially since we are now entering a decisive phase in the economic reform.

The SFRY Presidency stresses that anti-inflationary measures and the economic reform in the program must be implemented in the direction of a faster restructuring of the economy and its adaptation to market economy methods must be resolutely insisted on. In this context,

specific adjustments to the measures that have been implemented have to be undertaken. These adjustments will make it easier to surmount the difficulties emerging in daily routine with the proviso that the basic concept of the reform should not be deviated from.

Newspaper on Revision of Penal Code

LD1602142990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1100 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 16 (TANJUG)—Democratization in Yugoslavia spreads to cover criminal legislation and a few days ago the federal parliament opened the process of revising the penal code during which what is termed "political delicts" will be abolished.

Followng years of polemics and disputes, especially in the past two years, the federal parliament decided to strike out from the penal code the article on "verbal delicts" and to re-phrase the crime of "counter-revolutionary endangering of social order" into the "attack on constitutional order" which will be applied only to the crimes of forcible destruction of social order and the overthrow of the supreme organs of authority.

It remains unknown as yet how the said "dis-ideologization" of the legislation would affect the trial of ex-president of the party in the Kosovo Province, Albanian Azem Vlasi, who is being tried under charges for instigating bloody unrests of Albanian separatists last year on the basis of the penal code article on the "counter-revolutionary endangering of social order."

In reviewing an initiative from the Republic of Slovenia for the abolition of capital punishment, the Yugoslav parliament ruled that the final decision on this proposal should be carried in several months, because such a decision required an overall reforming of the punitive policy and system. But capital punishment may be expected to be abolished, or limited to certain exceptional situations like the state of war. Capital punishment has so far been very seldom applied in Yugoslavia.

Vasic Calls for Trade Union Autonomy

LD2202205790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1738 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG)—The trade union organization must not be either part or extension of any political organization or party—Andjelko Vasic, president of the Yugoslav T.U. Council, has told TANJUG in explaining his organization's announced withdrawal from the political and Assembly institutions.

He said the t.u. would no longer participate either in signing what is termed "social compacts" on the cadre policy that most directly ensured the League of Communists' (LC) monopoly over t.u. cadres.

The transformation, said Vasic, mirrors the membership's desire and the need for the trade unions to become an independent and autonomous interest organization.

Vasic stressed the t.u. organization must adapt itself to the conditions of market-oriented economic activity and political pluralism, meaning that the workers' organization must not be politicized.

Vasic also assessed that the experience gained by independent trade unions emerging across Yugoslavia was precious for the present t.u. organization.

The emergent trade unions primarily resulted from workers' discontent with the hitherto activities of the t.u. organization, and hence dialogues had to be held with them for best solutions to be reached from authentic experience, Vasic said.

Federal Chamber on Changes, Rights in Bulgaria

AU1602151090 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 90 p 3

[Unattributed report on session of the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly held on 14 February in Belgrade: "Support for the Changes in Bulgaria"]

[Text] At the request of Aleksandar Simovic, the Federal Chamber made the last point on the agenda the proposal that the SFRY Assembly address the Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria regarding the current events in the country.

In this connection, the Committee for Foreign Policy proposed to the Federal Chamber a "version" of the possible message—whose final form will be decided upon by the Federal Chamber delegates—which says that the Yugoslav public and the SFRY Assembly see the current political changes in Bulgaria as part of the wider democratic changes that have encompassed a large part of the European continent.

The Yugoslav public has welcomed the decisions of the new Bulgarian leadership on recognizing the rights of the ethnic minorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which is the case with the ethnic Turkish minority.

In this regard, the SFRY Assembly sincerely hopes and expects that the new democratic authorities in the People's Republic of Bulgaria will again permit the ethnic Macedonian minority to express its national and cultural identity and enjoy all rights.

Albania's Malile Stops in Skopje

AU1203185690 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Albanian Foreign Minister Reis Malile is visiting Bulgaria. On his way to Bulgaria, Malile made a brief stop in Skopje where he held talks with Boris (?Regalovski), Macedonia's secretary for foreign relations.

TANJUG reports that the Albanian foreign minister also held a brief talk with Tito Belicanec, vice president of the Macedonian Assembly Executive Council.